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Dynamics of authoritarian political system: The Fourth Republic of South Korea

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Dynamics of Authoritarian Political System: The Fourth Republic of South Korea

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by

Sung Chull Kim

Dissertation Committee:

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

Committee Chair

University of California, Irvine

1991

To my mother and the memory of my father

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ABBREVIATIONS

CRC	Council on Revision of Constitution
DRP	Democratic Republican Party
DUP	Democratic Unification Party
FKTU	Federation of Korean Trade Unions
FNCM	Factory New Community Movement
JIH	Joint Investigation Headquarters
JOC	Jeunese Ouvriers Catholiques (Young Catholic Workers)
KCAO	Korea Christian Action Organization
KCIA	Korean Central Intelligence Agency
KSCF	Korea Student Christian Federation
KWP	Korean Workers' Party
LCNS	Legislative Council for National Security
LMC	Labor-Management Council
LSMSN	Law of Special Measures for Security of Nation
MLD	Martial Law Decree
MSCA	Military Security Commanding Agency
NAD	National Alliance for Democracy
NADU	National Alliance for Democracy and Unification
NCCK	National Council of Churches in Korea
NCPCRJ	National Catholic Priests' Corps for Realization of Justice
NCRD	National Congress for Restoration of Democracy
NCU	National Conference for Unification
NDP	New Democratic Party
NFDYS	National Federation of Democratic Youths and Students
NUTW	National Union of Textile Workers
PEM	Presidential Emergency Measure
PRP	People's Revolutionary Party
PSF	Presidential Security Force
SCNSM	Special Committee for National Security Measures
SCRC	Special Committee for Revision of Constitution
UIM	Urban Industrial Mission

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Dynamics of Authoritarian Political System:
The Fourth Republic of South Korea

by

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Professor David Easton, Chair

The purposes of this research are to develop a generalization for the study of the dynamics of the authoritarian political system in developing societies and then apply it to analyze the case of the Fourth Republic of South Korea. It examines the 'legitimacy crisis' and the 'intervening mechanism' for a regime change (or no change).

In the authoritarian system, a legitimacy crisis develops when two junctures come about: diversification of the object of opposition from the political authorities and the authority structure around them to all the elements of the regime, including the legitimating values; and the political activation of labor, the social group which has contributed to the achievement of the legitimating values but whose interests have been neglected.

A legitimacy crisis does not automatically lead to a regime change.

There exists an intervening mechanism, which means that the relationship among subsystems of the political system will decide the path of dynamics of the authoritarian regime. Depending upon how the essential subsystems -- the political authorities, the military and the opposition -- are related to one another, they produce eight different models. Each model produces a certain level of system stress and transforms to another while decreasing the level of stress. Finally, the system reaches one of the two destination models either for a regime change or no change.

The authoritarian regime in South Korea experienced the diversification of the object of opposition and reached a legitimacy crisis at the end of 1970s. Shortly after the assassination of President Park, the system under a legitimacy crisis produced a very high level of system stress, because of the radical stance of the opposition and of the incompatibility between the newly emerged hard-line military and the cautious but conciliatory political authorities. This unstable model of relationship transformed through the two following steps: the military's overwhelming of the authorities, as seen in the declaration of nationwide martial law; and the military's repression of the radical opposition in the Kwangju Popular Uprising.

PART I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1. THE DYNAMICS OF AN AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The purposes of this research are to develop a generalization for the study of the dynamics of authoritarian political systems in developing societies and then apply it to analyze the case of the South Korean authoritarian system. Instead of modifying any existing theory and applying it to the Korean case, this research will develop a generalization under the umbrella of systems analysis. For these purposes, this part will focus on the following points. First, it will introduce the discussion about how political science can become a scientific discipline, in order to overcome the problems derived from conceptual confusion and from inductive methods in its inquiry. Second, it will examine the concept of political change based on its domain such as political authorities, regime, and political community. Third, it will develop a model of change (or no change) of authoritarian systems in a developing society. Here the change particularly refers to a transition in the form of political system, i.e., regime. It will explain 'legitimacy crisis' as a condition and then explore the 'intervening mechanism' for a regime change (or no change). By the intervening mechanism is meant the relationship among subsystems of the political system, which will decide the path of the dynamics of the authoritarian regime.

(1) POLITICAL INQUIRY AS A SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE

In spite of strenuous efforts made by the mentors of modern

political science, contemporary political science is still too immature to be a scientific discipline. This is so not only because students of political science have not seriously assessed the mentors' contribution or ignored it, but also because political science has suffered from a confusion of concepts and lack of generalization based on deductive methods in the process of building theories. For instance, political science has developed hypotheses around such concepts as the state, revolution and change in comparative politics in particular, but due to their unclear notions they become historically limited concepts and change in their meanings over time.[1] Such situation by and large interferes with understanding of politics in a systematic way.

In the study of politics, a scientific understanding is needed so as to present orderly facts and reasonings about a certain subject. Here we should ask how social inquiry in general and political inquiry in particular can be established as a scientific discipline. Specifically, what distinguishes social and political inquiry from natural science? Does distinctiveness of subject matters in social and political inquiry necessarily prevent us from attaining generalizations? How do we succeed in arriving at a good generalization? These questions remind us, first of all, that science makes use of the method which consists in offering deductive non-observational statements and testing them. The method is called 'hypothetical deduction', for its statements retain the character of tentative hypotheses until they pass a great

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[1]For the case of revolution, see James Farr, "Historical Concepts in Political Science: The Case of 'Revolution'," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 26, no. 4 (November 1982), pp. 688-708.

number of severe tests.[2] Philosophers of science like Karl R. Popper and Carl G. Hempel take the viewpoint that the hypothetical deductive method may be used in social inquiry as well as natural science. Particularly, Popper has proposed the unity of method in the sense that theoretical inquiry uses the hypothetical deductive method whether it is natural or social inquiry. Furthermore, he has criticized the widely held prejudice that social inquiry is more complex than physical inquiry. He has maintained that social phenomena in general are less complicated than physical phenomena. This is so because there is an element of rationality in most social situations, which make it possible to construct simple models of interrelationships of human beings.[3] Hempel also has stressed a need for unity of method, stating that there is "no general agreement on precisely where the dividing line is to be drawn" between social sciences and natural sciences.[4]

Of course, some may argue that social and political phenomena are qualitatively different from natural phenomena and that the naturalist scientific method cannot be employed in social inquiry. According to this argument, the most distinctive characteristic trait of social and political inquiry is that human actions are intentional and express purposes and meanings of actors. Thus they may insist that research of human actions needs an interpretative method, because the researcher has

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[2]Karl R. Popper, "Utility of Method in the Natural and Social Sciences," in David Braybrooke, ed., *Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 33.

[3]*Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

[4]Carl G. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 1.

to understand the meanings of actions and interpret their significance in terms of actor's intentions.[5] Despite such distinctiveness, however, the naturalist scientific method can and should be employed in social and political inquiry. The interpretation of particular human actions is tied to explication of particular phenomena only. The gross characteristics of social and political entities, which we are interested in, rarely correspond to intentions of anyone.[6] Aggregation of particular actions cannot provide us with systemic explanation of the characteristics of a social and political entity as a whole. For example, intentional actions of bureaucrats who were involved in Iran-Contra Affair had a result none of the actors intended. Regardless of the credibility of their statements in Congressional hearings, interpretation of each bureaucrat's intention hardly provides any explanation of the overall characteristics of Iran-Contra Affair.

For systemic understanding of social and political entity, we need a generalization, which states relationships among actions or behavior of individuals and groups, through a hypothetical deductive method. Such generalization basically opposes the assumption according to which one has to decompose an entity into its parts in order to understand it as a whole.[7] Then, a generalization should have the characteristics of

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[5]Donald J. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby eds., *Political Science: Scope and Theory* (vol. 1 of *Handbook of Political Science*) (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 132-3.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 183.

[7]For the discussion of problems of such type of research, see David Easton, *The Analysis of Political Structure* (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 142-3.

reliability, validity and parsimony. A generalization has to help us explain associated variables of indefinite numbers of cases with validity; at the same time, it should be simple and economic. In other words, a generalization yields a valid explanation of a certain subject matter without adding inconsistent postulates and without sacrificing parsimony.[8] A possible problem we may face is that these two traits of the generalization -- parsimony and validity -- are not easily compatible with one another, since a high degree of simplicity accompanies a high degree of falsifiability.[9] Although simple generalization gives us more empirical content and is more testable, its validity may be questioned when particular examples are inconsistent with the generalization. In this case one tends to adjust the generalization to particular examples by simply adding other postulates; as a result, the generalization may become more complex, and thus it fails to meet with parsimony.

How do we avoid this complexity, keeping the consistency of the generalization in political and social inquiry? Imre Lakatos' research program is instructive regarding this question. His research program is characterized by a hard core (negative heuristic) and protective belts of auxiliary hypotheses and theories (positive heuristic). The hard core consists of unchangeable basic generalizations, whereas the protective belts are composed of a particularly articulated set of

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[8]Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Strategies of Inquiry* (vol. 7 of *Handbook of Political Science*) (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 86-92.

[9]Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science*, p. 44.

hypotheses which confront a number of particular cases.[10] The research program may save the hard core of the basic conceptualizing of social and political entities not by piling up hypotheses at the cost of increasing complexity, but by proposing supporting hypotheses at a lower level than the hard core. That is, a hard core and protective belts compose two different levels of generalization.

To sum up, political inquiry, as a part of social inquiry, should attain generalizations through a hypothetical deductive method so as to become a scientific discipline. Generalizations should have two levels: At the higher level, a basic conceptual framework about the operation of politics in general; and at the lower level, practical analyses of certain aspects of political process, structure, change and so on. In this context, this research attempts to explore a generalization at a lower level, which deals with changes of an authoritarian political system. This lower level generalization is based upon the conceptual framework which has been developed in systems analysis.

(2) DOMAINS OF POLITICAL CHANGE

Systematic understanding of political change needs examination of the 'domains' of the change which has rarely caught the attention of scholars in the political science community. This is so due to the fact that with the understanding of the domains of political change, we can identify where our research is located in an analytical sense and

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[10]Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 133-8.

identify what domain of political change the opposition aims at in empirical study. The political change that has been studied by political scientists ranges from radical transformation to evolutionary or incremental transition, based on the pace of the process. Theories of revolution investigate radical transformation of a political system or a society as a whole, whereas developmental theories illustrate evolutionary processes of political change. Along with such theories of political change, however, we should analyze domains of political change since a study of change necessarily has to question and probe what political entity changes.

According to David Easton, the domains of political change are political authorities, regime and political community.[11] These domains correspond to the objects of support that is a component of input.[12] First, changes of the authorities occur frequently. Occupants of authority roles are replaced by others either through an institutionalized way of selection, i.e., election, or through conflict among individuals or groups such as military coups. Whatever the means of a change may be, a change of political authorities does not necessarily bring a shift in the characteristic mode of interaction by which a political system operates, namely the form of political system or the regime.

Second, a change of the regime sometimes takes place. The regime

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[11]David Easton, "Systems Analysis and Its Classical Critics," *Political Science Reviewer*, vol. 3 (Fall 1973), pp. 295-300.

[12]For the objects of support, see David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; originally published in 1965), Chapters 11, 12 and 13.

change leads to fundamental alteration of the mode of interaction. Not only are political authorities replaced but also the values, norms and structure of a given regime are transformed. Accordingly, members of the new regime interact in a quite different way from those in the previous one. Such change frequently occurs through a revolution.

But we cannot equate regime change to revolution. Here we should discriminate between the two concepts. On the one hand, revolution implies transformation of the characteristic mode of social relationships as a whole. Through revolution all the privileges of a previously dominant group are removed, and new political and social values and norms are established. Thus the concept has caught the attention of social scientists and historians as well. On the other hand, the notion of regime change has to be confined to the political realm only. The regime means a general matrix of goals, norms and structure of authority. The regime "limits and validates political actions" and thus "provides a context for political relationships."[13] Therefore, regime change brings a substantive alteration only in the mode of political relationships.

Revolution may be a typical means of a change of regime; however, it is not the only means of change. The rise of authoritarian regimes by the military in developing societies in Latin America and Asia during the sixties and the seventies is another case of regime change. Without mass mobilization of particular social groups, the regime can be shifted by the replacement of top political authorities and by the following

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[13]*Ibid.*, p. 193.

alteration of authority structure and structure of the regime.[14] As soon as the structure of the regime is changed, new political authorities are able to impose their own values and norms or rules of the game in politics. Thus, unlike revolution which usually accompanies mass mobilization and collective violence, a change of the regime from an unstable democratic one to an authoritarian one, in many developing societies, is led by the replacement of existing political authorities by military officers and the latter's alteration of the given regime structure. What we should note here is that the regime changes only when new political authorities have a capacity for a successful shift of the structure of the regime. A military coup which has overthrown the existing junta does not bring a change of the regime but simply represents replacement of temporary occupants of political roles. In this case, the coup brings about a change of the political authorities only.

Whatever the means of the change may be, a change of the regime in general brings about transformation of any given 'form of the political system'. The transformation yields a quite different rule of converting inputs into outputs (i.e., decisions and policies) from that of the previous regime and provides a new context of political relationships. A change of the regime usually accompanies replacement of political authorities, since the former is more inclusive than the latter in the

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[14]For the notion, see Easton, *Political Structure*, pp. 12-3. The structure of the regime includes not only patterns of relationships among political authorities but also those between political authorities and other members of the political system. It is a more inclusive notion than the authority structure which defines the relationships among political authorities only.

domain of change. Studies in political science on such topics as revolution, democratization, and breakdown of democracy usually examine variables and processes of regime change. As we will see later, this research focuses on a change of the regime.

Third, a change of the political community may occur even though it is not frequent. Such change takes place when the people under the existing regime no longer share a common political life. Many independent political systems after the end of World War II have shown cases of the change in political community. But the political community may also change through a civil war or secession from the existing political community. Civil war is a case of division and contradiction between two political communities, whatever its consequence may be. During the period of civil war, each political community does not regard any decision made by the other one as authoritative or binding; furthermore, the two communities conflict and try ultimately to eliminate the other. On the other hand, secession is understood as a restoration of the old political community or the creation of a new political community, which ceases to be part of the existing given political community. The change of the political community is the most inclusive one. It brings about a change of the authorities and of the regime at the same time.

(3) CHANGE IN AN AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

After analyzing domains of the political change, it is natural for us to address the question: What are the conditions of such changes? With special reference to regime change, on which special attention is

paid by many scholars, this general question leads to more practical ones in comparative politics: What has led unstable democratic systems in Latin America and Asia into authoritarian ones during the sixties and the seventies? What are the variables for the transition from authoritarian systems in Latin America and Asia into democratic ones? How does (or does not) the regime change? Regarding these questions, two concepts will be explored in this section: One is 'legitimacy crisis', and the other is an 'intervening mechanism' which will decide the path of the change (or no change).

Legitimacy Crisis

Decline of compliance to an existing regime is the most obvious condition for regime change. Thus, we should question the bases on which the people comply with the decisions and policies made by the political authorities. In general, compliance of members of a society with the political authorities and with requirements of the given regime comes from the two bases: The first is legitimacy, referring to the convictions of the members that the existing regime and the political authorities are morally right and binding;[15] and the second is use of coercion by the political authorities for generating fear of insecurity among the society's members. Every system employs a combination of the two bases to maintain compliance. The particular mixture varies according to the form of the system and changes from time to time within any one system.[16] Generally, non-democratic systems, including

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[15]Easton, *Systems Analysis*, pp. 278-80.

[16]*Ibid.*, p. 285.

authoritarian systems, heavily rely upon the latter base for acquiring compliance, in comparison to democratic systems.

What should be noted is that the political system hardly manages to persist without a certain extent of legitimacy, whatever the form of the system may be. For legitimacy is the most important source of diffuse support by which members of the system attach unconditionally to political authorities and the regime without any direct benefits. Without legitimacy and, in turn, without diffuse support, the political system has to face voluminous discontent from members of the system on every single decision or policy produced by the political authorities in daily politics. The authoritarian system is not an exception.

Each political system has 'legitimating values' whereby the political authorities, and structures of the regime are rationalized. Particularly, in an authoritarian system of a developing society, the values are usually initiated and rationalized by the political authorities.[17] The values are not an appeal to a set of existing predispositions but policy orientation of the authorities to direct a new change. Here follows a question: how are such values accepted by the people in an authoritarian system? First, if the political authorities are incumbents of a previous regime, their past performances may contribute to popular acceptance. Especially when the values match the performances, they can successfully induce some extent of legitimacy. We can find such an example in the authoritarian system of

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[17]In an analysis of politics in Asian emergency regimes, Jyotirindra Das Gupta has called such a way of establishment of the legitimacy 'top-down legitimation'. See "A season of Caesars: Emergency Regimes and Development Politics in Asia," *Asian Survey*, vol. 18, no. 4 (April 1978), p. 321.

the Philippines and South Korea. Ferdinand Marcos and Park Chung Hee showed their competence in revitalizing their underdeveloped societies during the earlier period of their presidencies, and they succeeded in generating a certain extent of conviction about the newly proposed legitimating values. Second, a psychological factor may be conducive to the acceptance of the legitimating values. A eroding sense of obligation to the previous political authorities or regime leaves attitudes of free floating obedience. New political authorities can easily make use of the loosened attitudes for the acquisition of the acceptance.[18] Such a psychological factor is particularly important when the social situation is unstable. Communist insurgency, ethnic strife, regional conflict and economic crisis bring fears of uncertainty about the future and give opportunities to new occupants or incumbents of authority roles for taking advantage of inducing a sense of crisis. In turn, such a psychology leads the attitudes of free floating obedience to convictions that new values proposed by them are right and binding.

Then, how effectively do the legitimating values induce matching actions by the members of the authoritarian system in a developing society? This question is significant since the convictions of people to accept the legitimating values of the authorities and the regime are not automatically accompanied by corresponding actions. Effectiveness of the values to mobilize actions largely relies upon properties of the values. On the one hand, the legitimating values of the authoritarian system are composed of idea sets which are not complex but lack a

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[18]Easton, *Systems Analysis*, p. 309.

linkage among them. They fail to penetrate into a circle of intellectuals who can contribute to developing or modifying them for an application to a certain historical juncture. Thus political authorities in the authoritarian system have to encounter difficulties in finding those who are armed with legitimating values and actively participate in politics as an end in itself rather than as a means for immediate benefit.[19]

On the other hand, more importantly, the legitimating values in the authoritarian system have a property of 'political deactivation' of the members of a society, particularly the labor force. By comparing the contemporary authoritarian system with the totalitarian system in Stalin or Mao's era, we can identify this property more clearly. At the beginning of new regimes in the Soviet Union and China, Marxism-Leninism and Maoism activated and politicized peasants, along with party cadres and intellectuals, in the processes of land reform and agricultural collectivization. Characteristics of the legitimating values in these systems were extremely radical and destructive. In contrast, there exists little evidence that the values in the authoritarian system -- such as continuous economic growth (or modernization) and national security -- are designed to politicize the people.[20]

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[19]For this reason, Juan J. Linz stressed absence of ideology in the authoritarian system. However, it is important for us to identify what is the substance of the values defined by the political authorities rather than to conclude as to whether there exists ideology or not in authoritarian systems. See "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Macropolitical Theory* (vol. 3 of *Handbook of Political Science*) (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

[20]For this reason, Fernando Henrique Cardoso has noted that authoritarian regimes differ from classical European fascism also. See "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," in

If we interpret these values from the perspective of Guillermo A. O'Donnell, they may be a manifestation of agreement among bureaucrats based on the military, local capitalists, and transnational capitalists, all of whom strive to depoliticize the members of society and then to overcome the crisis that originates from lack of 'deepening' in the structure of industry. Accordingly, the legitimating values such as national security and economic development are avowed and explicit values presented by the political authorities. The political authorities' implicit values lie in the maintenance of the political offices and prolongation of political life, while making mutual benefits with local and international capitalists. The latter are incapable of imposing their interests without depending on the power of the former. That is, the latter has to rely upon the former not only for the means of violence so as to deactivate labor but also for the allocation and inflow of capital in the age of increasing interdependence and division of labor in the international economy.[21] On the other hand, the political authorities should depend upon the capitalists for the legitimation of the regime values through increasing economic indicators. However, with this exception, in general the legitimacy of

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David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 37.

[21]For the discussion of the relative weakness of the bourgeoisie in authoritarian regimes, see Philippe Faucher, "The Paradise That Never Was: The Breakdown of the Brazilian Authoritarian Order," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Philippe Faucher, eds., *Authoritarian Capitalism: Brazil's Contemporary Economic and Political Development* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 13; and Frederic C. Deyo, "Coalitions, Institutions, and Linkage Sequencing: Toward a Strategic Capacity Model of East Asian Development," in Frederic C. Deyo, ed., *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 233.

an authoritarian system should depend upon societal members' passive support which it is more or less difficult to identify empirically.

For a more thorough understanding of contemporary authoritarian systems under change, it is needed to examine how such fragile legitimacy based on the passive support develops into a crisis, namely a 'legitimacy crisis'. Here the crisis does not simply mean the occurrence of a series of events which pose a challenge to the political authorities of the political system. A legitimacy crisis refers to a serious challenge to the legitimating values, a challenge which will be accompanied by a deviated pattern of interrelationship among subsystems of the existing system. That is, the legitimacy of the regime is in a crisis when serious opposition against the legitimating values is in conjunction with political activation of the social force that has most contributed to maintaining the legitimating values but has been disadvantaged by those values. Expression of opposition to the values alone is not enough, since it might be done by a specific social force which advocates demands on behalf of other forces. The expression has to be followed by politicization of the force which should undermine the legitimating values imposed by the political authorities, such as national security and economic development. For this reason, politicization of the labor force calls our special attention.[22]

Now we should examine the developmental process of the legitimacy

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[22]In this context we have to understand Edward C. Epstein's theme that economic problems contribute to undermining authorities' 'self-defined' base of legitimacy in an authoritarian system. Cf. Epstein, "Legitimacy, Institutionalization, and Opposition in Exclusionary Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes: The Situation of the 1980s," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 17, no. 1 (October 1984), pp. 37-54.

crisis. To draw a conclusion at first, the legitimacy crisis develops through 'diversification of the object of opposition': from opposition against the political authorities and their authority structure to opposition against all of the objects of the regime, including the legitimating values of the regime. The diversification occurs by the 'spill-over effect' or 'overflow effect' in that one piece of unsatisfied demand finally develops into widespread demands.[23]

Opposition against the political authorities and the authority structure around them starts from the establishment of an authoritarian regime. Intellectuals such as students and church leaders carry out the job of opposing the authorities and their structure and of demanding revision of the structure, since these are obvious source of political repression. Repetitive activity by the intellectuals only cannot become a serious challenge to the political authorities and the structure. This is so because the political authorities are tightly intertwined with means of violence such as the military and security agencies. Furthermore, repetitive activity by such a particular force leads the political authorities to being immune, desensitized, and even prepared for the repetition.[24]

However, as time passes, the opposition by the intellectuals comes to be compounded by new demands which originate from changes in the environment of the political system, especially disturbances in the process of economic development. For example, through industrialization

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[23]Easton, *Systems Analysis*, p. 321.

[24]James W. Button, *Black Violence: Political Impact of the 1960s Riots* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 175.

and urbanization, the labor force is empowered, particularly in numbers, while being relatively disadvantaged in the redistribution of wealth. Whether the labor force is able to mobilize effectively their resources or not, its demands will be articulated. The demand of the labor force frequently originates from disturbances in the international economy also. The political authorities are supposed to have a certain capacity to predict possible changes in the international economy and be prepared to cope with them. However, since the authoritarian system of a developing society is largely dependent upon the capital, technology and natural resources of industrialized societies, it is vulnerable to disturbances in international economy. As a result, the labor force which is directly influenced by economic change, whether it is domestic or international, will articulate demands, through violence or through forming an alliance or solidarity with other social forces, like churches, students, and opposition political parties.[25]

On the other hand, the political authorities who face such demands frequently fail to produce satisfactory outputs, not only because of their lack of capacity to cope appropriately with problems derived from the rapidly changing domestic and international economy, but also because their acceptance of the demand would mean giving up the self-defined legitimating value of the existing authoritarian system, i.e.,

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[25]For example, along with the debt problem, the oil shock to major oil importers such as Brazil and South Korea and subsequent economic crises at the end of 1970s have led the labor force of auto, metal and textile industries, in particular, into demand producers for wages and job security. See Thomas E. Skidmore, "Brazil's Slow Road to Democratization: 1974-1985," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Hak-Kyu Sohn, *Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea* (New York: Routledge, 1989).

economic development. They attempt to keep this value by excluding the demands of the labor force and by defining such demands as illegal.[26] But cumulative output failures by the political authorities, accompanied by repeated violation of human rights, will result in a diversification of the objects of opposition. That is, the domain of opposition is being broadened. In addition to opposing the fragile legitimacy of the political authorities and the authority structure, the opposition will aim at the value of economic development. As the labor force itself is politicized, the legitimacy of the existing authoritarian system comes into a crisis. There might be a time lag between the manifested opposition against the legitimating values and the activation of the labor force. And the time lag may vary between empirical cases, depending upon history of the development of labor force.[27]

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[26]The labor force is controlled in various ways and excluded from political and economic realms under the name of 'economic development', a typical legitimating value of the authoritarian system. For an explanation of the exclusion of the labor, see Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973) and "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 13, no. 1 (1978), pp. 3-38.

[27]On the other hand, we should pay attention to the paradoxical role of the growing middle class, in the analysis of the development of a legitimacy crisis. Not only does this class desire democratic values, but also it is sensitive to the economic situation and wants to maintain benefits from development. That is, the middle class favors democracy; however, it comes to sacrifice political rights when economic interests are jeopardized. For example, under the Pinochet regime of Chile, the middle class -- which originally had helped the military assume power -- was disinclined to oppose the regime even after years of seriously undermining the legitimacy of the regime. When the political authorities employed the combined measure of repression and concession to the middle class and when the middle class expected that the authorities would negotiate with the opposition between 1983 and 1986, the middle class was reluctant to support the opposition openly. Of course, its role may become significant when the regime changes gradually through legal institutions like election and when breakdown of

Of course, the economic problem and the subsequent activation of the labor force is not the only reason for the erosion of legitimacy. An international conflict which has not been appropriately managed by the political authorities can also contribute to the weakening of the regime's legitimacy. Not only may the international conflict put direct pressure on the political authorities, but it may also lead the opposition forces to denounce the legitimacy of the regime. A defeat in war is the extreme case that brings about the undermining of the regime's legitimacy in general and the legitimating value of national security in particular. The authoritarian systems of Greece and Argentina experienced a drastic undermining of their legitimacy by their dismal handling of the Cyprus Crisis in 1974 and the defeat of the Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982 respectively.[28] But the mismanagement of other sorts of international dealings can also undermine regime legitimacy, as we will see in Chapter 2.

Consequently, continuous output failure by the political

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the authoritarian system reaches its last phase. Otherwise, the middle class gives passive support to the regime, rather than becoming an initial driving force for creating a legitimacy crisis. For a general explanation and the Chilean case, see Susan Eckstein, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America," and Manuel Antonio Garreton M., "Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile: The Complexities of the Invisible Transition," in Susan Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 29 and p. 269.

[28]P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 156; and Carlos H. Waisman, "Argentina: Autarkic Industrialization and Illegitimacy," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 83.

authorities in responding to increasing demands will bring about an overflow effect on the domain of the opposition: from opposition against the political authorities and the authority structure to the rejection of legitimacy of the existing regime as a whole. This process is usually accompanied by the emergence of the 'challenging values' which contrast with the legitimating values of the regime. The challenging values may vary in content. They may simply reject the existing legitimating values, such as economic development and national security. While denouncing negative effects and repressive traits of the legitimating values, the challenging values may aim at the restoration of democracy. Or the challenging values may present a more sophisticated formula for a future vision. In any case, it is not an overstatement to say that every authoritarian system undergoing regime change experiences a legitimacy crisis, regardless of whether the change is transitional or radical, and regardless of who becomes a dominating force in the process of the change.[29]

We have to be cautious in analyzing the legitimacy crisis in the following respects. First of all, it is not easy to identify the object of opposition, empirically. Even when the opposition is limited to the

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[29]For the analysis of the pace and the initiator of the regime change, see Donald Share, "Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 19, no. 4 (January 1987), pp. 525-48; and on the discussion of types of the regime change regarding the initiator, in particular, see Eduardo Viola and Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 2 (Winter 1985), pp. 193-219. All the authors of these articles have shared the theme that a legitimacy crisis is the precondition for regime change.

political authorities, sometimes it does not unveil its object,[30] while criticizing specific policies made by political authorities or using broad and abstract terms such as freedom and democracy. Particularly, the usage of those terms makes observers confused about the domain of opposition; thus, it becomes unclear whether the opposition rejects the legitimacy of political authorities only or the regime as a whole.

Second, as seen earlier, we cannot consider it to be a legitimacy crisis when the regime is denounced by one limited social group. Frequently, intellectuals like students and church leaders become advocates of demands on behalf of other social forces. They criticize the legitimating values and inhumane repressive control over disadvantaged social forces under the authoritarian system. However, legitimacy of the regime does not reach a crisis until the social forces whose support is essential for the realization of the legitimating values and their corresponding policies become mobilized to oppose the regime. In this respect, activation and politicization of the labor force has a significant meaning in the analysis of change of an authoritarian system which stresses economic development.

Third, as Ekkart Zimmermann has put it, a legitimacy crisis is neither political violence in itself nor an automatic consequence of political violence. In other words, political violence cannot be equated with a legitimacy crisis, and it is not a necessary condition of

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[30]Fear of repression would bring about such a consequence. Culture also would play a role, particularly in Asia. As Lucian W. Pye has pointed out, distaste for open criticism of authority is one of many paternalistic characteristics of authority relationship in Asia. See *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 341.

the legitimacy crisis. Sometimes a legitimacy crisis occurs without violence. The legitimacy crisis of the Weimar Republic in the 1930s exemplified the absence of major political violence.[31] Even if the Brownshirts, later *Sturmabteilung* (storm troops), used violence, there was no broad civil disorder.

Finally, more importantly, we should address the question of whether an alliance between opposition forces is a causal factor for a legitimacy crisis or is simply an observable phenomenon, that is, a manifestation of such a crisis. The answer needs some elaboration. Opposition forces of an authoritarian system can be analytically differentiated from one another. The opposition political party is an 'official' opposition force, whereas other opposition forces such as students, churches, and labor are 'extra-official' opposition forces. Most authoritarian systems regard any type of opposition as dysfunctional for achieving, with efficiency, specific goals set by such legitimating values as economic development and national security. Accordingly, they either abolish or transform the existing opposition political parties and build other artificial ones, on the one hand.

They repress the extra-official opposition forces through one of the two following means, on the other hand. First, they transform the demand channels originally established by those forces in the previous regime into control channels. They utilize the ready-made web of demand channels as a device to control the opposition. Second, they define any inputs made by the forces as illegal and dismantle the existing

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[31]Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crisis & Revolutions: Theories and Research* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1983), pp. 188-93.

channels. In particular, the first case has been called 'exclusionary state corporatism',[32] and has caught the attention of many scholars of authoritarian regimes, with special reference to labor unions. The political authorities exclude demands made by the extra-official opposition forces, while coercively encapsulating autonomous channels of those forces into the authority structure. The authoritarian regimes of Argentina and Brazil in the late 1960s and early 1970s adopted the first pattern of repression, i.e., corporatist control of the labor force, while that of Argentina between 1976 and 1982 employed the second pattern to dismantle the structure of labor unions.

Whatever the means of control of extra-official opposition forces may be, either an alliance among them or an alliance between the official and the extra-official opposition forces emerges as a feature of the legitimacy crisis. As the domain of opposition expands and as a new social force comes to be politicized, the capacity of the opposition as a whole matures in the process of undermining the legitimacy of the regime. Consequently, alliances, or 'ties' to use Alfred Stepan's terminology,[33] come into existence. The alliance is an observed phenomenon or manifestation of a legitimacy crisis of the authoritarian

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[32]Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 76-7.

[33]Alfred Stepan has noted the two types of ties as significant features of the regime dynamics: One is the horizontal ties between social forces, and the other is the tie between the horizontal ties and the opposition political party. See *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 6-7; and "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 336.

system rather than a causal factor of the legitimacy crisis. Under the situation that officially and legally defined demand channels are completely blocked, it is natural for the opposition forces finally to resort to an alliance.

The political authorities are concerned about the alliance, because it threatens the persistence of the existing regime. The alliance is an expression of 'coupling' among the subsystems of a society, such as labor, students, churches, and opposition parties. Just as in the biological system so in the political system, relative isolation of subsystems allows the given political system to remain stable, whereas tight coupling between them leads the system to being vulnerable to any disturbance in any of the subsystems.[34]

Intervening Mechanism

When the existing authoritarian system is in a legitimacy crisis, relationships between the subsystems -- such as political authorities, the military and the opposition of the authoritarian system -- will decide the path of the dynamics of the authoritarian system. A legitimacy crisis is a necessary condition for a change of the existing regime, and yet it does not automatically lead to a regime change, i.e., it is not sufficient. There are several possible paths along which the authoritarian system may travel from the point at which it reaches a

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[34]Robert B. Glassman, "Persistence and Loose Coupling in Living Systems," *Behavioral Science*, vol. 18, no. 2 (March 1973), pp. 83-98; and Easton, *Political Structure*, p. 248. For a classical example of the vulnerability of the system -- which lacks relative isolation of subsystems -- to the environmental disturbance, see Herbert A. Simon, *The Sciences of the Artificial* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 2nd edition, pp. 200-2.

legitimacy crisis. Depending upon which path it takes, a legitimacy crisis will either lead to a change of the existing authoritarian regime into a democratic one or to no significant change of the regime but a slight modification of authority structure only. In this respect, the relationship between essential subsystems is called an 'intervening mechanism' in the dynamics of an authoritarian system.

Of the three subsystems, we have to be cautious in discriminating the political authorities from the military. In many authoritarian systems, the military officers have occupied offices of the administration. For this reason, one may question the necessity for the differentiation of the two concepts. But as Alfred Stepan developed such concepts as 'the military as a government' and 'the military as an institution', the concept of military may be divided, depending upon the roles each plays.[35] To take one step forward, we should understand the military of authoritarian systems in terms of its place on a 'continuum' of its roles rather than in terms of Stepan's dichotomy.

It will be useful to consider that on the continuum there are two extreme possibilities: One is the junta based on the revolutionary committee, and the other is the most civilianized former officer group. At one extreme, the officers of the junta play their roles as political authorities and military at the same time. There is no boundary to discriminate between the political authorities and the military as an institution. At the other extreme, the former officers with considerable political skills, as those in South Korea under Park Chung

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[35]Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), Chapter 12.

Hee,[36] are clearly differentiated from the military as an institution. They have a comprehensive social base and are politically interested persons resigned from active duty. The military is not directly involved in daily political affairs. There is a fairly clear boundary between the political authorities and the military, even though the former originates from the latter. However, there may be intermediate forms. The intermediate form is exemplified by the military regime of Brazil, in which the president as a former general is frequently influenced by the military as an institution, particularly in the process of succession. The boundary between the political authorities and the military is more or less unclear. Harmony and agreement between the two groups is a key for the maintenance of the given system. In sum, the two concepts, the political authorities and the military, are defined not by the occupational status of their members but by the roles they play. The political authorities may be either military officers on duty, or retired officers, or even civilians. Whatever their formal occupational status may be, if they are directly involved in decision-making they are the political authorities. In this respect, we shall use the terms of the political authorities and the military as analytic concepts which may include all the possible forms on the continuum. The political authorities and the military are defined in terms of their roles, rather than indicating specific persons.

Now let us illuminate how the intervening mechanism decides the paths of a change in an authoritarian system. Suppose that there exists

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[36]Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). pp. 91-2.

strong cohesion between the ironhanded political authorities and the hard-line military, and that the opposition forces take a moderate stance while forming an electoral alliance. In this case, a change of the regime can hardly take place, since the authorities and the military, who are not ready to lead a regime transition, will attempt to dismantle the alliance by taking repressive measures. Thus, to examine the interrelationships among the subsystems (i.e., opposition forces, military and political authorities) for a regime change, one needs to address the following questions. What stance does the allied opposition take toward the political authorities? How does the military respond to the crisis situation? What stance do the political authorities have toward the allied opposition forces? What is the relationship between the political authorities and the military? The stance of the allied opposition forces is important on the ground that it is accompanied by a particular method in expressing demands and opposition toward the political authorities. Also that of the military is significant as far as it is an essential institution for maintaining the given authoritarian system whatever its specific role may be in the system. Likewise, the stance taken by political authorities is important since they are located at the crucial point of the trilateral relationships as we will see later. What we have to point out here is that one subsystem's stance has different meanings in different models of their interrelationship. For the stance of each is related to that of the others.

Models for the explanation of interrelationships[37] are based on the following assumptions with simplicity.

Assumption 1: Each subsystem takes one of two possible 'stances'.[38] The allied opposition forces are either radical or moderate; the military hard or soft; and the political authorities non-conciliatory or conciliatory.

Rationale: The allied opposition forces are defined as radical when they disregard legal means of participation in the belief that the means are spurious. A radical stance is a maximalist standing and is typically followed by violence. They are considered to be moderate when they attempt to participate mostly under the rules of the game defined as legal by the political authorities. A typical case is an electoral alliance. The allied opposition forces will take such a moderate stance either when they are mature enough to demonstrate their capability through making use of the web of their organization, or when they disguise their radical stance temporarily for a tactical reason. On the other hand, the military and the political authorities are called hard and non-conciliatory respectively when they are risk-insensitive. The insensitivity is attributed to a problem in the channels of information feedback: distortion of information, ignoring of the transmitted information, or blockade of the information feedback. In any case, they believe that use of force is sufficient to maintain their prerogatives. But the military and the political authorities are regarded as soft and

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[37]The models developed here are neither from the hypotheses of small group theory nor from mathematical models of structuralism.

[38]The stance means not only the attitude but also the behavior taken by a subsystem toward the other subsystem.

Figure 1. Models of Interrelationships



conciliatory when they are risk-averse. Particularly, the military may take a soft-line when it concerns the prestige and unity of the institution. Both the political authorities and the military try to prolong their main privileges while conceding demands of the opposition forces gradually.[39]

Assumption 2: There are 'eight' possible models of relationships between the three subsystems, as shown in Figure 1.

Rationale: On the one hand, the opposition's stance is directed toward the political authorities but not toward the military. This is due to the fact that the political authorities are those who produce decisions and policies in response to the demands of the opposition. On the other hand, the political authorities and the military may take independent stances toward the opposition, even though they together form the ruling bloc of the authoritarian regime. Accordingly, the relationship between the political authorities and the military is decided by compatibility or incompatibility of the stances they take toward the opposition. For instance, if the political authorities takes a conciliatory stance and the military takes a hard-line toward the opposition, the relationship between them is disharmonious and brings about a schism between them. In sum, since each of the three directions has two possibilities -- positive (solid line) or negative (dotted line) as in Figure 1 -- the total number of models is eight.

Assumption 3: Each model of relationship generates a certain level

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[39]For the terms of risk-insensitive and risk-averse, see Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 54.

of 'system stress'. There are three levels of system stress: very high, high, and low.

Rationale: It is obviously true that a political system is under extremely high stress when the allied opposition forces lead an all-out struggle and when there exists a contradiction between the political authorities and the military. In this case, normal operation of the political system will be impossible, and persistence of the system will be threatened. Since stress is an important notion for the explanation of the operation of the political system, we have to define the criteria of the stress level, as follows. The level of system stress is the function of (1) the opposition's stance and (2) the compatibility between the stances of the political authority and the military. On the one hand, if the political authorities and the military, both of which consist a 'ruling block' of the authoritarian political system, take different stances in dealing with the opposition at a time of legitimacy crisis, the level of system stress increases. This is so because the incompatibility of their stances originates from the desertion of the military. The decision made by the political authorities is hardly considered to be binding even by the military. On the other hand, the demands with militant tones, produced by the radical allied opposition forces, also contribute to the increase of the stress level. For the political authorities, the radical demands are time-constrained ones, so that the authorities' response usually produces time-lag and is unable to make the opposition satisfied. According to those criteria of system stress, we can classify the models in terms of their level. When either the allied opposition forces are radical or there is a schism between

Figure 2. Transformation of Models



the military and the political authorities, the stress level is high (e.g., models 1, 4, 6, and 7). If both of them occur at the same time, the level is very high (e.g., models 2 and 3). If neither of them happens, the stress level is relatively low (e.g., models 5 and 8).

Assumption 4: The models are not static but dynamic. When the stress level of a certain model is high or very high, the model will 'transform' into another model of a lower level of system stress, as shown in Figure 2.

Rationale: The system stress tends to lessen, since the political system, whatever its form may be, has a 'homeostatic' characteristic[40] by nature just as any other system. Accordingly, there are 'rules of transformation'. First, if a schism does occur between the military and

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[40]The concept of homeostasis has been used extensively since Walter B. Cannon. He defined it as preservation of constant internal economy of the system by adapting to the environment. Without homeostasis the system would always be in danger of disaster. On the other hand, W. Ross Ashby employed the concept of "essential variable" in explaining homeostasis. The system adapts to ensure the "survival of the essential variable". In body politics, to ensure the survival of the essential variable means to produce binding decisions constantly. If the system stops generating the decisions, it can hardly persist. Even when the political system is under stress, in the long run, it tends to restore stable status to its operation, status which makes it possible produce binding decisions. It should be noted that the preservation of the essential variable by the restoration of stable status does not necessarily mean a return of the system to the exact previous one. For instance, the system under a high level of stress -- with contradiction between the conciliatory political authorities and the hard-line military and with a radical opposition -- can restore stable status and preserve the essential variable, when the authorities persuade the military to accommodate the opposition's demand. This case will finally restore stable status through a regime change. In the assumptions of this research, the notion 'stable' does not convey any normative connotation. See Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1932), pp. 24-5 and p. 305; Ashby, *An Introduction to Cybernetics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963), p. 196; and David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; originally published in 1965), p. 95.

the political authorities, it is resolved at all costs. A schism between them is considered to be peculiar in that the desertion of the military brings about unprecedented abnormal operation of the given political system. There is a tendency to resolve the schism between them through persuasion of the military by the political authorities; otherwise, the military may lead a coup, replace the old political authorities with a new officer group. The way in which the schism between the military and the political authorities is resolved depends upon which subsystem has more power than the other. Since this power relationship cannot be generalized, we assume that the models with the schism will follow one of the possible paths of transformation -- e.g. from model 2 to either model 1 or model 4. Second, when the allied opposition forces take a radical stance while the military and the political authorities take compatible stances, as in model 1 and model 4, the stance of the opposition will be changed. The allied opposition forces with a radical stance will not be accepted or tolerated by the hard-line military and the non-conciliatory political authorities. In contrast, when the military and the political authorities are soft and conciliatory respectively, the radical opposition forces will be alienated, and finally they are unable to find any reason to keep the same radical stance.

Based on these assumptions, we should elaborate each model. Model 1 shows that the military and the political authorities are harmonious in their stances, while a radical stance of the allied opposition cannot be accepted by the military and the political authorities. Accordingly, it yields high system stress. The frustrated but radical opposition

will lead into mass protest, which is followed by military repression. The mass protest, mobilized by opposition parties and organizations, and the repressive measures, taken by the political authorities and the military, are of a mutually causal relationship;[41] thus, their feedback frequently amplifies until a loss of many civilian lives has resulted. This model can be observed in many authoritarian systems typically, and it changes into model 5 after a harsh measure by the political authorities and the military. Consequently, no regime change is expected. The Kwangju Popular Uprising and its following changes, which occurred in South Korea in 1980, exemplified the transformation from model 1 to model 5, as will be seen in Chapter 6.

Model 2 presents that there is no basic agreement among the allied opposition forces, the military and the political authorities. Disharmony between the military and the political authorities is remarkable. The military exists as an institution independent of the political authorities' direct control. Not only because the allied opposition forces are radical but because there is a schism between the hard-line military and the conciliatory political authorities, this model of interrelationship generates very high system stress and is unstable. A harmonious relationship between the military and the political authorities tends to be restored as far as the innate trait of

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[41]For a mathematical conceptualization of the mutual causality, see John H. Milsum, ed., *Positive Feedback: A General Systems Approach to Positive/Negative Feedback and Mutual Causality* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968). And for its theoretical development in explaining the political system in general and a breakdown of authority structure in particular, see Yong Pil Rhee, *The Breakdown of Authority Structure in Korea in 1960: A Systems Approach* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1982), particularly chapters 2 and 6.

this given system is authoritarian. The new relationship may be established either by the hard-line military's complete control of public offices through a coup or by the conciliatory political authorities' buying off or persuasion of the military. Accordingly, model 2 will be changed into either model 1 or model 4. While the hard-line military and the conciliatory political authorities are in a neck and neck race temporarily, the former may use terror against the radical opposition forces. Brazilian liberalization has experienced model 2. Liberalization was initiated by the political authorities and often interrupted by the hard-line military. In 1979, General Joao Batista Figueiredo became president and carried out slow liberalization just as former President Ernesto Geisel had done. However, after the impact of the oil shock, workers' movements developed and showed a high degree of solidarity with the church. This was followed by the hard-line military's terror by bombings against the opposition during 1980 and 1981.[42]

Model 3 shows similarities to model 2 in the sense that there is no harmonious relationship among the three subsystems and that the military disagrees with the political authorities. But it is distinctive in that the military is soft and risk-averse while the political authorities are non-conciliatory and risk-insensitive. The military may be discontented with decisions made by political authorities and does not go along with them. In other words, the military would not work as the political authorities' instrument of repression, in order to keep its prestige and privileges. This model of interrelationship produces a very high degree

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[42]Skidmore, "Brazil's Slow Road to Democratization," pp. 25-6.

of system stress, and it will be transformed because of the schism between the soft-line military and the non-conciliatory authorities, besides the radical stance of the allied opposition forces. It may shift to model 1 or model 4. If the military is supportive or keeps silent for the allied opposition forces and wins over the non-conciliatory political authorities, it may play a crucial role as a lever for a regime change by a transformation of the existing model into model 4. Otherwise, the model changes into model 1. The authoritarian regime in the Philippines under President Marcos at its last phase exemplified model 3. When Marcos tried to use military forces to restore order just after the rigged election in 1986, Defense Minister Enrile and Lieutenant General Ramos vetoed Marcos and backed the allied opposition forces.[43]

In model 4 the military and the political authorities are basically harmonious, while they would not tolerate the radical and allied opposition forces. This model produces a high system stress by the radical stance of the allied opposition forces. In this respect, it is similar to model 1; however, unlike model 1, both of the military and the authorities in model 4 are risk-averse. The political authorities may initiate concessions in order to lessen the system stress, whereas they do not want to concede their prerogatives at one moment insofar as there is no schism between the political authorities and the military. As a result, a regime transition will take place when the model changes

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[43]Karl D. Jackson, "The Philippines: The Search for a Suitable Democratic Solution, 1946-1986," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. 256-7.

into model 8. Brazil's 'liberalization'[44] in general, which was initiated by President Ernesto Geisel, might exemplify this model. Of course, sometimes the hard-line wins over the soft-line in the military and impairs the process of liberalization; however, it was finally persuaded by the political authorities and took the same stance as the political authorities.

Models 5 to 8 are distinguished from the previous models in that the allied opposition forces take a moderate stance. In general, the moderate allied opposition forces participate in politics under the rules of the game set by the political authorities. In model 5, the level of system stress is relatively low, since the harmonious relationship between the hard-line military and the non-conciliatory political authorities is not threatened by the allied opposition forces with a moderate stance. The opposition political parties may have a relatively weak linkage with the extra-official opposition forces, while the alliance of the latter remains intact. The latter is repressed by various legal means as well as by force, whereas the former is conservative and semiloyal, preferring the status quo. Accordingly, the opposition forces in general appear to be weak, even if it is not always

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[44]By scholars on the Latin American studies, the concept of liberalization has been differentiated from that of democratization. The former refers to a decline in repression and the restoration of basic political rights, whereas the latter refers to institutionalization of the open contestation for the right to win control of power. Liberalization does not necessarily lead to democratization. Undoubtedly, however, the former may contribute to the slow move toward the latter. See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 9-11; Viola and Mainwaring, "Transitions to Democracy," p. 194; and Alfred Stepan, "Introduction," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil*.

true. No regime change is expected in this model. Instead, the model of interrelationship yields so-called 'stable authoritarian rule'.[45] Model 5 can be applied to the early period of the authoritarian system under President Chun Doo Hwan in South Korea during the first half of the 1980s. Owing to the artificial multiparty system and the political ban against leading opposition figures, opposition parties were semiloyal, on the one hand. Because of the authorities' intervention or legal limitation, the extra-official opposition forces disguised their radical stance, on the other hand.[46]

Model 6 represents the case in which the allied opposition forces are moderate in their stance while the military and the political authorities are incompatible. It is a misconception to believe that there is a coalition between the political authorities and the allied opposition forces to exclude the military from the political scene. Rather, the political authorities recognize that they have to concede their prerogatives gradually. Such a conciliatory stance of the political authorities may stem from a defeat in a national election in which allied opposition forces may show their potential. The division between the hard-line military and the conciliatory political authorities generates a high degree of system stress. The prospect of a gradual regime transition or liberalization based on the agreement

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[45]Such a stable authoritarian rule will be maintained until the time when the environment of the political system will change to bring about a new relationship: for instance, domestic and international economy transforms the configuration of social forces. But we have to note that it is difficult to generalize how model 5 will be transformed afterwards. It is beyond our prediction analytically.

[46]Harold C. Hinton, *Korea under New Leadership: The Fifth Republic* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), pp. 58-61.

between the moderate allied opposition forces and the conciliatory authorities is uncertain because of the threat posed by the hard-line military. This model may be transformed into model 5 or 8.

In model 7, the military and the political authorities are split, whereas the military of the soft-line is compatible with the allied opposition forces with a moderate stance. The schism between the military and the political authorities produces a high system stress. The risk-averse military in this model, as in model 3, runs out of the non-conciliatory political authorities' control in order to preserve its prestige, when the latter loses popularity drastically. This model can be transformed into model 5 or 8 theoretically.

Model 8 is exactly opposite to model 1 in the stances taken by the three subsystems. All the three subsystems are able to coexist, since none of them takes a stance which will generate severe contradiction. However, the privileged military and the political authorities still predominate in the operation of the political system, and a certain amount of system stress is generated by the opposition forces at the time of a legitimacy crisis. A regime change will occur, since all the three stances toward one another are compatible and positive. This model of relationship can be applied to the gradual regime change in Spain after the death of General Franco in 1975. Spanish opposition forces participated in the Moncloa Pact of 1977, which authorized the political authorities to initiate several measures so as to overcome an economic crisis and to put into practice urgent political reforms, while

the military maintained a soft-line.[47]

Through analyzing the above models of interrelationships, we may draw some propositions as follows.

Proposition 1: As shown in the Figure 2, even if a certain authoritarian system faces a legitimacy crisis, only half of the cases of transforming paths finally arrive at model 8 and thus lead to a regime change.[48] This fact suggests how difficult it is to achieve a regime change whatever the pace of change may be.

Proposition 2: The models which generate high or very high system stress originally -- i.e., unstable models -- experience their own paths of transformation within the given authoritarian system and then arrive at either one of the two destinations, model 5 or model 8. Both of the destination models produce low system stress in common; however, their consequences are quite different from each other. While model 5 leads into a stable authoritarian system due to the repression and the moderate allied opposition forces, model 8 brings a regime change from an authoritarian to a democratic one.

Proposition 3: The stance of the opposition is not a determining factor for a regime change (or no regime change). Since the stance of the allied opposition forces is one of the determining factors for the level of system stress, one may specifically raise a question regarding

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[47]Jose Maria Maravall and Julian Santamaria, "Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 86.

[48]This is by no means the same as having a 50% of probability of achieving the regime change at the time of legitimacy crisis, in empirical reality.

the relationship between the stance of the allied opposition forces and a regime change. For instance, some may assume that a moderate stance by the allied opposition forces would be acceptable to the military and the political authorities with any kind of stance, and thus it would contribute to a regime change. Others may predict that if the allied opposition is moderate, there would not be a good chance of a regime change. However, it is a fallacious argument to say that the stance of the opposition alone can determine either a regime change or no change.[49] This is so because the stance of the allied opposition forces will have different meanings, depending upon the stances of the political authorities and the military.

As shown in Figure 2, of the six patterns of transformation or original models with a moderate opposition, such as 5, 6->5, 6->8, 7->5, 7->8, and 8, only three cases guarantee a regime change: 6->8, 7->8, and 8. Likewise, of the six patterns of those with a radical opposition, such as 1->5, 2->1->5, 2->4->8, 3->1->5, 3->4->8, and 4->8, only three cases reach a regime change: 2->4->8, 3->4->8, and 4->8. Both produce an equal number of cases for regime change. Of course, empirically either the moderate opposition or the radical opposition might have a higher correlation with a regime change than the other empirically. However, even in this case we cannot say that the stance of the opposition is the determinant of the regime change.

To sum up, this chapter postulated a generalization in order to examine the dynamics of authoritarian political system in developing

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[49]Cf. Robert Pinkney, *Right-Wing Military Government* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 129.

societies. The generalization is related to a regime transition, in particular. A legitimacy crisis is a condition of a regime change. However, the relationship between the three subsystems -- the political authorities, the military, and the allied opposition forces -- operates as the intervening mechanism for regime change, through which the path of dynamics of the authoritarian system is decided.

In the authoritarian system, a legitimacy crisis develops when two junctures come about: (1) diversification of the object of opposition from the political authorities or the authority structure around them to all the elements of the regime, including the legitimating values of the regime; and (2) political activation of the social group which has most contributed to the achievement of the legitimating values but whose interests have been sacrificed. As the domain of opposition extends and a new social force becomes activated, the capacity of the opposition forces mature to form ties, i.e., alliances, among themselves. The authoritarian system under a legitimacy crisis reaches either a regime change or no change, depending upon the relationship between the political authorities, the military, and the opposition.

PART II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS

CHAPTER 2. DIVERSIFICATION OF THE OBJECTS OF OPPOSITION

The following two parts will examine the dynamic process of the authoritarian regime in South Korea, particularly that of the Fourth Republic.[1] There are two important and related questions in the study of the Fourth Republic of South Korea: how the authority structure around President Park Chung Hee collapsed in 1979; and why a democratic form of political system failed to be formed even after the death of President Park. These factual questions will be illuminated in Part II and Part III by the application of the generalizations developed in the previous part. The two chapters of Part II will analyze the process through which the legitimacy of the authoritarian system of Park reached a crisis. This chapter, in particular, will examine the process of the diversification of the objects of opposition, which means the expansion of the domain of opposition: from political authorities around Park and the Yushin Constitution to all the elements of the authoritarian regime, including the legitimating values. This chapter will also examine the declining legitimacy which resulted from diplomatic strains with the United States, with a reference to the opposition's stance. Here the opposition means mostly the extra-official opposition forces, since the opposition party during the period under investigation, i.e., between

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[1]The Fourth Republic has been considered to be identical with the Yushin regime, meaning "revitalizing regime" in Korean. This research differentiates the latter from the former. That is, the Yushin regime of Park ended in 1979 when he died, whereas the Fourth Republic had continued until the launching of the Fifth Republic in 1980. This research covers the whole period of the Fourth Republic, from 1972 to 1980.

1972 and 1978, remained semiloyal to the existing regime.

(1) LEGITIMATING VALUES AND STRUCTURE OF THE YUSHIN REGIME

Among the denunciations of the regime, made by opposition forces, those attacking the legitimating values will be the most critical ones to undermine the legitimacy of the regime. The self-proclaimed legitimating values used by the political authorities usually have two dimensions: 'explicit' or avowed values and 'implicit' values. The political authorities in Latin American and Asia have presented 'national security' and 'economic development' as their explicit legitimating values. These values have contributed to inducing passive but diffuse support, to some extent, especially from the capitalists who had feared political disturbances or had benefitted from modernization. For both the political authorities and the supporters of the values, the two values are closely intertwined in that they are mutually causal. National security is needed to achieve economic development; likewise, through achieving the latter the given regime is able to strengthen the former.

However, examining the implicit meaning of the legitimating values, we may infer that with those self-proclaimed values the political authorities aim at the strengthening of their power through coercive rule, along with continuous development. There are some rationales: They fear that free democracy will be accompanied by a tendency to populism that will finally interrupt modernization.[2] The political

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[2]George A. Lopez, "A Scheme for the Analysis of Government as Terrorist," in Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., *The State as Terrorist* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 67-8.

authorities should not be an instrument of the capitalists, they believe, but an independent actor who uses coercion for the exclusion of labor from the political arena and provides the capitalists with favoritism in order to promote uninterrupted economic development. Thus, under the name of the legitimating values of national security and economic development, the political authorities attempt to achieve social order through coercion, which is the very means for the strengthening and prolonging their power. In accordance with these values, they formulate the structure of the regime in general and the authority structure in particular. Now let us look at the features of South Korea's legitimating values and structures of the regime which were rejected by the extra-official opposition forces.

Legitimating Values

It is well known that the rapid economic development during the 1960s was attributed to the labor-intensive and export-oriented industrialization of the first two terms of President Park. With the successful economy he won confidence and gained relatively high popularity from the people during that period. But Park's political ambition motivated him to revise the Constitution to permit himself to extend his presidency to a third term in 1969, and after having faced a strong challenge from the prominent opposition candidate Kim Dae Jung in the 1971 election, Park finally drafted the Yushin [revitalization] Constitution of the Fourth Republic in 1972.[3] On 17 October 1972 when

[3]Along with the motivating factor, the causal source for the rise of the authoritarian system in 1972 has been discussed as a polemic issue in the social sciences community of Korea. For the explanations

Park declared martial law and appealed for a national consensus in a special announcement, he rationalized the measure under the name of national unification at first. But as time passed, the values of legitimating an authoritarian system under the new constitution became clear. They were 'national security' and 'economic development' through maximizing efficiency. These legitimating values were repeatedly emphasized in all of President Park's announcements and statements.

What did the legitimating values pursue in the new form of political system? By national security, Park and his associated political authorities aimed at maintenance of the Yushin regime through social order, as well as preservation of the existing political community from North Korea's threat. This legitimating value of national security emerged while replacing the original slogan of 1972, national unification. As a background of the legitimating value, national security, two important changes in the environment of South Korea occurred: deadlock of the South-North dialogue in 1973 and the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975.

First, the relationship between South and North reached a deadlock. The rapprochement between the United States and China, the normalization between China and Japan, and the agreement on peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1971 contributed to the relaxation of the Cold War mood in the early 1970s. In the wake of

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employing Guillermo O'Donnell's bureaucratic authoritarianism, see particularly Sang Jin Han, *Hanguksahoewa Gwanryojeok Gweonwijueui [Korean Society and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism]* (Seoul: Munhaggwa Jiseongsa, 1988). Hereinafter, all the Korean names of well-known figures in the main body of this research will be noted as they are called; however, in footnotes the family name of the authors of books and articles goes at the end for bibliographical purposes.

the rapidly changing international environment, Park's administration engaged in secret diplomacy with North Korea and succeeded in issuing the South-North Joint Communique (4 July 1972).[4] However, the South-North dialogue did not last long. After the abduction of Kim Dae Jung, former presidential candidate in the 1971 election, by a KCIA plot during his stay in Japan and his forceful return home (13 August 1973), the North attacked the incident and threatened to break off the dialogue. The reason for the attack was that the director of the KCIA, Lee Hu Rak, was one of co-chairs of the South-North Coordinating Committee.[5] The North's charge was followed by the South's countercharge, and consequently the dialogue reached a complete deadlock.[6] Even if Park had not intended to break up the dialogue from the beginning, it was true that he made use of this timely opportunity

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[4]This Communique represented a historic event in the sense that since the division of Korea in 1945, for the first time, both parts of Korea officially agreed to end their hostile relationship and to work together for peaceful unification. Based on Article 6 of the Communique, the South-North Coordinating Committee was formed to carry out the agreements.

[5]Regarding this incident, former KCIA director Kim Hyung Wook testified before the U.S. House Subcommittee on International Organizations chaired by Representative Donald M. Fraser. Kim disclosed that 11 KCIA officers plotted the abduction of Kim Dae Jung. *New York Times*, 24 June 1977. It is said that Kim gathered information about the Kim Dae Jung incident by traveling to Japan shortly after the incident. His desire to secure the information originated from his personal hostility against President Park. See Sohn Chung Mu, *Kim Hyung Wook* (Seoul: Samseong Seojeok, 1990), p. 128.

[6]Of course, the deadlock could not be attributed only to the incident of Kim's kidnapping but also to the disagreement between the South and the North on the matter of approaching long-pending problems. While the South gave high priorities to economic cooperation and socio-cultural exchange as an approach to decrease tension, the North emphasized reduction of military forces, including the U.S. forces, and their spending as a precondition for any agreement.

for legitimating the new regime and repressing opposition forces. Because of the deteriorating relationship between the South and the North again, the slogan of national unification, which had been preached when Park had drafted the Yushin Constitution, came to be replaced by the more rigid value, national security.

Second, the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 provided the president and his associates with the opportunity to use the legitimating value for practical purposes. Under the name of national security, they accused the opposition forces of threatening the persistence of the political community. The political authorities enforced the National Security Law and the Anti-Communist Law for repressing students and church leaders. In appearance, the political authorities around Park gave the highest priority to the preservation of the existing political community through consensus among all South Koreans. Undoubtedly, however, by consensus they meant conformity of the people to the values presented by the political authorities so as to strengthen their power.

On the other hand, another important legitimating value of the new regime, i.e., economic development, was based on Park's past performance and Park's conviction about the future. During his presidency in the 1960s, he shifted economic policy from that of the previous government. While the latter focused on post-Korean War reconstruction and stability, Park emphasized maximization of development through export-oriented industrialization based on cheap labor.[7] He implemented that

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[7]Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, *Growth and Structural Transformation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 44-5; and Hyun-Chin Lim, *Dependent Development in Korea, 1963-1979* (Seoul:

policy by adopting a centrally planned economy called Five-Year Economic Development Plan since 1962. Consequently, the growth rate of GNP, as a typical indicator of economic development, was remarkably high. From 1961 to 1970, the average annual growth rate was 8.7 percentage.[8] Furthermore, total exports increased by more than 40 times between 1961 and 1972, whereas manufactured exports expanded by 170 times during the same period.[9] It should be noted that the successful economy was based on the trend of international division of labor. Cheap labor with high levels of productivity in developing societies has attracted international capital because of rising wages and growing labor conflicts in the developed societies.[10] However, such rapid growth was indebted also to the labor-intensive industries which were limited in their ability to keep a high growth rate continuously.

Then, what specific goal did the legitimating value of economic development aim at during the Yushin period? While maintaining the previous development plans, President Park set another goal for a shift in the structure of industry. The goal was materialized by promoting the heavy and chemical industries. Such a shift was for a 'deepening' of industry, to use O'Donnell's term. The heavy and chemical industries

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Seoul National University Press, 1985), p. 90.

[8]Edward S. Mason, et al., *The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 98.

[9]Charles R. Frank, Jr., Kwang Suk Kim, and Larry E. Westphal, *Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975), pp. 77-8.

[10]Hyug Baeg Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea," *World Politics*, vol. 39, no.2 (January 1987), p. 242.

had been fostered since the late 1960s, even though they were officially emphasized at the New Year Press Conference of President Park on 27 January 1973.[11]

The legitimating values in the Yushin regime, national security and economic development, had their own characteristic traits. They were designed neither to mobilize nor to politicize the public. Just as the rise of the Yushin regime was not launched through revolutionary or mobilizational means, so the values were neither revolutionary nor destructive. This trait of the values was already presented in Park's Special Announcement (17 October 1972) where he characterized the introduction of a new constitution as simply 'revitalizing reforms'.[12] The New Community Movement which he emphasized here as a practical means for the reforms was not a new campaign for the people. The movement had been carried out in the rural areas for the two preceding years so as to improve farming skills and to increase the income of farming families. Furthermore, the ideas presented by the movement, such as self-help, self-reliance and cooperation, were by no means contradictory to the main context of the existing culture which emphasized natural solidarity. Also, when the New Community Movement was introduced in manufacturing factories just after the oil shock of 1973, it was not intended to achieve any radical mobilization. The movement aimed at control of workers by 'depoliticizing' labor unions at the time that factories could not cope with the increasing pressure of production

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[11]Han, *[Bureaucratic Authoritarianism]*, p. 156.

[12]Park Chung Hee, *Toward Peaceful Unification* (Seoul: Kwangmyong Publishing Company, 1976), p. 59.

costs due to the oil shock and with wage increases.[13]

The deactivating trait of the legitimating values could be observed also in educational ideas. The ideas were 'loyalty to nation' and 'filial piety'. Admiral Lee Sun Shin, a legendary figure in Korean history who had defeated a Japanese invasion between 1592 and 1598, was introduced as a model figure representing the two ideas. All the elementary schools in the nation posted the ideas on the wall or on the buildings and built statues of Admiral Lee at one corner of the playground.

In sum, the legitimating values of the Yushin regime were designed to 'deactivate' and 'depoliticize' the public. As one political scientist has noted, they aimed at generating compliance of the public without excessive enthusiasm in politics and at pursuing uninterrupted economic development.[14] From those regime values, we cannot find any of the radical and destructive characteristic that usually appear in the values of a revolutionary totalitarian political system.

Structure of the Yushin Regime

For the sake of realizing the legitimating values of the Yushin regime, the authority structure in particular and the regime structure in general were constructed to guarantee the autonomous power of the political authorities. First, the authority structure provided

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[13]Jang Jip Choi, *Labor and the Authoritarian State: Labor Unions in South Korean Manufacturing Industries, 1961-1980* (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1989), pp. 182-3.

[14]Dal-Joong Chang, *Economic Control and Political Authoritarianism: The Role of Japanese Corporations in Korean Politics, 1965-1979* (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1985), p. 76-7.

President Park with unprecedented enormous power. The president as the top leader of the executive in this regime dominated not only the executive but also the legislature and the courts. According to the Constitution, the president had the right to dissolve the legislature, i.e., National Assembly (Article 59), and to declare a Presidential Emergency Measure (PEM) on internal and foreign affairs, national defense, economy, finance and judicial affairs (Article 53). Moreover, the president was not elected by the National Assembly nor constituency but by the non-partisan rubber stamp organization, the National Conference for Unification (NCU),[15] without any limitation in the number of terms (Article 39).

Second, the role of political parties was weakened, and the ruling party, the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), was not an exception. On the one hand, the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) could not have any chance to become a majority in the National Assembly; and on the other hand, the ruling DRP by itself was not able to compose a majority. This was so because one-third of the National Assembly membership, called *Yujeonghoe*, was elected by the NCU based on the recommendation of the president (Article 40). The formation of the *Yujeonghoe* originated from the president's tactic of divide and rule. Furthermore, the parties lost one of their major functions, i.e., nomination of presidential candidate, after the NCU was formed. But one point was clear. Even though the political parties were weakened, the formal structure of the Yushin regime ensured that the ruling camp, which was a

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[15]The NCU consisted of directly elected members between 2,000 and 5,000. Its members were not allowed to join any political party.

combination of the lawmakers of the DRP and the *Yujeonghoe*, was always able to form an absolute majority in the National Assembly.

Third, civil rights were extremely vulnerable to infringement under the Yushin regime. The PEM could suspend the freedom of speech, press, assembly and association, which were defined in the Article 18. More importantly, labor rights was substantially restricted by law. Since the Law of Special Measures for the Security of the Nation (LSMSN) enacted in 1971, of the three basic rights of workers -- association, collective bargaining, and collective action -- the latter two rights were subject to limitation. Before the LSMSN was drafted, the political authorities had intervened in labor disputes of public sector industries only. After the law was introduced, however, the authorities came to intervene in dispute in the industrial sector whether it was public or private. The office of Labor Administration became the agency to control all labor disputes; accordingly, labor issues were under the domain of the administration and could be solved without the process of the courts.[16] The labor law in the Yushin Constitution were based on the LSMSN. It should be noted that such a legal device for the authorities' intervention into labor affairs was in the context of the legitimating values which aimed at depoliticizing and deactivating the public.

Even though the legitimating values and the structure were designed for deactivating the members of society, the authoritarian system of South Korea confronted a certain amount of opposition from its beginning. And it came to reach a critical situation when the domain of

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[16]Choi, *Labor and Authoritarian State*, p. 88.

opposition became diversified. The opposition in 1973 and 1974 aimed at the president and his instruments of repression, such as the KCIA, on the one hand, and the Yushin Constitution, on the other. However, after the declaration of the most repressive PEM 9 in 1975, the domain of opposition spread to encompass the whole of the regime, including its two main legitimating values. Such diversification of the domain of opposition was attributed to output failure by the political authorities.

(2) OPPOSITION AGAINST AUTHORITIES AND AUTHORITY STRUCTURE

In Part I we have postulated that the domain of opposition extends from the political authorities and the authority structure to the legitimating values. In South Korean case, the opposition against the political authorities and the authority structure took place at the same time. Now let us look at how the political authorities and authority structure came under mounting opposition, at first. Such an explanation should be accompanied by illustrations of the repressive measures carried out by the political authorities around President Park.

Among many extra-official opposition forces, the students and the church, in particular, contributed to producing significant stress to the Yushin regime. At the initial stage of the regime from 1973 to 1975, the two opposition forces basically focused on the revision of the Yushin Constitution, even though they had shown differences in their demands. For them, the change of authority structure could restore democratic practices of political life. The political authorities at this stage responded to the demands of these extra-official opposition

forces by declaring the repressive PEMs 1 through 4.

Since the emergence of the Yushin regime, the stream of extra-official opposition forces which had continued since the 1960s split into two. Some argued for continuing their opposition movements, but many others preferred to wait for the right moment. Because of this split, the Declaration of the Emergency Situation at Pagoda Park on 28 July 1973 was aborted. Those who advocated waiting for the right time believed that solidarity with labor should come about prior to the political struggle. That is, building a formidable alliance between the opposition around intellectuals and labor would pave the way to for the political struggle. These advocates were largely affected by the death of a labor activist Jeon Tae Il on 13 November 1970, who committed suicide by setting himself afire for labor rights and better working conditions in the Peace Market in Seoul. Likewise, the students were divided on the matter of solidarity with labor.[17] One group stressed the importance of students' opposition against the emergence of the new regime as an urgent task for the student movements, whereas the other preferred to wait for the right time while solidifying the relationship between the students and labor.

At any rate, the students came to stand at the forefront of the opposition. On 2 October 1973, the first open opposition started at Seoul National University where four hundred students criticized Park's suppression of civil rights and demanded the dissolution of the KCIA which had been suspected of having abducted the opposition party leader

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[17]Jae Oh Lee, *Haebanghu Hanguk Haksaengundongsa [History of Korean Student Movements since Independence]* (Seoul: Hyeongseongsa, 1984), p. 323.

Kim Dae Jung.[18] Demonstrations spread in November of the same year through universities across the nation, and finally stretched out to some high schools in Kwangju and Seoul. As a result, the political authorities decided to close the schools for winter vacation earlier than ever before in the name of the energy crisis. The demands made at the student demonstrations in 1973 comprehended all the major social problems. They included establishment of a democratic system, freedom of the press, restoration of civil rights, and criticism of economic dependency on Japan.[19] It should be noted that even though the demands seemed to be comprehensive, they focused on the political authorities, particularly President Park, and the authority structure of the Yushin Constitution.

Those student demonstrations awakened other social groups. The most notable move was that thirty political figures, religious leaders, and intellectuals decided to launch the 'Campaign for the Collection of One Million Signatures in Support of the Petition for the Revision of the Constitution' (24 December, 1973).

But the response of the political authorities to the student movements and the campaign for the revision of the constitution was only to issue repressive measures through PEMs. The PEM 1 which was declared on 8 January 1974 read that not only opposing the constitution but also

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[18]*New York Times*, 3 October 1973. The news about this demonstration was reported in Korean newspapers five days later, because the political authorities banned reporting of student demonstrations for the reason of national security. Journalists reacted by the overnight sit-in at the Donga Ilbo (a daily newspaper) office on 7 October to protest the ban. See Hak-Kyu Sohn, *Authoritarianism and Opposition*, pp. 66-7.

[19]Lee, *[Korean Student Movements]*, pp. 328-9.

advocating, proposing or discussing the desirability of constitution revision were to be punishable by imprisonment of up to 15 years. Furthermore, the measure prohibited informing the public of those activities by either broadcasting or publishing.[20] The purpose for which PEM 1 was issued was basically for dismantling the campaign for constitutional revision.

Only three months after the declaration of the PEM 1, Park issued the PEM 4 on 3 April in order to eradicate the organizing of the student movements under the umbrella of the National Federation of Democratic Youths and Students (NFDYS). According to the investigative report (25 April) by Shin Jik Su, the director of the KCIA, the NFDYS was supported by (1) the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), previously defined as illegal, (2) the Federation of Koreans Residing in Japan, which had been affiliated with North Korea, (3) the Japanese Communist Party and (4) other domestic left-wing organizations. The report said that the activists of the NFDYS plotted to establish a regime of the working class and the peasantry through a four stage revolution and to form a transitional political apparatus.[21] The Emergency Court-Martial which was constituted to investigate and try the NFDYS incident announced that 1,024 persons were investigated and that among them 253 were remanded as suspects.[22] Those persons who were involved in the PRP case stood trial for concurrent offenses, and seven of them were sentenced to

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[20]*Donga Yeongam* 1975, p. 286.

[21]*Donga Ilbo*, 26 April 1974.

[22]NCCK, *1970 Nyeondae Minjuhwa Undong [Democratic Movements in the 1970s]* (Seoul: NCCK, 1987), vol. 1, p. 352.

death. But the charge against the NFDYS must have been exaggerated and fabricated. Not only was the existence of the PRP doubted by Christians and families of prisoners,[23] but also the plot of the NFDYS turned out to be fabricated when 148 of them were released on 15 February 1975 shortly after the referendum regarding the legitimacy of the Yushin Constitution and President Park.

The dismantling of the NFDYS by PEM 4 had a great impact on the opposition forces facing the Yushin regime and changed the future course of the opposition. First of all, as an immediate impact, the imprisonment of many students resulted in stirring fellow students. Demonstrations demanding the release of the students swept through university campuses as soon as fall semester of 1974 began, and the demonstration spread to high schools again. The spread of the demonstrations was contrary to the expectation of the political authorities. After the assassination of the first lady by a Korean-Japanese affiliated with North Korea on 15 August, the anniversary day of independence, Park expected that the incident would inspire national consensus and anti-communist sentiment and thus he decided to lift PEMs 1 and 4.[24] However, such a temporarily moderate measure could not alleviate the discontent of the students at all.

Second, the NFDYS incident exemplified that students played their role as a vanguard of the whole opposition forces and as a 'mediator'

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[23]Sohn, *Authoritarianism and Opposition*, p. 72.

[24]"Teukbyeol Damhwamun" [Special Announcement], made by President Park on 23 August 1974, cited in *Donga Yeongam* 1976, p. 288.

between social forces against the Yushin regime.[25] This organizing opposition of the young students was supported by both secular and Christian leaders of the older generation. Among them, the former President Yun Bo Seon, Rev. Park Hyeong Gyu, Bishop Chi Hak Sun, professor Kim Dong Gil and professor Kim Chan Guk supported NFDYS, and they were sentenced as part of the 'subversive plot'. The students played their mediating role through the active involvement of the Korea Student Christian Federation (KSCF) in the NFDYS. The members of the KSCF were students and Christians at the same time, and they had personal connections with both of the secular and Christian leaders. Four of those sentenced to 12 to 20 years of imprisonment were the secretary and three staff members of the KSCF.

Third, the treatment of the NFDYS led the students to articulate more challenging demands in the second half of the 1970s. The demands were about rights and working conditions of workers and problems in the redistribution of wealth. Along with the demands for the revision of the authority structure, these demands put mounting pressure on the political authorities. This was the case because the latter demands more directly pertained to the most important legitimating value of the Yushin regime, ie., economic development.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the wave of opposition by the students, journalists staged the Declaration for the Practice of Freedom of Speech (24 October 1974), and Catholic priests formed the National Catholic Priests' Corps for the Realization of Justice (NCPCRJ) (24 September 1974). Also it was not an accident that opposition political leaders,

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[25]Sohn, *Authoritarianism and Opposition*, p. 71.

intellectuals like Catholic and Protestant leaders, professors, writers, journalists, and lawyers agreed to found the National Congress for Restoration of Democracy (NCRD) (27 November 1974). Particularly, the NCPCRJ and the NCRD contributed to making it clear what would be the object of the opposition movements in the second half of the 1970s. Along with denunciation of the political authorities and the Yushin Constitution, these organizations began to question seriously the two legitimating values, national security and economic development, even though they focused on the political authorities and the Yushin Constitution before the 1975 referendum.

To the increasing magnitude of the opposition, the political authorities responded by a national referendum on 22 January 1975, which posed the question of the credibility of the Yushin Constitution and President Park. For the opposition forces, the authorities' decision to carry out the referendum was nothing more than giving lip service to democracy, insofar as the opposition's activity to affect its result was forbidden. The political authorities mobilized administrative and financial resources to win the referendum. Given the result of 79.8% turnout and 73.1% support,[26] President Park released most of those who had been imprisoned by the NFDYS incident, with the exception of those charged by the Anti-Communist Law and those related to the PRP case.

However, the release of the imprisoned students revealed the fact that many of them were tortured and had falsely confessed in the process

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[26]Compared to the former national referendum held for the approval of the Yushin Constitution in 1972, this result of 1975 was a disappointing one for the political authorities. The former referendum won more than 91% support.

of investigation. Even though professors were not tortured, they admitted later that most of the evidence provided for their trials was fabricated. The disclosure of the torture of the students was immediately followed by the disclosure of the experience of torture by thirteen lawmakers of the National Assembly. They stated that they had been sent to be tortured by investigators when the Yushin Constitution was promulgated.[27] Such disclosure of torture brought the human rights issue to the fore. During the second half of the 1970s, this eroded the moral ground of the Yushin regime seriously in domestic politics, while it created complicated diplomatic strains with the United States.

(3) OVERFLOW EFFECT OF THE OBJECT OF OPPOSITION

The object or domain of opposition expands as the political authorities produce continuous output failures. The opposition which originally aims at the political authorities and the authority structure moves to the denunciation of the legitimating values of the regime. What should be noted is that the condemnation of the legitimating values is too often followed by the creation of 'challenging values'. At this stage, the challenge against the existing regime is not a simple matter of alteration of structure of authority relations or of replacement of some political authorities. The opposition forces present a logic of why the legitimating values are deceitful and false. This overflow effect of opposition occurred in South Korea between 1975 and 1978.

In the midst of the opposition's denunciation of the violation of

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[27]Sang Woo Lee, "70 Nyeondae Bancheje Seryeok" [Opposition Forces in the 1970s], *Shindonga*, no. 4 (1974), pp. 191-2.

human rights of prisoners, on 13 May 1975 President Park brought out the PEM 9 which continued until the his death. In the special statement regarding this PEM, Park emphasized the lesson from the Communist takeover in Vietnam and Cambodia and the need of national consensus for national security. In this respect, he named it the 'Presidential Emergency Measure for National Security and Public Order'. According to the PEM 9, the following activities were forbidden: (1) fabrication or dissemination of false facts and distortion of facts; (2) denial of the Yushin Constitution or petition for its repeal through assembly, demonstration, or use of mass media like newspapers, broadcast, and news correspondence; (3) criticism of the PEM itself; and more importantly, (4) spread of news about instances of violation of the PEM by means of broadcasting or reporting.[28] The proclamation of PEM 9 brought about the consolidating stage of the Yushin regime. The PEM 9 was not a temporary measure to restrict and curb a specific case of opposition. The PEMs 1 and 4 were imposed to block the campaign for the revision of the Yushin Constitution and to root out the NFDYS organization respectively, whereas the PEM 9 was launched as a extended repressive measure to maintain the regime at any cost.

It is notable that at this stage, the PEM 9 was accompanied by the enactment of four wartime laws by the political authorities. The wartime laws were the Public Security Law, the Civil Defense Law, the Defense Tax Law, and the Amendment to the Education Law. These laws were passed in the National Assembly without any major friction between the ruling camp and the moderate opposition party (9 July 1975). By the

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[28]*Hapdong Yeongam* 1976, p. 122.

Public Security Law, the political authorities were able to restrict the activities of those who had been imprisoned. The Civil Defense Law was made to organize paramilitary groups by mobilizing men aged from 17 to 50. The Defense Tax Law enabled to promote defence industries by adding a 10 to 15 percent Defense Tax to every tax and by imposing the Defense Tax on every citizen. And the Education Law was amended to replace the independent student organizations of universities and high schools with the Student Defense Corps.[29] Since this law was enacted, staffs of the Student Defense Corps were nominated by school authorities. Accordingly, the abolition of the Corps became one of the major demands at student demonstrations in the following years.

The enactment of the four wartime laws provided the political authorities with a legal channel for more effective control of the public. Along with the control of labor which will be discussed in the Chapter 3, the political authorities expanded their coercive capacity so as to impose more effectively the legitimating values, national security and economic development. Such expansion of coercive capacity was a phenomenon that also occurred in 'exclusionary corporatism' of the Latin American authoritarian systems. In this corporatism, the political authorities exclude from the political arena the social group which is capable of opposing their goals, and then incorporate this social force into the existing regime.[30] Of the four wartime laws, the Civil Defense Law and the Education Law, in particular, showed the trait of

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[29]*Ibid.*, pp. 123-4; and Sohn, *Authoritarianism and Opposition*, p. 90.

[30]See Stepan, *State and Society*, pp. 78-80.

exclusionary corporatism. By the formation of Civil Defense Corps and Student Defense Corps in every single occupational unit and university, respectively, the political authorities tried to integrate various social institutions and schools into the authority structure of the regime via the use of auxiliary organizations controlled by the existing regime.

On the other hand, the political authorities, obsessed by the national security matters, were fortunate to work with the moderate leadership of the main opposition party, NDP, in the National Assembly. In the NDP, a new collective leadership led by Lee Cheol Seung was launched on 16 September 1975, while replacing the more aggressive leader Kim Young Sam.[31] Based on his political philosophy which was called 'integration in the middle-of-the-road', Lee adopted a new party line of the NDP, that is, reformation through participation within the institution. In accord with the national security concern of the political authorities, Lee proposed to establish the Democratic and Peaceful Unification Committee in the National Assembly in order to provide for non-partisan participation and cooperation (5 October 1975).[32] His rhetoric using the term 'non-partisan' was nothing more than a compromising gesture toward the ruling camp in the National

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[31]Kim Young Sam rose to the head of the NDP on the day President Park lifted PEMs 1 and 4 (23 August 1974). As the youngest head in history of the opposition party, he took an aggressive stance towards the regime at the beginning. However, because of his weak organization, he could not manage diverse factions but tried to find a balance between them. And finally he came under attack, with the expulsion of his fellow lawmaker Kim Ok Seon and the disputed secret meeting with President Park in 1975.

[32]*Hapdong Yeongam* 1977, p. 83.

Assembly. Owing to the 'semiloyal' stance of the opposition party, to use Juan J. Linz's terminology,[33] the political authorities could implement the PEM 9 effectively.

In spite of the PEM 9 and the semiloyal stance of the NDP, the leading figures of the extra-official opposition forces came to articulate more challenging demands on the political authorities. This was because under the PEM 9, some concepts became major concerns for both the political authorities and opposition forces: *jeongbu* (literally meaning government) versus *gukga* (literally referring to nation or state) on the one hand, and national security versus democracy on the other hand. While defending themselves from the harsh repression by the political authorities, the opposition leaders maintained that they did not fight against the *gukga* but only against the *jeongbu*. Also they asserted that their 'anti-*jeongbu*' activities were not same as those of 'anti-*gukga*'. Meanwhile, political authorities considered the two concepts to be identical. Here we should be cautious in analyzing the language of struggle, whose terms may deliver different meanings depending upon how users interpret them.

Without doubt, to extra-official opposition leaders, the *jeongbu* meant not only the political authorities but also the formal authority structure embodied in the constitution. Since the authority structure

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[33]Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 32-3. Linz has explained that as an important indicator, the semiloyal opposition party makes a distinction between means and ends. While it rejects extreme means of other opposition forces, it does not denounce them openly since it agrees with those forces in principle. Even though the term has been developed for analyzing the breakdown process of democratic systems, it is considered applicable to that of authoritarian systems also.

was an important element of a regime, the anti-*jeongbu* conveyed the meaning of opposition against the main elements of a regime. Accordingly, the opposition aimed at not only President Park, his associates, and instruments of oppression like the KCIA and the police but also the Yushin Constitution. As time passed, the opposition came to aim not only at political authorities and authority structure but also at the legitimating values such as economic development and national security. Such an extension of the object of the opposition meant rejection of the existing authoritarian regime as a whole. On the other hand, for the opposition leaders, the *gukga* meant a political community, which was a more inclusive concept than the regime. The opposition forces did not reject the persistence of the political community of South Korea.

Based on such conception of anti-*jeongbu*, the extra-official opposition forces developed the challenging values by which they stopped regarding the legitimating value, national security, as legitimate. According to them, for the persistence of the *gukga* (i.e., political community), the *jeongbu* should be democratic on the ground that the public in a repressive regime ignoring human rights would loose its willingness to resist communist North Korea. Thus, for the opposition, any repressive regime under the name of national security could not be rationalized. Also it would fail to engender a public consensus and might finally lead to the erosion of the political community. Such an anti-*jeongbu* stance taken by the opposition leaders was already clarified in a declaration issued by the NCRD.

> Most of our citizens oppose the communist regime, since we know that it violates human rights, deprives its citizens of political

> freedom, and enforces dictatorship. If our regime comes to imitate characteristics of the communist regime and finally becomes a similar one, the will of our citizens to confront the communist regime will loose its ground.[34]

In response to the emergence of the challenging values, the political authorities asserted that opposition against the *jeongbu* (regime) was the same as rejection of the existence of political system as such and the political community as well. For them, the main part of the regime, i.e., the authority structure in the Yushin Constitution, was designed for the preservation of the political community of South Korea through efficient maintenance of social order and in turn for continuous economic development based on export-oriented industrialization. Consequently, the political authorities considered the anti-*jeongbu* to be equivalent to the anti-*gukga*, that is, to the rejection of the political community. In this respect, President Park frequently emphasized the legitimacy of the Yushin regime, saying that "the Yushin regime is indispensable to overcome the national crisis and to secure the persistence of the nation."[35]

One of the most publicized and united acts of opposition against the regime was the Declaration for the Democratic Salvation of the Nation (or Myeong Dong incident) on 1 March 1976. The declaration was read during the mass joined by Protestants at Myeong Dong Cathedral on the day commemorating the independence movement of 1919 against Japanese colonial rule. It was signed not only by leading political figures such

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[34]"Minjuhoebok Gukminhoeui Seoneonmun" [Declaration of National Congress for Restoration of Democracy], signed by 71 opposition leaders (27 November 1974), mimeograph.

[35]*Hapdong Yeongam* 1977, p. 61.

as the former president Yun Bo Seon and the former presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung but also by Hahm Seok Heon and many other prominent Catholic and Protestant leaders. The declaration addressed three main demands: restoration of democracy, fair redistribution of wealth, and national unification. Eighteen leading figures were indicted on the ground that they had violated the PEM 9. Yun Bo Seon, Kim Dae Jung, Hahm Seok Heon, and Mun Ik Hwan were sentenced to five years of imprisonment, and the others were sentenced to from one to three years of imprisonment.[36]

The declaration was not limited to opposition against the president and the constitution, because such an opposition became meaningless after the 1975 referendum. The declaration of the Myeong Dong incident denounced in detail the legitimating value of economic development, which relied heavily upon foreign capital, corruption, and repressive labor control. Moreover, the declaration opposed the other legitimating value, i.e., national security, which was emphasized more than ever before, with the breakdown of South Vietnam in 1975. It asserted that to build a democratic regime would guarantee national unification based on anti-communism.[37] Supporting such an assertion, former president Yun made the following statement at court.

> There is a clear distinction between South Vietnam and South Korea....Most citizens of South Korea do not like communism, but I only worry that the political authorities are doing what those of South Vietnam have done. It is so because the political authorities of South Vietnam were dictatorial and corrupted....In view of Vietnamese failure, we can defend our nation through

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[36]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 2, pp. 688-97.

[37]"Minju Guguk Seoneonseo" [Democratic Salvation of the Nation], issued by eleven opposition leaders (1 March 1976), mimeograph.

> democratic practices and by the courage of citizens that comes from our hearts....We cannot repel communism when our freedom is oppressed by the political authorities.[38]

Such a viewpoint of the opposition to communism was basically the same as that of the political authorities, and it did not challenge the persistence of the political community at all.

The Myeong Dong incident attracted the attention of the political authorities, since it provided the opposition with another chance to publicize the challenging values against the regime. For this reason, the political authorities made every effort to block the repetition of commemorating the independence movement day. While the Human Rights Committee of the NCCK was planning to hold a worship on 1 March in 1977, the police prevented its staff from entering the committee office and forcefully transported them to their homes. In addition, many church leaders were put under house arrest beginning 28 February. Despite such intervention by the police, the Charter for the Democratic Salvation of the Nation was declared on 22 March. Unlike the case of Myeong Dong incident, the political authorities responded to the declaration of the charter carefully since they did not want a diffusion effect that might be caused by arresting cosigners. What they really were concerned with was the prohibition of the spread of copies of the charter.

The two subsequent incidents in 1976 and 1977, which occurred around the day for commemorating the independence movement, reflected a solidarity among extra-official opposition leaders centered around the

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[38]This was from an unofficial record of the first trial of Yun Bo Seon (15 May 1976), cited in NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 2, pp. 703-4.

church.[39] Because of the severe repression by which the student movements were shrunk and compartmentalized under the PEM 9, the church with the advantage of an organizational base became the center of the opposition. Of course, the church by itself had been one of the major social forces to challenge the Yushin regime since the beginning of the regime. But, under the PEM 9, it became a guardian of young full-time dissidents, mostly composed of expelled students from universities, and it acted as a care-provider for the labor force by articulating its demands. By taking advantage of the organizational base and its ideological trait like anti-communism which was in line with one of the values of the political authorities, the church in South Korea came to play a central role in the networks of opposition.

(4) DIPLOMATIC STRAINS UNDERMINING THE LEGITIMATING VALUE

International conflicts, particularly war, can act as a crucial means of undermining the legitimacy, as shown by the Cyprus Crisis to Greece and the Falklands War to Argentina. On the one hand, the conflicts themselves may generate voluminous pressure with which the political authorities are unable to cope. On the other hand, the failure to treat conflicts appropriately may bring about a rapid decline of the regime's legitimacy among the public. This is so because the

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[39]The church here is a general notion that includes protestants and Catholics of various denominations: Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal, Holiness, and Roman Catholic. It also includes church organizations jointly supported by those protestants, such as Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) and Seoul Metropolitan Community Organization (SMCO), and organizations of Catholics, like Young Catholic Workers (JOC: Jeunes Ouvriers Catholiques) and National Priests' Corps for the Realization of Justice (NCPCRJ).

weakened sovereignty caused by the failure contradicts the regime's legitimating value of national security. The Yushin regime was not an exception. A diplomatic issue caused by a South Korean businessman Park Dong Sun's influence-buying lobby in the United States developed into a complicated strain when the lobby scandal became intertwined with President Carter's human rights issue and the ground troop withdrawal. These issues directly affected the opposition forces in various ways, since all three were connected with the legitimating value of the Yushin regime, i.e., national security.

An influence-buying lobby scandal was publicized when the American mass media disclosed the activities of the KCIA and Park Dong Seon who attempted to influence American foreign policy toward South Korea.[40] This lobby scandal became one of the sensitive issues in the United States when two investigations, one by the U.S. Justice Department and one by the House Committee on Standards and Official Conduct (the Ethics Committee), began. Furthermore, former KCIA director Kim Hyung Wook's open criticism of President Park and his testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations largely contributed to the escalation of the diplomatic strain between South Korea and the United States.[41] With the inauguration of President Carter who advocated human rights diplomacy and the withdrawal of ground troops from South Korea (February of 1977), the diplomatic strain caused by the lobby scandal became more complicated. Despite the opposition by the U.S. military authorities and Congress, the withdrawal plan was implemented

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[40]*New York Times*, 2 October 1976, p. 6.

[41]*Ibid.*, 5 June 1977.

by pulling out 3,386 troops by the end of 1978.[42] Furthermore, in connection with the lobby scandal, the House threatened that without South Korea's cooperation in a thorough investigation, it would reject even the transfer of $800 million worth of military weapons to South Korea to compensate for the ground troop withdrawal.[43]

Meanwhile, the concern over human rights by the United States had harassed the political authorities of South Korea for several years. Such a concern was raised in the United States even before the inauguration of President Carter. During the presidency of Gerald Ford, not only Congress but also concerned scholars expressed displeasure over violations of human rights in South Korea. Their concern for human rights was inspired particularly by the Myeong Dong incident of 1976 and the arrest of leading opposition leaders, including Yun Bo Seon, Hahm Seok Heon, and Kim Dae Jung. After Carter was inaugurated, he became concerned over this issue, based upon his strong belief that it was the 'responsibility and right' of the United States to observe closely the internal affairs of other systems.

Of the three diplomatic issues, the human rights issue failed to be carried out at face value,[44] because it could not be effectively

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[42]*Donga Yeongam* 1979, p. 329.

[43]*Ibid.*, p. 26.

[44]For a general discussion, see Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arson, *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regime Abroad* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981), p. 15. Carter's human rights policy was effective in the areas of no strategic significance for the U.S. However, in the areas of strategic importance such as Thailand, the Philippines, El Salvador, South Korea, the policy could not be implemented effectively. This was because of Carter's approach to harmonize the two policies, human rights and national security.

implemented in areas strategically important areas to the United States, such as South Korea. But all the issues produced mounting pressures on the political authorities centered around Park, on the one hand, and provided the extra-official opposition forces with chances for reinforcing their challenge against the legitimating value of national security, on the other. Accordingly, the political authorities and the opposition forces acted in different ways. Since the four wartime laws passed in the National Assembly in 1975, the political authorities had given impetus to the defense industries, even though the latter had already begun to produce weapons in 1971. More importantly, President Park initiated an aborted plan to develop nuclear weapons. In an interview with the *Washington Post* on 26 June 1976, he said that if South Korea could not be protected under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S., he would make every effort, including the development of nuclear weapons, for national security. How he carried out the plan could not be easily identified. However, it was true that along with the building of nuclear power plants, he made an effort to introduce the facilities for 'reprocessing' nuclear fuels. The reprocessing has been known as one of the necessary work processes to separate plutonium, which is a key ingredient in nuclear weapons.[45]

On the other hand, the extra-official opposition resisted the withdrawal plan on the ground that an absence of U.S. troop meant absence of U.S. leverage to press the oppressive authoritarian regime under President Park. As former president Yun Bo Seon stated, with the

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[45]Jong Yeol Park, "Yigeosi Park Daetongryeongeui Haekmugigaebaleui Jinsangida" [Real Facts about President Park's Nuclear Weapon Development], *Shindonga*, no. 4 (1989), p. 290.

withdrawal of troops the United States would lose political influence over the issue of freedom in South Korea.[46] Therefore, the opposition forces not only put increasing pressure on the political authorities but also attempted to influence the pullout decision by the United States. Organized demands were made by the church, above all. First, to President Park, NCCK sent a letter that demanded communicating the public opinion against the pullout plan to the political authorities of the United States.[47] This demand was an unbearable one to the president since he was under pressure from the United States due to the issues of Park Dong Seon's lobby scandal and the human rights issue. Second, various church organizations sent letters to the United States: from NCCK to President Carter (15 February 1977) and to Christians in the U.S.(16 February 1977); from Korean Presbyterian to U.S. Presbyterian organizations and to the U.S. Council of Churches (25 May 1977). These letters, which aroused the special attention of the churches of the United States, asserted in common that the withdrawal of ground troops would cause continuous violations of human rights as well as a threat from North Korea.[48]

All the three issues generated mounting pressure against the political authorities and finally were conducive to the erosion of the self-defined legitimating value of the Yushin regime, national security. For the political authorities, it was obvious that the deteriorating

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[46]*New York Times*, 26 May 1977.

[47]"Juhan Migun Cheolsue Gwanhayeo Park Daetongryeongege Bonaeneun Seohan" [A letter to President Park Regarding the Pullout of the U.S. Ground Troop], sent by NCCK (7 February 1977), mimeograph.

[48]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 3, pp. 1115-21.

relationship between South Korea and the United States would disturb international relations around South Korea. This was true from the perspective of the opposition forces also. However, when the object of the opposition was diversified due to the output failures, such as the referendum of 1975 as a response to the demand for revising the constitution and violation of human rights against opposition leaders, the diplomatic strain reinforced the stance of the extra-official opposition.

(5) CONCLUSION

In the study of the undermining of the legitimacy of the regime, little attention has been paid to the qualitative change of the objects of opposition. This chapter focused on this change as a process in which the legitimacy of the Yushin regime reached a critical point. At the initial stage, i.e., between 1973 and 1974, the extra-official opposition, which was characterized by the student demonstrations and the campaign for the revision of the Yushin Constitution, was aimed at the political authorities and the constitution. However, the political authorities responded to the opposition by holding a referendum for evaluating the legitimacy of the president and the constitution in 1975. Owing to the restriction of the opposition, the result of the referendum turned out just as the authorities wished. Moreover, the political authorities issued the most repressive and prolonged measure, PEM 9, so as to consolidate the Yushin regime. The PEM 9 was immediately followed by the enactment of the four wartime laws which were intended to encapsulate occupational units and student organizations into the

structure of the regime. Both the PEM 9 and the wartime laws were devices intended to control the social forces under the formula of exclusionary corporatism.

The repressive measures and output failures by the political authorities -- such as the declaration of PEMs and the national referendum -- brought about an overflow effect of the object of the opposition. The opposition leaders denounced not only the authorities and the authority structure but also the legitimating values, national security and economic development. Their denunciation of the legitimating values was followed by the creation of challenging values, particularly in contrast with national security. Unlike the assertions of the political authorities, they argued that restoration of civil rights and of democracy are the preconditions for national security on the ground that only democratic citizens voluntarily fight for their nation. Accordingly, unlike the charge made by the political authorities, they did not reject the persistence of the political community but the existing regime only.

In addition, in the second half of the 1970s, the diplomatic strains with the United States provided the opposition forces with further opportunities to denounce the regime. The influence-buying lobby backfired against the political authorities, whereas its complication, the pullout plan of U.S. ground troops and partial withdrawal, revealed the vulnerability of the legitimating value of the Yushin regime, national security.

During the period of the PEM 9, the church's opposition activities were distinctive for undermining the legitimacy of the regime as a

whole. Owing to its organizational bases, it became the locus of the extra-official opposition forces. Also it became a care-provider for disadvantaged labor, as we shall see in Chapter 3 in more detail. The church was motivated by a model of the good society based on the divine rights of human beings. For this reason, it could easily engage in collective endeavors with other opposition forces struggling against the legitimating values of the regime which were incompatible with the good society and the divine rights of men.[49]

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[49]Of course, the church was not a unified institution. The conservative sector of the Protestant church did not join the collective endeavors to struggle against the existing regime but showed political apathy. See Yong Bok Kim, "Haebanghu Gyohoewa Gukga" [The Church and the State since the Liberation], in Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development, ed., *Gukga Gweonryeokgwa Gidokgyo [The State Power and Christian Church]* (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1982), pp. 233-5 and pp.240-3.

CHAPTER 3. ACTIVATION OF THE LABOR FORCE

In the previous chapter we have illustrated the diversification of the objects of opposition, which contributed to the development of the legitimacy crisis. However, we should note that such an overflow effect of the opposition is not enough for a legitimacy crisis. Without serious opposition by the specific social force which is essential for realizing the legitimating values of the regime, we cannot say that an authoritarian system reaches a legitimacy crisis. In this respect, the activation of the labor force has significant meanings in the process of delegitimation of the authoritarian regime. Along with a challenge from the classical middle class, such as students and church leaders, labor activation means the expansion of the magnitude of the opposition. Furthermore, insofar as the exclusion of the labor force through various mechanisms is crucial to the consolidation of the emerging authoritarian regime, its activation will bring about a serious threat to the maintenance of the regime. For these reasons, a thorough understanding of the legitimacy crisis at the end of the Yushin regime requires an examination of the expansion of the labor force and its limited but potential capacity to delegitimate the regime.

Owing to urbanization and export-oriented industrialization, the labor force became a crucially empowered social group in terms of its numbers. Because of its importance as a resource for economic success, the political authorities of the Yushin regime controlled the labor force through various mechanisms. However, when the labor force became

activated, with the church's active involvement, their union broke down the legitimacy of the regime most seriously. An examination of the increase in the size of the labor force, the authorities' control mechanisms, and the alliance of labor with the church will illuminate how labor contributed to the death of President Park in 1979 and to deciding the path of the dynamics of the authoritarian system after Park.

(1) EXPANSION OF THE LABOR FORCE

Above all, to understand the character of labor as a social force, we need to describe how the labor force expanded in South Korea during the process of export-oriented economic development. A series of Five-Year Economic Development Plans, implemented since 1962, and the National Land Development Plan, launched in 1972, largely contributed to urbanization during the 1960s and the 1970s. The Five-Year Plans had varied the priority given to light and heavy industry as time passed. They initially emphasized light manufacturing industries but shifted their weight to heavy and chemical industries and technological innovation. The success of these plans created plenty of jobs in urban industrial areas and resulted in the spatial mobility of the population during the two decades. Also the National Land Development Plan, which aimed at efficient management of natural land spaces, reinforced urbanization and the spatial mobility of the labor force in the 1970s particularly.[1] Consequently, as shown in Table 1, the proportion of

[1]Ki-sok Yi, "The Impact of National Development Strategies and Industrialization on Rapid Urbanization in Korea," *Korea Journal*, vol. 21, no. 12 (December 1981), pp. 35-6.

Table 1. Changes in Urban and Rural Population

(In thousand persons)

	Total	Urban	Rural	Urban Ratio
1960	24,956	7,083	17,871	28.4%
1962	26,513	7,978	18,535	30.1
1964	27,984	9,128	18,856	32.6
1966	29,160	9,753	19,407	33.4
1968	30,838	10,851	19,987	35.2
1970	31,435	12,941	18,494	41.2
1972	33,505	14,020	19,485	41.8
1974	34,692	15,945	18,747	46.0
1976	35,860	17,511	18,349	48.8
1978	37,019	19,623	17,396	53.0
1980	37,448	21,441	16,007	57.3

Source: Yi, "The Impact of National Development Strategies and Industrialization on Rapid Urbanization in Korea," p. 33.

Note: The urban population included not only residents of cities but also those of *eup* (towns).

urban population increased during the two decades. It is remarkable that the trend of increase accelerated since the end of the 1970s.

If the export-oriented industrialization based on the Five-Year Plans and the Land Development Plan induced the rural population in general and the labor force in particular to move to urban areas, what were the immediate motivating factors that forced them to leave their rural homes? Living conditions in the rural areas were lagging far behind those in urban areas. This was so because the political authorities gave first priority to manufacturing industries for export, while almost ignoring the agricultural sector, even though both industrialization and the achievement of self-sufficiency in agricultural production were cited as important objectives of economic

development.[2] For instance, even in the 1970s when the New Community Movement was implemented, President Park did not invest a large amount of funds in the rural areas. But he encouraged farmers to make use of the leisure season to create non-farm employment and to improve their physical environment, such as by replacing straw-thatched roofs with tile roofs, constructing bridges, and improving roads. Such initiatives by farmers were carried out under the slogans of 'self-help, self-reliance, and cooperation'. Furthermore, the government became the major buyer of rice and controlled its price to win the favor of the urban population at the cost of the farmers.

According to a survey on attitudes of rural residents in 1974, some 53% of the respondents showed a willingness to move into cities for economic reasons. Of them, the younger age group was more inclined to move, in comparison to older age groups.[3] Their motivation came from their concern about living standards and adequate education for their children.[4]

Not all of the migrant rural labor force changed into wage workers in the manufacturing sector. A part of it was transformed into wage workers of the tertiary sector. However, it was obviously true that the secondary sector, mainly manufacturing industries, was the main source of demand for the mobile labor force. Accordingly, as shown in Figure 3, in the 1970s the proportion of employment in the secondary sector

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[2]Samuel P.S. Ho, "Rural-Urban Imbalance in South Korea in the 1970s," *Asian Survey*, vol. 19, no. 7 (July 1979), pp. 647-8.

[3]Willard D. Keim, "The South Korean Peasantry in the 1970s," *Asian Survey*, vol. 14, no. 9 (September 1974), p. 861.

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 863.

Figure 3. Rate Changes of Employment in Three Industrial Sectors



Source: Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook (1971-1980)

steadily increased at the cost of that in the primary sector, which was mostly composed of agriculture in the case of South Korea.

(2) LABOR AS AN UNDERDEVELOPED SOCIAL FORCE

Now it should be legitimate to question: Did the expanded labor force form a politically important social force in South Korea? In many Latin American cases, the economic crisis, which followed development of the economy through import substitution, brought about the political activation of the labor force and in turn led to the intervention of the military. Those military-based authoritarian regimes excluded this politically important social force from the economic sector and from the political arena. But South Korea did not follow the same process as that of the Latin American cases. At the time of the emergence of the Yushin regime, there was neither a serious economic crisis nor significant labor activation. Unlike the Latin American experience, the

labor force was an underdeveloped social force in spite of its expansion in numbers. This section will look at why the labor force remained an underdeveloped social force.

The expanded labor force in general and increased workers in the manufacturing industries contributed most to economic development during the Yushin period. And yet it became the most disadvantaged group in the society.[5] Let us look at some indicators of the disadvantages of the labor force. First of all, according to the data of the Ministry of Finance, 74.9% and 76.9% of total employees received wages under the income tax exemption in 1976 and 1978 respectively.[6] And as shown in Table 2, the average wage of the workers of the manufacturing industries remained far below the minimum living cost during the second half of the 1970s; furthermore, the amount of the gap between the average and the minimum living cost rose as time passed. Most of the rank and file employees with production-related occupations and those in the service sector were considered to belong to the category of low-wage workers. Secondly, as a comprehensive statistical portrait of income distribution, the Gini index in Table 3 shows a measure of income inequality during the Yushin period. Between 1965 and 1970 the Gini index in Table 3 shows a measure of income inequality during the Yushin

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[5]There were several factors for disadvantages of the labor force during the Yushin period. Such factors as favoritism toward big enterprises, inflationary financing, and regressive tax policies were conducive to social inequality. Undoubtedly, however, labor control by political authorities directly affected the unequal distribution of gains from economic development. See Hagen Koo, "The Political Economy of Income Distribution in South Korea: The Impact of the State's Industrialization Policies," *World Development*, vol. 12, no. 10 (October 1984), p. 1032.

[6]Choi, *Labor and the Authoritarian State*, p. 299.

Table 2. Average Wage and Minimum Living Cost

(In Korean Currency: Won)

	Average Wage	Minimum Cost	No. of Family Members
1975	38,378	57,994	3.44
1976	51,685	79,710	3.44
1977	69,168	97,273	3.31
1978	92,907	119,610	3.06
1979	114,159	153,084	3.06

Source: NCCK, *Nodong Hyeonjanggwa Jeungeon [Scene and Witness of Labor]*, (Seoul: Pulbid, 1984), p. 438.

Table 3. Measure of Income Inequality

	1965	1970	1976	1980
Bottom 40%	19.3	19.6	16.9	16.1
Top 20%	41.8	41.6	45.3	45.4
Gini Index	.344	.332	.391	.389

Source: CISJD, ed., *Hangukeui Sahoe Jeongeui Jipyo [Social Justice Indicators in Korea]* (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1986), p. 15 and p. 24 for 1965-1976 data; Economic Planning Board, *Social Indicators of Korea, 1982* (1982), p. 61 for 1980 data.

Table 4. Comparison of Increases of Wage and Labor Productivity

	Real Wage (%)	Labor Productivity (%)
1971	2.4	9.7
1972	2.0	8.7
1973	14.3	8.8
1974	8.8	11.4
1975	1.4	11.6
1976	16.8	7.5
1977	21.5	10.4
1978	17.4	12.0
1979	8.4	15.8
1980	-4.7	10.7

Source: *Donga Ilbo*, 3 December 1981.

Table 5. Comparison of Working Hours in Manufacturing Industries

(Per Week)

	Korea	Japan	Singapore	Philippine	Taiwan	U.S.
1970	52.3	43.3	48.7	-	53.0*	39.8
1975	50.5	38.8	48.4	45.3	51.0*	39.5
1980	53.1	41.2	48.6	46.0	51.0*	39.7

Source: International Labor Office, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics*. The data with * are from Tiber Scitovsky, "Economic Development in Taiwan and South Korea, 1965-1981," in Lawrence J. Lau, ed., *Models of Development: A Comparative Study of Economic Growth in South Korea and Taiwan* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1986), p. 180.

period. Between 1965 and 1970 the Gini index slightly decreased, but it rose remarkably during the first half of the 1970s. Such an index of inequality was higher than that of Taiwan which has followed a very similar model of economic development. Thirdly, even though wages had increased during the 1970s, the trend of their increase lagged behind the increase of labor productivity with some exceptions, as shown in Table 4. Labor productivity between 1971 and 1980 rose at an average annual rate of 10.66%, whereas the real wage increased at a rate of 8.83%.[7] Finally, the workers had to suffer from long working hours. As shown in Table 5, they worked longer than workers of other developing nations in Asia as well as those of industrialized nations. Particularly, the working hours of female workers were longer than those of their male counterparts. In 1980, men worked 52.8 hours and women

[7]The wage increase between 1976 and 1978 was remarkable. But it was attributed to the supply shortage of the skilled labor forces, owing to the labor export to the Middle East by Korean construction companies. Seung Hyeok Jo, *Hanguk Gongeophwawa Nodongundong [Industrialization and Labor Movements in Korea]* (Seoul: Pulbid, 1984), p. 114.

53.5 hours.[8]

Here questions follow. Why did the social group that contributed the most but that was the most disadvantaged fail to become a politically significant social force? Why was the labor force unable to form a united and cohesive opposition force? It was because of the repressive labor control by the political authorities and the segmentation of the labor force. An examination of these questions is important in understanding its solidarity with the church in the 1970s and the path of change of the authoritarian regime in 1980.

Mechanisms of Labor Control

In spite of the steady increase of the labor force in numbers in the manufacturing industries, it was an underdeveloped social force in making demands during most of the period of the Yushin regime. Political authorities effectively controlled it through legal and organizational mechanisms. With the control mechanisms, they closely intervened in the processes of labor disputes and attempted to block any involvement of church-related organizations in the labor force.

Mechanisms of labor control had been developed even before the Yushin regime was launched. First, a legal device to prohibit labor from establishing an alliance with political parties, meaning opposition parties in particular, was already installed in 1963, i.e., two years after General Park Chung Hee gained power in a military coup. The revised labor laws included Article 13 which prevented political activity as follows: First, the labor union may not support a specific

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[8]ILO, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics* (1983).

political party or a candidate in the election; second, the labor union may not collect money for political campaigns; and finally, the fund of the labor union may not be used for political campaigns.[9]

Second, on 1 January 1970, the Special Law Governing Labor Unions and the Settlement of Labor Disputes in Enterprises Invested by Foreigners became effective. It was intended to prevent a repetition of the labor disturbance that occurred at two foreign manufacturing enterprises in 1968 and 1969. The law required approval by the office of Labor Administration to establish unions and the office's referral of all labor disputes for conciliation.[10]

Third, a more comprehensive measure followed immediately. The Law of Special Measures for the Security of the Nation (LSMSN), which was passed on 27 December 1971, virtually limited the three rights of labor: organization, collective bargaining, and collective action. The LSMSN is worthy of particular attention, since not only did it grant enormous emergency powers to President Park but also it was an unprecedentedly harsh one on the matter of dealing with the labor force. The LSMSN deprived workers of the rights of collective bargaining and collective action. With the LSMSN the scope of intervention by political authorities in the labor affairs was expanded also. The Labor Administration came to intervene directly in the settlement process of

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[9]Cited in NCCK, *[Scene and Witness of Labor]*, p. 58.

[10]George Ogle, "South Korea," in Albert A. Blum, ed., *International Handbook of Industrial Relations* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 512; Frederic C. Deyo, "State and Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development," in Frederic C. Deyo, ed., *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 188.

labor disputes and the adjustment of collective bargaining not only in the public industries but also in private ones which could not be touched by political authorities previously. In legal terms the right to organize unions remained for workers.[11] But it did not mean that political authorities guaranteed workers the right to organize unions in the real sense. Not only Labor Administration but also such security agencies as the KCIA, Military Security Commanding Agency and National Police intervened in the formation of new unions.[12] Even when a union was eventually approved legally, the employer held luxurious parties and gave material incentives to union leaders so as to transform the newly formed union into a cooperative one. Once a legally approved union was established, the political authorities did not allow a second union in the same enterprise. This was because the second union usually emerged as an independent union, whereas the existing union was an employer-controlled one through which workers' interests could not be transmitted. Along with the security agencies, the employer made various efforts to prevent the formation of the illegal but autonomous second union.

Based on those previous labor laws, the political authorities of the Yushin regime created more sophisticated labor laws and policy for effective control of the labor force. A revised labor law in 1973 and 1974 and the labor policy it contained was intended to decentralize the

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[11]Jeong-Taik Lee, "Export-oriented Industrialization, Labor Control and the Labor Movement in South Korea," *Korean Social Science Journal*, vol. 14 (1988), pp. 109-110.

[12]For details about the agencies' intervention, see Choi, *Labor and Authoritarian State*, pp. 93-103.

union structure at the cost of weakening the role of 17 industrial unions which linked the Federation of Korean Trade Unions with the unions at the enterprise level. The revised law emphasized the Labor-Management Council (LMC) and the Factory New Community Movement (FNCM) for industrial productivity and 'peace in industry'.

The LMC was a cushion designed to minimize impacts from the demands of the labor force in order to protect enterprises which pursued a value corresponding to one of the important legitimating values of the Yushin regime, i.e., increase in industrial productivity and finally development of national economy. Firms with employees of 50 to 99 were encouraged to establish an LMC, and those with more than 100 workers were required to do so.[13] For labor control, the institutional device of the LMC was always accompanied by the campaign of FNCM. The campaign, originally launched in rural areas, was extended to the urban areas just after the oil shock of 1973. It stressed close cooperation between workers and employer for the increase of production. According to the FNCM, workers had to take care of the factory as their own and to carry out given duties with sincerity, whereas the employer should make efforts to improve the working conditions and welfare of the workers. In this respect, the advocate of the FNCM, President Park, repeatedly maintained that the solidarity between workers and employers should be like a family relationship. In Confucian culture, such emphasis on the family relationship between workers and employers sounded plausible. Such a labor-management relationship was aimed at the patrimonial and authoritarian control of labor, which was one of the three types of

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[13]Lee, "Labor Control and Labor Movement," p. 112.

labor control that Richard Edwards has explained.[14]

Along with those control mechanisms, the political authorities occasionally mobilized the security agencies to prevent the development of solidarity between the labor force and the church. Since the horizontal alliance among opposition forces was considered the most dangerous challenge to the Yushin regime, the political authorities made every effort to forbid possible connections or to discontinue existing ties. In fact, the UIM (Urban Industrial Mission) and JOC (Jeunese Ouvriers Catholiques: Young Catholic Workers) supported workers in forming independent unions in manufacturing industries. While the UIM contacted workers while remaining outside factories, the JOC could work within factories because the JOC itself was composed of workers.[15] However, in common they associated with the team leaders of production lines and encouraged solidarity between rank and file workers.[16] Such approaches by the church organizations were first checked by employers. Since the labor force of the manufacturing industries during the period of the Yushin regime was mostly transformed from that of agriculture, many young wage workers resided in dormitories until they married. Their lives at work were not differentiated from off work, and thus the hierarchy of the work place functioned to control the individual lives

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[14]Richard Edwards, *Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1979), pp. 17-8.

[15]Choi, *Labor and Authoritarian State*, p. 94.

[16]Jeong-Taik Lee, "Dynamics of Labor Control and Labor Protest in the Process of Export-Oriented Industrialization in South Korea," *Asian Perspective*, vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1988), p. 146.

of the workers.[17] Thus it was possible for the employers to scrutinize their dormitory lives and to check their contact with churches.

Segmentation of the Labor Force

The underdevelopment of labor as a significant social force in the Yushin regime was due not only to the control mechanisms designed by the political authorities but also to the segmentation of the labor force based on education and gender. As an extreme comparison, a skilled male worker with a college education enjoyed relatively high privileges, on the one hand; and an unskilled female worker with lower than middle school education suffered from low wages and poor working conditions, on the other hand.

The segmentation of the labor force by and large originated from President Park's policy to emphasize heavy and chemical industries beginning in 1973. Investments in these industries rapidly increased, which resulted in a supply shortage of skilled and educated labor in these industries. Here we have to explain the process of segmentation from a macro-perspective, along with the microeconomic perspective of demand and supply of labor, to obtain a further understanding of the underdevelopment of the labor force in the Yushin regime.

The heavy and chemical industries already received 49.3% of the total investment in manufacturing industries in 1973, and yet their proportion of the total steadily increased, reaching 68.9% in 1979. Particularly, the trend of increase was so remarkable in the machinery industry that its proportion of the total investment in manufacturing

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[17]*Ibid.*, p. 145.

industries changed from 13.6% to 30.9% during the same period.[18] There was a crucial interplay between politics and the economy. In order to foster the heavy and chemical industries, the political authorities exercised autonomous power in the distribution of foreign capital to conglomerates called *'Jaebeol'* which are often compared with Japanese corporations named *zaibatsu.*[19] That is, the authorities were able to play the role of arbiter of the *Jaebeol* because of their reliance on foreign loan capital.[20] And in turn, those *Jaebeol* who had been indebted to the political authorities contributed to the achievement of the very significant legitimating value of the Yushin regime, economic development. In 1979 *Jaebeol* such as Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo and three other conglomerates received half of the total amount of investment in the Changwon Machinery Industrial Complex, which has been one of the biggest industrial concentrations. Meanwhile, the proportion of their own capital was as low as about 15%.[21]

Also the composition of the labor force in the manufacturing industries was transformed. The number of employees in all the three major industries steadily increased during the period of the Yushin regime. As shown in Table 6, however, changes in the ratio of employees should be noted. Of the total employees, the percentage in the textile

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[18]Han, *[Bureaucratic Authoritarianism]*, p. 161.

[19]Minho Kuk, "The Governmental Role in the Making of Chaebol in the Industrial Development of South Korea," *Asian Perspective*, vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1988), p. 108.

[20]Peter Evans, "Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia: Lessons for Latin Americanists," in Frederic C. Deyo, ed., *Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism*, p. 216.

[21]Han, *[Bureaucratic Authoritarianism]*, p. 164.

Table 6. Changes in the Composition of the Labor Force in Manufacturing Industries

(In Thousand Workers)

	1972	1976	1980
Total	973 (100%)	1,717 (100%)	2,015 (100%)
Textile	318 (32.7)	609 (35.5)	622 (30.9)
Chemical	112 (11.5)	224 (13.1)	265 (13.2)
Machinery	172 (17.7)	399 (23.2)	535 (26.5)
Others	371 (38.1)	485 (28.2)	593 (29.4)

Source: *Gwanggongeop Tonggye [Statistics of Mining and Manufacturing Industries]*, cited in Han, *[Bureaucratic Authoritarianism]*, p. 166.

industry fluctuated from 32.7% in 1972 to 35.5% in 1976 and 30.9% in 1980. On the other hand, the percentage working in the machinery industry steadily rose from 17.7% to 23.2%, and 26.5% during the same period, whereas that in the chemical industry increased slightly. In terms of demand and supply of the labor force, industrial development demanded both unskilled and less educated workers and the skilled and more educated workers at the same time. However, compared with the unlimited supply of the former, the supply of the latter became limited by the mid-1970s.[22] Of course, it was due to the fact that the heavy and chemical industries needed higher technology than the other traditional industries. The political authorities in the Yushin regime made use of the educational system and introduced qualifying examinations for a certificate so as to produce a skilled labor force. In 1974 they implemented the Law of Special Measures for Vocational Training which required the training of workers in all the enterprises with a certain number of employees. Meanwhile, they further supported

[22]Koo, "Political Economy of Income Distribution," p. 1034.

technical high schools to produce a large number of skilled workers. Moreover, they changed some of technical high schools to 'machinery' technical high schools for producing precision machinery workers. In 1975 the political authorities became more deeply involved in the supply of labor than ever before by introducing various levels of qualifying examinations and corresponding certificates.[23] Such a policy was intended to guarantee preferential treatment to the qualified workers in terms of promotion and wages. As a result, qualified college graduates with the highest certificate enjoyed relatively high privileges.

Such close intervention into the treatment of the labor force by the political authorities through controlling the labor supply brought about segmentation of the labor force based on education and gender. The segmentation infringed upon the unity of workers in enterprises and thwarted alliance among unions, finally delaying the development of the labor force as a unified social force.

First, education became a crucial factor which contributed to income disparity. For instance, as shown in the Table 7, the average income of the graduates of four year college was about four times as much as that of primary school graduates in the late 1970s. This income disparity widened significantly after the mid-seventies. Since the political authorities emphasized heavy and chemical industries requiring higher technology than traditional industries, workers with a higher level of education and with professional certificates in the engineering field were paid well. Of course, the deepening of industrialization was not the only reason for the income disparity among the different levels

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[23]Han, *[Bureaucratic Authoritarianism]*, pp. 173-4.

Table 7. Income Differences between Educational Groups

	Primary	Middle	High	2 Year College	4 Year College
1976	100	118	185	269	425
1977	100	112	176	259	405
1978	100	113	173	258	399
1979	100	113	163	240	376

Source: Labor Administration, *Hanguk Nodong Tonggye Yeongam [Yearbook of Labor Statistics]* (1977-80).

Note: The average income of primary school graduates was taken as 100.

Table 8. Income Disparity Based on Education and Gender

(In Korean currency: *Won*)

	Primary	Middle	High	2 Year College	4 Year College
Male	91,853 (184)	97,443 (195)	133,650 (268)	188,656 (378)	278,539 (558)
Female	49,887 (100)	52,141 (105)	76,947 (154)	111,965 (224)	164,684 (330)

Source: Labor Administration, *Hanguk Nodong Tonggye Yeongam [Yearbook of Labor Statistics]* (1979), p. 223.

Note: In ( ), the average income of female workers with middle school or lower education was taken as 100.

of education. Taking into account the fact that not all the college graduates worked as professional engineers,[24] there was another reason for the high income for the college graduates. This was a cultural bias toward rewarding education. In a society where educated persons have

[24]According to the data of the Labor Administration, some 62.4% of total college graduates worked as professional engineers, while the rest of them worked in administrative and managerial sectors. See Labor Administration, *Hanguk Nodong Tonggye Yeongam [Yearbook of Labor Statistics]* (1978).

traditionally been rewarded, the wage of a college graduate was always higher than that of a long-term employee with a high school diploma or less. College graduate employees in the administrative and managerial sectors were paid at a level equivalent to that of professional engineers.

Second, another cleavage, i.e., gender, confounded the income disparity. As seen in the Table 8, along with the educational differences, gender yielded big income differences. The average income of 'female workers with high school or lower education level' was remarkably low. It was a little more than a half of the male counterpart. Again, in a society where women were discriminated against, they had low education when compared with men. Those female workers with low education were employed in the labor-intensive manufacturing industries and in the service industries typically: garment and wig factories, textile industries, assembly lines of the electronic and machinery industries, sales, restaurants, and lodging businesses. Some 64% of the total number of female workers belonged to that category of occupation. Almost 80% of the total female labor force had to live below the minimum living standard.[25] Owing to the segmentation of the labor force, the demands, made by female workers with lower education, for wage increases, job security, and other rights were repressed by other segments of labor such as male and managerial workers as well as by the security agencies. Furthermore, their

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[25]In Ryeong Shin, "Hangukeui Yeoseongnodong Munje" [Issue of Female Labor in Korea], in Hyeon Chae Park, at al., *Hanguk Jabonjueuiwa Nodongmunje [Capitalism and Labor Issue in Korea]* (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1985), p. 363.

connection with any other social force was prevented by the advantaged segments of labor. As a result, as we shall see later, female workers with lower education became the most volatile part of the labor force at the end of the Yushin regime.

The segmentation of the labor force based on education and gender corresponded with the clustering of occupations. As an extreme case, managerial positions and professional engineers were predominantly held by male workers with a college education, whereas production-related occupations and the service sector were overwhelmingly dominated by female workers with a middle school or lower education. Accordingly, the segmentation of the labor force hindered development of its capacity for delegitimating the regime in the following respects. On the one hand, the horizontal tie between enterprise-level unions was blocked due to the political authorities' legal control of unionization. On the other hand, the vertical tie was obstructed by the corporatist control of labor through functionaries who were usually male managerial workers. Most of the female workers with low education were from the first generation working class who had migrated from the rural area, and thus they had no solid group consciousness yet to overcome those obstacles by themselves. Therefore, this labor force had to depend upon the church and resorted to violence when it became politicized at the end of the Yushin regime.

(3) LABOR ACTIVATION THROUGH SOLIDARITY WITH THE CHURCH

It was not a surprise that the underdeveloped social force, i.e., labor, became activated through solidarity with various church

organizations at the end of 1970s. It was due to the fact that the church had been the locus of the extra-official opposition forces condemning the legitimating values of the regime such as national security and economic development, under the PEM 9. This section will answer how the church solidified a relationship with labor. The answer to this question is significant in that it will suggest why the stance of the allied opposition forces could be characterized as radical, as we will see in Chapter 4.

The economic structure of South Korea, vulnerable to the international environment, had a direct impact on the labor force at the end of the 1970s. The two waves of oil shock of 1973 and 1979, along with the rapidly increased foreign debt[26] for fostering the heavy and chemical industries, contributed to inflation and price hikes. When the political authorities enforced a tight-money policy for the stabilization of the currency to alleviate inflation, some *jaebeol* as well as many small enterprises went bankrupt or cut down the operation of factories. As a result, the rate of unemployment rose: from 2.7% in the first half of 1978 to 3.6% in its second half and to 4.0% in the first quarter of 1979. Also overdue wages became a problematic issue in

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[26]The foreign debt increased rapidly during the second half of 1970s, as follows.

(In billion dollars)

1970	1975	1977	1978	1979	1980
2.3	8.5	12.6	14.9	20.5	27.4

Source: David I. Steinberg, *The Republic of Korea: Economic Transformation and Social Change* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 140.

that period.[27]

Given such frustrating situations, social forces such as labor, which had originally been segmented and underdeveloped, came to have closer contact with other social forces for articulating demands. In particular, labor relied upon the church organizations, such as the UIM, Christian Academy, and JOC. The relationship between them began with the church's approach to labor. This was the process of activation or politicization of labor. Here we have to investigate how the church solidified the relationship.

The activities of the church in industrial areas began when the Presbyterian church established the Committee for Industrial Evangelism in 1957. Shortly afterwards the Methodist, and Episcopal churches, and the Salvation Army joined in industrial evangelism in 1961, 1962, and 1965 respectively. Also a council of evangelism was formed in 1965 as a unified organization of working-level staffs. During the 1960s their activities focused on the salvation of individuals.[28] But as the export-oriented industrialization started to reveal several social problems, their attention shifted to how to deal with them. Staff members who participated in industrial evangelism realized that individual salvation was not enough, when they witnessed the poverty and poor working conditions of workers in the manufacturing industries, in particular. They felt the need for salvation of society as a whole. Accordingly, beginning in 1968 they used the term of 'urban industrial

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[27]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*., vol. 3, p. 1033.

[28]Seung Hyeok Jo, *Dosisaneopseongyoeui Insik [Understanding of Urban Industrial Mission]* (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1981), p. 88.

mission' instead of industrial evangelism.[29]

In spite of the repressive measures by the political authorities of the Yushin regime during the 1970s, the church in general and the UIM in particular solidified their relationship with the labor force, while sometimes disregarding legal constraints. It institutionalized the UIM by the formation of some related organizations. The Urban Rural Mission Committee was established within the NCCK in June 1976, and the Korea Christian Action Organization (KCAO) was formed in September of the same year by working-level staffs, while replacing the existing council type of organization.[30] Such institutionalization induced more participation by intellectuals and various sectors of churches.

What kinds of support did the church-related organizations provide? First, the church trained staff members and searched for popular support for missionary work within the church itself. The KCAO provided training programs for working-level staff and for mission works. The training was based on Saul Alinsky's organization theory and Paulo Freire's self-awareness theory, since its focus relied on fostering organizers in the workplace who would determine how to solve their own problems.[31] Moreover, the 'Declaration of Human Rights of Workers' by the Protestants and the Catholics on 10 March 1977 called attention to the industrial mission and suggested a common task of the church for the labor force. The declaration was not a simple manifesto for human rights but a challenge to the legitimating values of the Yushin regime.

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[29]*Ibid.*, p. 102.

[30]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 3, p. 1140.

[31]Jo, *[Understanding of UIM]*, p. 129.

> Human rights of workers are granted by the God and have significant meanings for social and economic development. Accordingly, the rights are of dignity, so that they should be protected by the law and that they may not be impaired for any reason. However, it is to be regretted that basic rights of workers and the labor law are infringed upon and that workers suffer from frequent inhumane treatment under the name of national security and economic development. We consider these to be unforgivable crimes.[32]

This statement was followed by more specific demands to the political authorities and employers for better working conditions and for restoring the rights of workers.

Second, staff members of the UIM educated workers through various programs and group activities. The latter was intended to train union leaders and to orient the direction of the labor movement. For example, the leadership training of labor movements conducted by the Ecumenical Modern Mission Council in April 1974 included several labor-related technical courses as follows: economic development and the labor issue, direction of labor policy, labor unions and labor-management relationships, direction and strategy for the labor movement, labor movements in western societies, new philosophies and strategies in modernizing society, and so on. Another leadership training program of labor leaders led by the Christian Academy after 1975 aimed at similar goals. Its prospectus stated that the purpose of education lay in promoting leadership of union staff and inculcating in them a sense of their responsibility and duty.[33]

Third, the UIM became directly involved in supporting labor

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[32]"1977 Nyeon Nodongja Ingweon Seoneonseo" [Declaration of Human Rights of Workers in 1977], declared at the united mass of the Protestant and the Catholic (10 March 1977), mimeograph.

[33]Jo, *[Understanding of UIM]*, pp. 130-1.

struggles initiated by the independent labor unions. Under the situation that independent labor unions could not be tolerated due to the repressive labor control by the political authorities, the UIM became the major source of support for the independent unions' struggle to maintain their organizations and to improve working conditions.

We should introduce two cases of the church's direct support for the labor struggle. These cases attracted the attention of church leaders as well as labor leaders and finally brought serious damage to the existing channel of labor control established by the political authorities. In July 1977, Cheonggae Garments Labor Union[34] in the Peace Market of Seoul came into conflict with the police, and then with the support of the Protestant and Catholic church leaders, the conflict developed into an incident that contributed to a crisis of legitimacy for the Yushin regime. The struggle by this union in 1977 was ignited by the death of a leather factory worker in a drain pipe caused by suffocation during cleaning (2 July 1977).[35] Angered not only by the factory's selfish cost-cutting policy which caused the death but also by the negligence of the authorities of the Labor Administration who were responsible for supervising the operation of the anti-pollution equipment of the factory, many fellow workers burst out into the street and confronted the police during his funeral. They were immediately joined by 300 workers from other labor unions, particularly the

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[34]After an exemplary labor leader Chun Tae Il's suicide by burning himself for the working conditions of clothing workers in the Peace Market in 1970, his mother Lee So Seon formed the Cheonggae Labor Union and made it known to the public.

[35]*Donga Ilbo*, 2 July 1977.

Cheonggae Labor Union, exclaiming against inhumane treatment of workers and demanding the improvement of working conditions. After a violent confrontation, forty-two workers were arrested, and two were hospitalized. The political authorities, who recognized the gravity of the situation in view of the violent clash on the street in an unprecedentedly big scale by workers, arrested Lee So Seon who was called the Mother of the Workers and ordered the closing of the 'Labor Classroom' established by her at the Peace Market (22 July). Furthermore, they accused the labor union of being communist and threatened the workers against attending the Labor Classroom.[36]

With the formation of the Peace Market Incident Countermeasure Committee by the Protestant and Catholic church leaders and workers, the church leadership became directly involved in the incident. The committee demanded the release of Lee So Seon and the reopening of the Labor Classroom and criticized the threat to dismantle the union. Also the committee planned to have a prayer meeting at the Labor Classroom on 5 August, but the meeting was aborted by tight police control. Here the UIM leader Rev. Cho Hwa Sun and a staff member of Korea Metropolitan Community Organization Lee Cheol Yong were beaten by the police, and many other workers were injured. Along with such violence, the authorities' forceful evacuation of the Labor Classroom by threatening the building owner infuriated the workers; as a result, the workers determined to fight. On 9 September a group of workers who succeeded in recovering the Labor Classroom by force went on a bloody protest against the police. Many of them attempted suicide by either disembowelment or

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[36]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 3, p. 1157.

jumping from the third floor and then were hospitalized for treatment. Astonished by the bloody protest, former president Yun Bo Seon, Cardinal Kim Su Hwan, General Secretary of NCCK Kim Gwan Seok, Rev. Park Hyeong Gyu and many bishops challenged the legitimacy of the regime. They said that the protest showed how the authorities had maintained the existing regime by repressing the labor force.[37] Furthermore, a charter for the rights of workers was issued during a prayer meeting on 23 December 1977 by the 'Human Rights Council for Peace Market Workers' which was established by five members. The charter read as follows.

> The political authorities have been pleased with ten billion dollars in exports and rapid economic development. However, for whom are the exports and the development? Now it is clear that a majority of citizens, workers in particular, were sacrificed for a small privileged class of foreign capital and monopoly. Workers in Korea have suffered from poverty, illness, and contemptuous treatment, just as ten years ago....[38]

And the charter demanded changes on the basis of several principles: first, a drastic change of working conditions, including the minimum wage and eight-hour working day; second, the end of discrimination against women workers; and third, the end of repression of autonomous and independent unions and a guarantee of the three basic rights of labor. Consequently, the Peace Market incident represented a case of organized labor stepping forward to be a spearhead of the opposition forces through the church's direct involvement in the labor issue.

Another case of the church's direct support of the labor struggle

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[37]"Gukmindeurege Deurineun Geul" [A Letter to the Nation], signed by former president Yun and 14 religious leaders (20 September 1977), mimeograph; and NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 3, p. 1158.

[38]"Hanguk Nodongja Ingweon Seoneon" [Charter of Human Rights for Korea's Workers], declared by Human Rights Council for Peace Market Workers (23 December 1977), mimeograph.

occurred at Dongil Textile of Incheon in 1978. Since Rev. Cho Hwa Sun of UIM began an industrial mission as a worker in 1966, the labor union in the company had changed from a male-dominated and company-controlled union to a female-dominated and independent one. However, it was not until 1972 that the union elected women leaders and staff members, even though women workers composed the absolute majority. The company's efforts to replace the new independent union by a company-supported union brought about a protest by naked women workers in July 1976. When the employer forcefully drove out workers from the conference room for the union leader election and then selected a company-supported union leader, infuriated women workers went on a sit-in and a hunger strike. But while the police were trying to arrest the strikers by wielding clubs, they took off their clothes in order not to be pulled out. Despite the desperate protest, seventy-two of them were arrested. Fifty workers fell down in a faint, and seventy were injured; furthermore, among them fourteen were hospitalized.[39]

The incident at which male workers wearing rubber gloves poured excrement on women members of the independent union occurred on the election day of union representatives (21 February 1978). The male workers banned those union members from casting ballots by force and destroyed the ballot boxes. Moreover, while the police were assuming an indifferent attitude, many women union members were beaten by the male workers, and fifty of them suffered injuries. On the next day the National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) declared the independent union a problem union and dissolved it by force. Also at a Central Committee

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[39]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 3, p. 1259.

meeting of the NUTW in March, its president Kim Yeong Tae called the UIM a communist organization[40] and labelled the independent union of Dongil Textile its proxy.[41]

The incident in February and the charge of communism against the UIM resulted in the formation of the Dongil Textile Incident Countermeasure Council by leading figures of various circles (21 March 1978).[42] This council agreed with high ranking political authorities that union status should be restored before the February election.[43] But the agreement was not realized. The company dismissed 126 women workers on 1 April; furthermore, the NUTW sent the list of dismissed workers to every company with an order not to employ them. To such inhumane treatment of the women workers, the NCCK formed a countermeasure committee for the industrial mission and sent letters of protest to the Minister of Internal Affairs and the President of Dongil Textile. Also the NCCK campaigned to assist financially those dismissed workers.[44]

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[40]Coinciding with NUTW's charge, a book which accused the UIM of being communist was distributed to workers for the spread of a campaign against the UIM. The book was Ji Yeong Hong's *Saneop Seongyoneun Mueoseul Norineunga [What is the Urban Industrial Mission aiming at?]* (Seoul: Geumnan Chulpansa, 1977).

[41]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 3, pp. 1260-1.

[42]The council was composed of a large number of members: 9 advisors including former president Yun and NCCK leaders, a committee chair, four vice-chairs, a secretary, and 119 committee members. Cf. "Dongil Bangjik Sageonedaehan Seongmyeongseo" [A Statement about Dongil Textile Incident] (27 March 1978), mimeograph.

[43]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 3, pp. 1263-4.

[44]"Dongil Bangjik Haegogeunrojareul Dopgiwihan Gonggae Seohan" [An Official Letter for the help of the Dismissed Workers of Dongil Textile], signed by president and secretary of NCCK and members of the

The incidents at Dongil Textile and the Peace Market exemplified many cases of the activation of labor through solidarity with the church at the end of the 1970s. Faced with the solidifying relationship between labor and the church, the political authorities tightened their repression over the church in general and the UIM in particular. The repression was not the simple coercion which was applied to other opposition forces but a particular one accusing it of communism. The church's doctrine was actually incompatible with communism. But the church was no longer immune from repression even in the ideological sense, due to such charges by the political authorities.

(4) CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown how labor became politicized to delegitimate the Yushin regime. The labor activation was a fatal threat to the regime: The regime failed to control the labor force through functionaries at various levels of union hierarchy; and the labor activation brought about another serious blow to the legitimating values of the regime.

In spite of its remarkable contribution to economic development, labor had been an underdeveloped social force that could not articulate its demands and grievances until the end of the 1970s. There were some reasons for this. The political authorities controlled the labor force not only through legal mechanisms but through intervention into labor affairs by force, if necessary. Repressive labor laws were intended to

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Countermeasure Committee for the Industrial Mission (July 1978), mimeograph.

prevent any possible connection between the existing unions and other institutions such as the church and even the higher levels of the union structure. Also the LMC was designed to protect enterprises, which pursued increases in productivity, from labor disputes. Such legal devices were accompanied by the campaign of the FNCM that emphasized the cooperation and bond between labor and management and ultimately aimed at the patrimonial control of labor. Furthermore, the political authorities mobilized the security agencies to solve labor disputes by force.

Such mechanisms for direct control of labor were not the only reason that labor remained as an underdeveloped social force. Not only the increase in the demand for the labor force but also the involvement of the political authorities in controlling the supply of the labor force in order to foster the heavy and chemical industries brought about a segmentation of labor. The political authorities took special measures to generate a supply of highly skilled and educated labor forces to those industries. However, such close involvement in the flow of the labor force brought about cleavages in the labor force, along the lines of gender and education. For example, female workers with lower educational level were discriminated against in terms of wages and working conditions.

Given that situation, it was natural for the labor force to become activated and politicized through solidarity with the church at the end of the Yushin regime. The UIM and the JOC mostly contributed to the activation of labor. The church's approach to labor showed some similarities to that of Latin American cases, particularly the Brazilian

case. The church hierarchy encouraged and supported the grass-roots approach through which the workers learned to organize and articulate their demands.[45] Furthermore, when inhumane treatment of labor disputes occurred, as seen in the incidents of the Peace Market and the Dongil Textile, the church leaders became directly involved in the cases.

Labor activation through solidarity with the church contributed significantly to the denunciation of the legitimating value of economic development. Not only did the activated labor force protest inhumane treatment and poor working conditions of the workers, but also its role became significant in the delegitimation of the existing regime. Furthermore, the solidarity between labor and the church paved the way toward the formation of an informal alliance between the official and extra-official opposition forces, as in the Y.H. incident of 1979 which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

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[45]Cf. Daniel H. Levine and Scott Mainwaring, "Religion and Popular Protest in Latin America: Contrasting Experiences," in Susan Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest*, p. 213.

CHAPTER 4. LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF THE YUSHIN REGIME

In the previous two chapters, we have discussed the two processes that produced a legitimacy crisis: the diversification of the object of opposition and the formation of a new opposition force. That is, we examined 'what' the opposition rejected and then 'who' joined the opposition that led to a legitimacy crisis. Our task now is to answer the following questions: What were the features of the legitimacy crisis of the Yushin regime? How did the confrontation between the political authorities and the opposition escalate?

Under the legitimacy crisis, to use neo-Marxist terms, the political system no longer has the capacity to inspire sufficient beliefs and loyalty, since the political authorities are unable to produce legitimating ideologies.[1] From the perspective of the opposition in authoritarian regimes particularly, the concept of legitimacy crisis connotes that the legitimating values imposed by the political authorities, such as economic development and national security, are not considered legitimate at all. Accordingly, at the moment of legitimacy crisis, it is natural for the opposition forces to resort to an alliance.

In South Korea, the second half of 1979 was noted as a period of legitimacy crisis. The feature of this crisis that we will discuss in this chapter was as follows. Following an alliance among the extra-

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[1]James O'Connor, *The Meaning of Crisis: A Theoretical Introduction* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 110-1.

official opposition forces, a loose but timely alliance was formed between the now radicalized opposition party and the extra-official opposition forces when the Y.H. incident occurred in August. Faced with such an alliance, the political authorities took repressive measures consistently, as shown in the expulsion of Kim Yeong Sam from the National Assembly and in the repression of the Busan-Masan Uprising. This repressiveness by the political authorities at this critical juncture stemmed from the employment of a divide-and-rule tactic by Park and from his anti-American sentiment boosted by diplomatic strain, discussed in Chapter 2.

(1) ALLIANCE BETWEEN OFFICIAL AND EXTRA-OFFICIAL OPPOSITIONS

As the most important feature of the legitimacy crisis, the alliance between the opposition forces should be noted. The alliance has a coupling effect in destabilizing the regime in the sense that any disturbance between the political authorities and one of the opposition forces will soon develop into a contradiction between the political authorities and the opposition forces as a whole. Whether the alliance is formal or informal, a repressive measure applied by the political authorities to one component of the allied opposition will be translated into the repression of all components of the alliance. When the classical middle class such as the church and the intellectuals form an alliance with labor, efforts of the political authorities to dismantle the independent labor unions will strengthen the alliance and escalate the contradiction between the political authorities and the alliance. Undoubtedly, this coupling effect occurred in 1979 of South Korea.

At the end of the Yushin regime, the formation of such an alliance developed in two steps. First, a solid alliance was established between the extra-official opposition forces only, because the NDP remained semiloyal to the regime. With the release of former presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung who had been imprisoned since the Myeong Dong incident of 1976, the existing National Alliance for Democracy (NAD)[2] was reorganized and developed into the National Alliance for Democracy and Unification (NADU) of Yun Bo Seon, Hahm Seok Heon, and Kim Dae Jung as the co-chairmen (1 March 1979). Second, another alliance was formed between the extra-official forces and the newly emerged radical NDP leadership centered around Kim Yeong Sam through the Y.H incident in August. This alliance represented a temporary but timely and significant alliance between the two components of the opposition: the extra-official opposition forces such as the NADU, the church, and labor, on the one hand, and the official opposition force, the NDP, on the other. This section will focus on describing the creation of the second alliance and its coupling effect in generating a high level of system stress in 1979.

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[2]The NAD was established on 5 July 1978 by former president Yun Bo Seon and Rev. Mun Ik Hwan. This alliance included various opposition forces, such as journalists, literary men, dismissed professors, lawyers, youth, and prisoners' families. While proposing to fight against Park's dictatorship, the NAD presented the following goals for the struggle: (1) guarantees for the right of survival of disadvantaged social groups, (2) an independent national economy, (3) national unification, (4) freedom of the press and democratic education, and (5) an independent diplomacy of national sovereignty. However, because of the continuous repression of the organization leaders by the security agencies, the NAD largely relied upon the issuing of statements as its main activity.

Emergence of the Radical NDP Leadership

The 10th National Assembly election held on 12 December 1978 was significant in two respects. First, the opposition party, the NDP, succeeded in winning more support than the ruling party, the DRP, even though the latter took more seats than the former. As shown in Table 9, the NDP took 32.8% of the votes while DRP received only 31.7%. However, such an election result by no means brought about any change in the status of the DRP in the National Assembly, since one-third of the assemblymen -- *Yujeonghoe* who were elected by the rubber stamp organization, the NCU, on the recommendation of the president -- remained as partners of the ruling camp in the legislature. Second, the fact that independent candidates won 28.1% of the votes was remarkable. The percentage was close to that of the two major parties, even though independents were underrepresented in the number of seats.

In the analysis of the election results, one point should be noted. When compared with the results of the previous election held in 1972, the independents in 1978 emerged at the cost of the DRP. The number of votes for the independents rose from 18.6% to 28.1%, while those for the

Table 9. Comparison of National Assembly Elections of 1973 and 1978

	Total	DRP	NDP	DUP	Independent
% of Vote	100.0 (100.0)	31.7 (38.7)	32.8 (32.6)	7.4 (10.1)	28.1 (18.6)
No. of Seats	154 (146)	68 (73)	61 (52)	3 (2)	22 (19)

Source: *Donga Yeongam* 1974, p. 187 for 1973 data; and *Donga Yeongam* 1979, p. 293 for 1978 data.

Note: ( ) indicates the 1973 election results.

DRP decreased from 38.7% to 31.7%, on the one hand; and the NDP retained a relatively stable percentage of the votes, on the other hand. The result was that the NDP won over the DRP in terms of the percentage of the vote.

All the opposition forces considered the NDP's winning over the DRP by 1.1% to reveal a new momentum. For the extra-official opposition, the fact that the ruling party lost the election, despite its advantage of material and institutional resources, meant the complete loss of legitimacy for the regime. For the NDP, it suggested that there was a stable public support which was accompanied by a new demand for terminating its previous stance as the 'semiloyal' opposition party.

As a result, the 1978 election contributed to the downfall of Lee Cheol Seung's collective leadership of the NDP, which had taken a semiloyal stance. Based on his personal networks with other members of the collective leadership, Lee's mainstream had predominated over the more aggressive leader Kim Yeong Sam and Kim's associates. But the debate on the nomination of a new speaker of the National Assembly in March 1979 provided Kim with a chance to challenge the party leadership. The ruling camp of the legislature, the DRP and the *Yujeonghoe*, decided to support one of the lawmakers elected by the NCU, Baek Du Jin, as the speaker of the new session of the National Assembly. The NDP was determined to checkmate the ruling camp's move, but it split over how to counter the approval of Baek. Lee's collective leadership maintained the moderate party line, that is, to participate and vote against Baek, while Kim and most of the NDP lawmakers insisted upon a boycott on the ground that to participate and vote could be considered to be a

legitimation of the existing authority structure. On 17 March, only seven members from the NDP participated in the vote: Lee Cheol Seung, five other representatives of the collective leadership, and a floor leader. Their participation brought a serious blow to Lee's collective leadership. Consequently, within the NDP two umbrella camps gradually formed around Lee on the one hand and Kim on the other before the party convention of the NDP.[3]

Kim Yeong Sam was elected as the party head at the party convention of the NDP (30 May 1979). Kim's alternative party line of 'restoration of democracy' challenged and won over Lee Cheol Seung's 'middle-of-the-road' and 'reform through participation' within the institution. With the support of one of the co-chairmen of the NADU, Kim Dae Jung,[4] and other party members who were dissatisfied with Lee's stance, Kim Yeong Sam returned to the party leadership again three years after his defeat by Lee in 1976.

With Kim Yeong Sam's return to the NDP leadership, the official opposition came into a new era. On 5 June, nine independent assemblymen announced their intention to enter the NDP. Provided that they joined the NDP, it could have two more seats than the ruling DRP: The latter kept 68 seats, while the former came to have 70 seats. It would be the

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[3]*Donga Yeongam* 1980, p. 115.

[4]Kim Dae Jung made his first public appearance in seven years and gave a speech supporting Kim Yeong Sam for the office of party president on the eve of the party convention. Kim Dae Jung's support for Kim Yeong Sam was more than a personal one, since the former was one of the three co-chairmen of the NADU and had many associates remaining in the NDP. That is, his support as a leader of extra-official opposition alliance and his associates' support contributed to Kim Yeong Sam's winning at the leadership competition.

first time in parliamentary history in South Korea that the opposition party outnumbered the ruling party, even though the opposition party could not form an absolute majority in the National Assembly because of the *Yujeonghoe*, one-third membership elected by the NCU on the recommendation of the president.

The ruling camp in the legislature, which had been astonished by a series of drastic changes in the opposition party, threatened those independents and the NDP through covert coercion and an open criticism. First, it applied pressure on the independent lawmakers not to join the NDP. Only two days after their announcement of joining NDP, two of the nine independents reported to the NDP that they had to rescind their intention to join. They told the NDP headquarters that the reason was that leaders of their electoral districts wanted them to hold back on their decision to join the NDP. As the NDP asserted, however, it could hardly be seen as actions taken of their own choice but as a result of pressure by the security agencies.[5] Second, the ruling camp made use of Kim Yeong Sam's interview with foreign journalists in order to attack the NDP. On 11 June 1979 Kim stated that he was ready to meet North Korea's President Kim Il Seong to discuss the matter of national unification.[6] To this proposal North Korea responded positively through a statement by the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) and suggested

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[5]*Haptong Press*, cited in *FBIS (Asia & Pacific)*, 7 June 1979.

[6]In this interview, Kim also called for the abolition of PEM 9 and denounced a legitimating value of the Yushin regime, that is, national security. Saying that the NDP should restore genuine democracy for true national security, he maintained that promotion of democracy was a precondition of national security. *Daegu Maeil Sinmun*, cited in *FBIS (Asia & Pacific)*, 12 June 1979.

holding a preliminary conference between the KWP and the NDP. The ruling camp first criticized Kim's proposal and North Korea's response with a relatively moderate tone, but later it charged Kim's proposal with being an anti-*gukga* activity and urged him to cancel the proposal. Moreover, pro-ruling camp organizations accused the opposition leader of being a communist, and some 200 disabled veterans stormed into the NDP headquarters (22 June).[7] However, such repressive measures by the ruling camp contributed to the formation of a public opinion which was sympathetic to NDP leader Kim. Furthermore, the NADU issued a statement supporting Kim Yeong Sam's proposal and pledged collaboration in struggling against the Yushin regime.[8]

The radicalization of the opposition party and the repression by the ruling camp of the legislature became public with the interpellation session of the National Assembly (from 20 to 31 July 1979). Kim Yeong Sam demanded the abolition of the PEM 9 and the amendment of the constitution in his opening address of the session, and the NDP issued a bill calling for the formation of an ad hoc parliamentary committee for the revision of the constitution. But the ruling camp was determined to block the resolution and continued the session in the absence of the opposition members, after floor leaders of both camps failed to reach an agreement on the matter of the ad hoc committee. In the midst of such a limping operation of the session, Mun Bu Sik, the editor-in-chief of the NDP organ *Democratic Front*, was arrested on a charge of violating PEM 9 (30 July). This arrest was the result of Mun's report on the party

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[7]*Donga Yeongam* 1980, p. 116.

[8]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 4, p. 1729.

leader Kim's opening address of the National assembly session, which had demanded amendment of the Yushin Constitution.[9] His arrest drove the NDP to its last resort: an alliance with the extra-official opposition forces such as the church and the labor force in the Y.H. incident in August. Even though such alliance was an informal one, its effect on the escalation of the system stress was enormous.

Alliance Created by the Y.H. Incident

A politically significant event in 1979, called the Y.H. Incident, started with the protest of the jobless workers of a bankrupt enterprise. Jang Yong Ho, founder of the Y.H. Trading Company, had successfully expanded the company at the end of the 1960s, but he turned the ownership over to his relatives and moved to the United States while taking out assets from the company. When the company went bankrupt and finally closed its dormitory, some 200 women workers lost their jobs by surprise. The NDP president Kim provided the workers with the office of the NDP headquarters as a place for a sit-in, on the request of such opposition leaders as Professor Lee Mun Yeong, Rev. Mun Dong Hwan, and poet Go Eun (9 August). The NDP organized the Countermeasure Committee for Social and Labor Issues and demanded that the political authorities cooperate in the resolution of the Y.H. case. Also the NDP leaders requested that the police not become involved in this case. However, at two o'clock in the morning on 11 August, the police stormed the headquarters building of the NDP. While the police were evacuating the workers by using violence, one worker, Kim Gyeong Suk, died from the

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[9]*Donga Yeongam* 1980, p. 117.

cutting of an artery and from a contusion. Furthermore, the police beat sixteen lawmakers and all the journalists in the building, and among them four lawmakers were hospitalized. Kim Yeong Sam was the only person in the building who was not beaten by the police.[10]

We have to pay special attention to how the political authorities conceived and responded to the incident. They considered it to be a new challenge that the workers, whose union had been supported by the UIM, staged a sit-in protest in the headquarters of the NDP. That is, they conceived of the sit-in protest as a planned and organized alliance between the official and extra-official opposition forces -- the opposition party, labor, and the church -- even though such an alliance was in fact only an informal and loose one.

Such a conception of the situation by the political authorities was accompanied by repressive measures. They were determined to crack down on the wirepullers of the sit-in, in particular, and to dismantle the link between the NDP, the church, and labor, in general. First, the police made efforts to find out leaders and supporters who were directly involved in the protest. The Police Department of Seoul investigated 179 workers and then indicted four staff members of the labor union of the company. Also the police indicted Yeongdeungpo UIM's Rev. In Myeong Jin, Vice-President of the KCAO Rev. Mun Dong Hwan, Secretary Seo Gyeong Seok, former professor Lee Mun Yeong, and poet Go Eun (17 August).

Second, the ruling camp of the National Assembly denounced the UIM as an 'impure element' that was operating under the pretense of religion. A joint meeting of the DRP and the *Yujeonghoe* concluded that

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[10]*Ibid.*, p. 118.

the UIM aimed not only at the breakdown of the Yushin regime but also at the establishment of socialism. Accordingly, they urged the administration to make an organized effort to break off the UIM's involvement in labor affairs.[11] This ruling camp's denunciation of the UIM was followed by a flood of criticisms over the UIM in the daily newspapers, which were under the tight censorship of the political authorities.

Finally, the ruling camp of the National Assembly accused the NDP of making an illicit use of a simple labor dispute for the purpose of politicizing the labor force and finally of threatening the existence of the political community. It is notable that the ruling camp viewed the NDP's involvement in the Y.H. incident in the same context as NDP leader Kim Yeong Sam's proposal to meet North Korea's leader Kim Il Seong.[12] As we have seen in Chapter 2, this type of denunciation against the opposition originated from a different conception of the opposition movements held by the opposition and the political authorities, respectively. The opposition confined its activities to the denunciation of the existing regime, whereas the political authorities regarded the activities as a challenge to the persistence of the political community.

The repressive measures of the political authorities, shown in the Y.H. incident and afterwards, virtually cemented the alliance between the official and the extra-official opposition forces, i.e., the NDP, the church, and the opposition groups under the umbrella of NADU.

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[11]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 4, p. 1595.

[12]*Donga Ilbo*, 18 August 1979.

First, shortly after the incident, the NDP hung the party flag at half-mast and began a sit-in protest at the party headquarters. Also the NDP leader Kim refuted the charge against the church. He maintained that with the incident, the political authorities put pressure on religious organizations by labelling them communists, and he declared that the NDP was determined to fight for freedom of religion.[13]

Second, various denominations of the Christian church, along with the families of prisoners, staged sit-in protests and issued statements on the Y.H. incident. Furthermore, the KCAO brought out a statement, in which the nation-wide UIMs denounced not only the political authorities for accusing the UIM of being an impure element but also the mass media for disseminating fallacious information about the incident.[14] The National Council of Churches in Korea formed the Countermeasure Committee for the Issues of the Urban Industrial Mission and made an effort to prevent the political authorities from attempting to institute the limitation of the church's missionary activity.

Finally, the leading figures of the extra-official opposition groups formed the Countermeasure Committee for the Y.H. Incident on 23 August 1979. The committee was composed of more than one hundred members. It had five advisors; three of them were co-chairmen of the NADU -- Yun Bo Seon, Hahm Seok Heon, and Kim Dae Jung -- and two of them were Yun Ban Ung and Park Hyeong Gyu, representing the Catholic and the

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[13]"Jonggyojayu Suhoreul Wihan Teukbyeol Damhwamun" [Special Announcement for Freedom of Religion], presented by Kim Yeong Sam (22 August, 1979), cited in *Donga Yeongam* 1980, p. 119.

[14]"Y.H. Sageone Daehan Seongmyeongseo" [A Statement about the Y.H. Incident], issued by the KCAO (17 August 1979), mimeograph.

Protestant churches, respectively. In the statement issued by the committee, they accused the political authorities of using violence against the assemblymen and journalists and of repressing the industrial mission.[15] Consequently, the Y.H. incident and the following repressive measures by the political authorities provided the official and extra-official opposition with the grounds for collaboration in struggling against the political authorities and the regime.

(2) THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES' INCREASING REPRESSIVENESS

The confrontation between the allied radical opposition and the repressive political authorities escalated and led to the expulsion of the NDP president Kim Yeong Sam from the National Assembly, the Busan-Masan Uprising, and repression by the military forces which were under President Park's tight control. However, Park's divide-and-rule tactic brought about severe competition between his close aides and finally led to his death on 26 October 1979. A series of events that occurred in October represented the most extreme case of the legitimacy crisis -- assassination of the top leader and collapse of the authority structure centered around him.

Expulsion of NDP Leader

In the midst of the turbulent situation caused by the Y.H. incident, the leadership of the NDP faced a challenge from the faction which had supported the former collective leadership. Three chairmen of

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[15]"Y.H. Sageone Daehan Seongmyeongseo" [A Statement about the Y.H. Incident], issued by the Countermeasure Committee for the Y.H. Incident (23 August 1979), mimeograph.

the NDP district chapters filed a lawsuit which sought an injunction to prevent party president Kim Yeong Sam and four vice-presidents from carrying out their jobs (13 August). According to the lawsuit, the election result of the party convention in May, where Kim Yeong Sam won two votes more than 50% of the total votes, was an invalid one. This was based on the fact that some 25 voting members who were unqualified due to having violated the PEM 9 had supported Kim. On 8 September, the court ruled that the authority of party president Kim and four vice-presidents should not be exercised, and then it nominated the chairman of the party convention, Jeong Un Gap, as the acting president.[16]

With the court's decision, the moderate faction within the NDP appeared to reemerge while splitting the party into two, whereas the political authorities welcomed the suspension of Kim's party presidency. They suggested that they would resume talks with the NDP, if Jeong would accept the acting presidency. Moreover, the Minister of Culture and Information, Kim Seong Jin, issued an announcement stating that the political authorities would no longer consider Kim Yeong Sam's statements to be official ones representing the NDP but to be private opinion (10 September). Accordingly, in the announcement, the minister did not use the title of president but 'Mr.' or 'Assemblyman'.[17]

The repressive political authorities did not simply wait for the semiloyal opposition group to gain the leadership in the NDP. Instead, they tried to paralyze Kim Yeong Sam's leadership, by making use of Kim's interview with a reporter of the *New York Times* on 16 September.

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[16]*Donga Ilbo*, 8 September 1979.

[17]*Donga Yeongam* 1980, p. 120.

The content of the interview was not only a challenge to the Yushin regime but also an expression of blame against the lukewarm attitudes of the United States toward the Yushin regime:

> Carter gave a big present to Park by coming here. He gave Park the courage to wipe out the opposition by boosting his prestige here....Whenever I tell American officials that only by public and direct pressure on Park can the U.S. bring him under control, they say that they cannot interfere in the domestic politics of South Korea....This is a phony theory. Doesn't U.S. have 30,000 ground troops here to protect us? What is this if not interference in domestic affairs?[18]

Shortly after the report, the DRP and the *Yujeonghoe* labelled Kim a 'flunky' to the U.S. and tabled a motion in the National Assembly in order to discipline him. The formal charge was that Kim stood against the constitution and the political community by spreading false facts which endangered national security and the national interest. Accordingly, the ruling camp prepared a detailed list of items so as to penalize Kim and finally decided to expel him from the National Assembly as a type of discipline.[19] Despite the NDP's statement to refute the motion, on 4 October, the ruling camp alone voted to pass it, while the police prohibited the NDP members from entering the conference room.[20] In response to the expulsion of Kim, at first the NDP decided to boycott the regular session of the National Assembly. Thereafter, all the NDP lawmakers handed in their written resignations (13 October).

The expulsion of Kim was by no means a separate incident. It

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[18]*New York Times*, 16 September 1979.

[19]The list covered not only the *New York Times* interview on 16 September but also Kim's previous statements and press conferences. Notably his proposal to meet North Korea's Kim Il Seong (11 June) was included in the list.

[20]*Donga Ilbo*, 4 October 1979.

should be understood in the context of a series of events, including the arrest of the editor-in-chief of the NDP organ, *Democratic Front*, repressive measures connected with the Y.H. incident, attacks on the UIM by labelling it an 'impure element', and the court's injunction against the NDP leadership. Such events, along with the activation of labor owing to its solidarity with the church, contributed to the strengthening of the alliance between all the opposition forces and finally to the eruption of a violent uprising.

Busan-Masan Uprising

As soon as the fall semester of 1979 began, the university campuses were stormed by student demonstrations. Students of three universities in Daegu issued a statement, entitled "What If We Cannot Become the Vanguard in the Dark Age", and burst into the street. In the statement, they demanded repeal of the Yushin Constitution, sincere endeavors for national unification, the end of the economic policy of depending on foreign capital, and protection of labor rights. The demonstration resulted in a violent clash between the students and the police and the arrest of 87 students.[21] This was followed by several demonstrations at university campuses in Seoul. Finally, the student demonstrations at universities in the Busan area developed into a popular uprising in which not only students but also city-dwellers participated.

Some 40 days after the violent clash on the street at Daegu, the Busan National University students read aloud the "Declaration of struggle for Democracy and National Salvation" and ran off the campus

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[21]Lee, *[Student Movements]*, pp. 377-8.

(16 October). As the students demonstrated in the downtown streets, they were joined by Donga University students. About 6,000 students participated and were involved in a violent clash with the riot police; as a result, some 1,000 students and policemen were injured,[22] and 282 students were arrested.[23] As soon as the city-dwellers joined on the next day, the demonstration developed into a violent popular uprising (17 October). Under the cloak of darkness, some of the protesters raided and destroyed several police stations as well as many police vehicles. They also damaged the buildings of the *Busan Daily*, KBS Busan Broadcasting Station, and the Revenue Office. More than 300 students and 90 citizens were reportedly arrested on the second day.[24]

The uprising was a 'spontaneous' eruption without any particular organization's involvement. This spontaneous character of the uprising stemmed from the composition of the participants. They were mostly drawn from wage workers and day laborers, with the exception of the students. This feature of the uprising could hardly bring about any positive response from the political authorities.[25] Since the

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[22]Sang Uh Lee, "10.26 Jeonyaeui Bancheje Undong" [Opposition Movements on the Eve of the October 26th Incident], *Shindonga*, no. 3 (1986), p. 207.

[23]Su Eon Lee, "Bumasataeeui Jangmakeul Beodginda" [Unveil the Busan-Masan Incident], *Shindonga*, no. 5 (1985), P. 289.

[24]*Kyodo Press*, cited in *FBIS (Asia & Pacific)*, 17 October 1979.

[25]A disadvantaged social group which has no organized channel for the articulation of demands and grievances to the political authorities spontaneously explode as the mood of confrontation escalates. Since the accumulated demands and grievances are expressed suddenly, the eruption is easily accompanied by violence. The participants usually attack visible symbols of authority like the tax collector's office, police station, broadcasting station, and other administration buildings. However, the asymmetrical relationship between the unorganized

protesters overwhelmed the police, President Park decided to declare martial law and to send airborne troops by consulting the Chief of Staff of the Army, Jung Seung Hwa, in order to quell the violent protest.[26] But it was notable that the mobilization of the military was prior to the declaration of martial law in Busan. While the protesters were rushing to the broadcasting station, scores of military trucks approached to disperse them. It was a few hours before midnight on 18 October when martial law became effective.[27]

Even though the declaration of martial law and the brutal suppression by the airborne troops contributed to the tranquility in Busan, they did not put an end to the radical protest. On 18 October, one day after the massive violence in Busan, some 10,000 protesters including students led another violent protest in Masan, one of the free export zones of South Korea. At sunset, they destroyed the DRP office, a broadcasting station, and a newspaper office, and then set fire to several police stations.[28] The participation of high school students, wage workers, and day laborers brought about fierce violent protests on the two following days. Compared with the Busan protest, however, the

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participants of the spontaneous eruption and the organized political authorities tends to bring about the defeat of the former by the latter. On the notion of spontaneity, see Thomas H. Greene, *Comparative Revolutionary Movements: Search for Theory and Justice* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 3rd edition, pp. 88-92. For the discussion of the relationship between the organization of the participants and the effectiveness, see William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1975), Chapter 7.

[26]Gap Je Jo, *Gunbu [The Military]* (Seoul: Joseon Ilbosa, 1988), p. 115.

[27]Lee, [Unveil the Busan-Masan Incident], p. 291.

[28]*Ibid.*, p. 298.

violent protest at Masan was even more accidental and less organized. The students raised mainly campus issues, while other citizens did not call for repeal of the Yushin regime.[29] Accordingly, the political authorities issued a garrison decree over the area of Masan and Changwon at noon of 20 October.[30]

The political authorities and the allied opposition forces responded in quite different ways to the uprising in Busan and Masan. On the one hand, President Park issued a harsh announcement. He labelled the students and the citizens who participated in the protest 'impure elements' destroying social order, harming the national interest, and threatening the constitution through their agitation and violence.[31] Accordingly, he became determined to root out the so-called impure elements. On the other hand, the co-chairmen of the NADU -- Yun Bo Seon, Hahm Seok Heon, and Kim Dae Jung -- issued a statement in which they criticized the declaration of martial law and the use of the airborne division, by saying that the political authorities "mobilized the armed forces, who should make their best endeavors to defend the nation, for the purpose of securing the existing regime".[32] Also on 25 October, the political committee of the NDP

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[29]*Ibid.*, p. 301.

[30]The garrison decree is that the army is stationed in a certain area so as to guard the area and to watch arsenals, buildings and other facilities of the army. Unlike martial law which is declared from the top political authorities, the garrison decree is issued at the request of the local authorities.

[31]"Damhwamun" [A Statement], issued by the president (18 October 1979), cited in *Donga Yeongam* 1980, pp. 133-4.

[32]"Damhwamun" [A Statement], issued by the co-chairmen of the NADU (23 October 1979), mimeograph.

decided to fully support the Busan-Masan Uprising.

Considering that the Busan-Masan Uprising occurred on the days around the seventh anniversary of the launching of the Yushin regime, the uprising turned out to be a timely explosion by the city dwellers, at the initiative of the students. Most of the city dwellers were drawn from those social groups which had been the least organized for expressing their demands to the political authorities during the Yushin regime. Their accumulated dissatisfaction exploded with violence on the anniversary of the regime. In addition, the harsh measures taken by the political authorities against Kim Yeong Sam were immediately conducive to the uprising in Kim's political base and hometown. The participants expressed their support of Kim Yeong Sam in front of the NDP Busan district office; furthermore, some of them insisted that they should attack the court on the ground that the court had accepted the lawsuit to suspend Kim's party presidency.[33]

Sources of the Repressiveness

Why did the political authorities, particularly President Park, take such repressive measures at the period when the legitimacy of the regime was critically challenged? How did they perceive a series of events that occurred at the time of the legitimacy crisis and what made them believe that the repressive measures were the only means to solve the crisis? In order to answer these questions, we should examine the informal authority structure around the president at the end of the Yushin regime and then President Park's anti-American sentiment which

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[33]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 4, p. 1764.

led to his ignoring U.S. pressure on the human rights issue. To answer the question also requires an explanation of the internal conflict among the political authorities, which resulted in the assassination of the president.

President Park had used the tactic of 'divide-and-rule'[34] for the control of his associates and institutions. On the one hand, he employed this tactic by the establishment of the *Yujeonghoe*, which consisted of one third of the National Assembly members. Not only did he always want to control the National Assembly with an absolute majority, but also he wanted this new semiparty organization to check the DRP. This divide-and-rule was successful in that the *Yujeonghoe* showed loyalty to the president and in that the DRP remained as a ruling party subordinate to the president. At the same time, this tactic contributed to the increasing repression by the ruling camp. Since the members of the *Yujeonghoe* needed presidential recommendation every three years, their loyalty to the president was absolute. Accordingly, the *Yujeonghoe* frequently took a more harsh measure than the DRP toward the opposition party. When the discipline of Kim Yeong Sam was discussed, many DRP members tried to end the case by Kim's public apology while the

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[34]This is an old tactic which is used by many political leaders who have monolithic power. Mao Zedong exemplified the leaders who used the tactic. Even though Mao designated his successor at each party congress, he did not authorize all the powers to the successor but established a competitor to check the designated successor. At the Eighth National Congress of the CCP of 1956, he allowed the designated successor Liu Shaoqi to exercise only limited power and had him checked by Deng Xiaoping who was positioned at the newly created office General Secretary. Mao's divide-and-rule strategy continued throughout his era: Lin Biao versus Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing's faction versus Zhou at periods of the Ninth and Tenth Congress, respectively.

Yujeonghoe strongly advocated depriving him of membership in the National Assembly.[35] Consequently, the divide-and-rule strategy, combined with the *Yujeonghoe*'s loyalty, was conducive to the repressiveness of the ruling camp of the legislature.

On the other hand, President Park also applied this tactic to his close aides, i.e., the director of the KCIA and the chief of the Presidential Security Force (PSF). Both of them played important roles in decision-making during the Yushin period. However, if one side seemed to be trying to expand its powers ambitiously, Park would not tolerate it. The downfall of KCIA director Lee Hu Rak after the Yun Pil Yong incident in 1973 exemplified the crushing of the rising side. While President Park was carefully watching the formation of a private faction around Major General Yun Pil Yong, who was the Commander of the Seoul-Metropolitan Garrison, Yun's consultation with Lee Hu Rak on the matter of the political succession after Park brought about his imprisonment on official charges of accepting bribes and misfeasance. Since the KCIA director Lee had a personal link with General Yun, the imprisonment of the latter was a serious blow to Lee. Finally, the incident was followed by the downfall of Lee in December of the year.[36]

Likewise, during the second half of the Yushin regime, KCIA director Kim Jae Gyu and PSF chief Cha Ji Cheol competed by Park's

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[35]Sang Uh Lee, "Yujeonghoewa Yushin Jeongchi" [Yujeonghoe and Politics of the Yushin], *Shindonga*, no. 4 (1986), p. 332.

[36]Jo, *[The Military]*, Chapter 2. The direct reason for the downfall of Lee, who had won credibility through the opening of the dialogue between the South and the North by the Joint Communique in 1972, was the Kim Dae Jung abduction incident in August 1973. But it has been said that the imprisonment of General Yun was coincided with President Park's distrust of Lee.

tactic. However, in getting feedback about the series of events during the legitimacy crisis in 1979, President Park became dependent upon Cha Ji Cheol, who took a harsh stance, rather than Kim Jae Gyu, who was more conciliatory. For this reason, the feedback channel was monopolized by the PSF chief Cha Ji Cheol. Despite the fact that the PSF was not an intelligence agency, Cha gathered information about a series of incidents during the legitimacy crisis, the Busan-Masan Uprising in particular, through his private agency.[37] While Cha deliberately blocked KCIA director Kim's access to the president by taking advantage of his position, he transmitted biased information on the attitudes and responses of the public to the president. Moreover, he changed the presidential ordinance so that he could mobilize the troops of the Seoul-Metropolitan Garrison to serve as a presidential guard, in spite of his civilian status. Also he expanded the organization of the PSF and assigned a major general as his subordinate.[38]

For the political authorities, feedback is important to discover new ways for dealing with day-to-day problems. As Easton noted, the returned information enables them to "engage in any corrective action perceived as feasible and necessary".[39] The feedback should be even more significant at a time of legitimacy crisis than when the political system is operating normally. But the domination of the channel for information flow by PSF chief Cha Ji Cheol resulted in a 'feedback

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[37]*Ibid.*, p. 100; and "Cheongwadae Biseosil" [Presidential Secretariat] (27), *Jungang Ilbo*, 23 September 1991.

[38]Jo, *[The Military]*, p. 102 and p. 114.

[39]Easton, *Systems Analysis*, pp. 369-70.

blockade' in a strict sense. This then hindered transmission of information on the public mood to the president. Consequently, this feedback blockade not only reinforced President Park's repressive measures but also infuriated KCIA director Kim Jae Gyu, driving him to assassinate both Park and Cha on 26 October 1979.

President Park's ruthless repression of the opposition was also boosted by his anti-American sentiment. As many acquaintances have noted, Park had maintained antagonistic attitudes to the U.S. officers stationed in South Korea since he was a young officer.[40] Undoubtedly this attitude deepened after the deterioration of the relationship between South Korea and the United States by the issues discussed in Chapter 2. Moreover, President Carter's visit to Seoul in June and his personal letter to Park in October, carried by Defense Secretary Harold Brown, furthered Park's anti-American sentiment. At the summit meeting between the two presidents, Carter put pressure on Park by raising the human rights issue and requesting the lifting of the PEM 9 and the release of political prisoners, whereas Park counterattacked Carter through criticizing the withdrawal plan of the U.S. ground troops.[41] The confrontation between them continued until the death of Park. In a personal letter to Park, Carter warned: "While human rights issues would not affect the security ties between the United States and the Republic of Korea, as a practical matter it would be difficult for us if there

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[40]James H. Houseman, "Memoirs of Houseman (3)," *Hanguk Ilbo*, 14 November 1990; and Sang Uh Lee, "Park Chung Hee wa Miguk: Geu Galdeungeui Jeonmal" [Park Chung Hee and the United States: Details of Enmity], *Shindonga*, no. 10 (1984), pp. 228-30.

[41]Gyo Sik Kim, *Dacyumentari Park Chung Hee [Documentary Park Chung Hee* (Seoul: Pyeongminsa, 1990), p. 261.

was not a return to a more liberal trend."[42] However, such repeated pressure enhanced Park's non-conciliatory stance against the radical opposition. As the chief of Presidential Secretariat, Kim Gye Won, testified later, Park expressed his harsh stance, which was fostered by the contradiction with the United States, in front of his close aides at the last dinner where he was assassinated:

> I asked that Kim Yeong Sam be indicted before Harold Brown came here. Since Yu Hyeog In dissuaded me from indicting him, I reversed my order to do so. But it goes bad as I expected....What is wrong with following the law? Don't Americans give penalties to those offending the law? The KCIA should be considered dreadful. It is useless if you [KCIA] just keep a record of the wrongdoing by the assemblymen of the opposition party. Book them case by case.[43]

In sum, not only the loyalty of the ruling camp and aides and the following feedback blockade, which stemmed from the Park's divide-and-rule tactic, but also Park's anti-American sentiment exacerbated the confrontation between the radical opposition and the political authorities.

(3) CONCLUSION

The tie between the social forces challenging the regime is a significant feature in the dynamics of authoritarian regimes in general and the Yushin regime in particular. With the formation of the NADU, the extra-official opposition gathered under one umbrella organization for a political struggle. Even though the NADU did not include the official opposition, i.e., the NDP, it had the trait of being a

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[42]Cited in Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981* (New York: Giroux, 1983), p. 128.

[43]Jo, *[The Military]*, p. 82.

political organization owing to the entrance of the politically active Kim Dae Jung. The tie between the NADU and the NDP began when Kim Dae Jung as a co-chairman of the NADU supported the rise of radical leadership under Kim Yeong Sam in the NDP on 30 May 1979. A loose but comprehensive alliance was formed at the time of the Y.H. incident in August. Refuting the charges made by the political authorities, the official and extra-official opposition expressed common concerns, such as freedom of the church's industrial mission and guarantees for the labor rights.

In the midst of the Y.H. incident, the ruling camp in the National Assembly made use of the split within the NDP, which became public when three district chairmen of the NDP filed a lawsuit to suspend the new leadership around Kim Yeong Sam, in order to dismantle his radical leadership. The ruling camp finally expelled Kim from the National Assembly. The expulsion of Kim was accompanied by a massive scale uprising at his political base and hometown. The spontaneous and unorganized violent uprising brought about military repression, whereas it became one of the reasons for the death of President Park and for the subsequent restructuring of authority relations.

Some factors contributed to the solidifying of the repressive measure by the political authorities. Owing to the divide-and-rule tactics employed by President Park, the *Yujeonghoe* displayed loyalty which was conducive to the expulsion of Kim. Moreover, Park's anti-American sentiment furthered this stance.

There was a mutually causal relationship between the repressive political authorities centered around Park and the radical allied

opposition. On the one hand, Park's own divide-and-rule tactic and anti-Americanism heightened his regime's repressiveness, which further radicalized the allied opposition. On the other hand, the increasingly radical allied opposition strengthened the most repressive authorities like the PSF chief Cha, who monopolized the feedback channel through which information regarding the measures taken by the political authorities should flow. In turn, the blockade of information feedback contributed to reinforcing the repressiveness. Finally, this process resulted in the alienation of the relatively moderate KCIA director Kim by Park and Cha and brought about the Kim's assassination of Park and Cha.

In analyzing the dynamics of the authoritarian system, we should note one point. The death of the dictator may be accompanied by a restructuring of authority relations; however, we should not assume that his death will necessarily bring about any regime change. The Fourth Republic of South Korea was not an exception. As we shall see in Part III, Park's death was followed by model 2, model 1, and finally model 5, which ended up by launching another authoritarian regime under Chun Doo Hwan. This was so because Park left the military as a strong independent institution and because the radical opposition remained intact.

PART III

THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODELS

CHAPTER 5. PATH TOWARD MILITARY DOMINATION: FROM MODEL 2 TO MODEL 1

The previous three chapters in Part II delineated how the legitimacy of the Yushin regime reached a crisis and what were the features of the crisis. Now it is the time for us to explore why the authoritarian regime under a legitimacy crisis failed to bring about a transition of the regime. In order to answer this question, in the two chapters of Part III, we shall extensively examine the 'intervening mechanism' of the dynamics of the authoritarian regime during the period between the death of President Park and the rise of the Fifth Republic, i.e., between 1979 and 1980. Particularly, we will illustrate the transformation of models of the relationship between the main subsystems, such as the opposition, the political authorities, and the military. The relationship changed from model 2 to model 1, at first, as will be shown in Chapter 5, and then it shifted from model 1 to model 5, as will be delineated in Chapter 6.

Particularly, Chapter 5 will attempt to answer the following specific questions. What was the process of the realignment of the authority structure after Park's death? Why did the regime travel the path from model 2 to model 1, instead of the other path from model 2 to model 4? Shortly after the Park' death, authority relations were restructured by the emergence of a hard-line within the military and by the estranged relationship between the ruling party and the new administration. This restructuring of the authority relations resulted in the rise of a new relationship between the subsystems as shown in

model 2. In this model the level of system stress was 'very high' in the spring of 1980, partly because there were radical extra-official opposition forces such as students, labor, and the NADU, and partly because the military of a hard-line and the conciliatory political authorities were incompatible with one another. Due to the very high system stress, the model of interrelationship was in an unstable status and had to be transformed into another model. The system stress was decreased by the overwhelming of the political authorities by the hard-line military, i.e., by the transformation from model from 2 to 1. This process of transformation was first publicized when Lt. General Chun was appointed to the acting director of the KCIA (14 April 1980) and was completed when the existing martial law was expanded to the nationwide level (17 May 1980).

It is notable that the whole process of the military's overwhelming of the authority structure, i.e., from emergence of model 2 to its shift to model 1, matches to one of the four possible military configurations which have been presented by Alfred Stepan: The security (or intelligence) community uses its autonomous power to obtain influence strategically within the military and eventually dominates the political authorities.[1]

(1) REALIGNMENT OF THE AUTHORITY STRUCTURE

The assassination of Park by the director of the KCIA, Kim Jae Gyu,

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[1]Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, p. 31.

brought about a 'political vacuum'[2] temporarily and then the restructuring of authority relations. The authority structure centered around the president, the KCIA director, and the PSF chief, collapsed because of the incident. Since there was no political successor who was able to wield powers over the military at the time of the president's death, the military became an independent institution of political control. Choi Gyu Ha, who had been Prime Minister, became the acting president and then was elected as the president by the NCU according to the existing constitution on 6 December 1979. Choi had neither a political base nor a military background. He grew up as a career bureaucrat through such posts as National Security Advisor, Foreign Minister, and finally Prime Minister.

To the public demand for a regime transition, Choi responded by taking some cautious but conciliatory measures initially. But Choi's rise had the two following meanings in the process of the realignment of the authority structure. On the one hand, given the situation that the military was independent of Choi's control, the internal conflict in the military, called the 'December 12th Incident', brought about a disharmonious relationship between the military and Choi. The hard-line officer group excluded those top officers who attempted to restore the lost prestige of the military by taking a soft-line in responding to the fervent public demand for a democratic transition. With the rise of hard-line officers, the military and the political authorities taking a cautious but conciliatory stance became incompatible with one another.

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[2]Chong-Sik Lee, "South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of a New Authoritarian Order," *Asian Survey*, vol. 21, no. 1 (January 1981), p. 125.

On the other hand, Choi's estrangement from the ruling camp of the National Assembly contributed further to the weakening of the power of the political authorities around his interim administration. His dissociation from the ruling camp was exemplified by the fact that Choi alone attempted to initiate the revision of the constitution. Choi believed that the administration could be the most neutral institution and that the legislature under the existing political parties was partial, whether they were ruling party or opposition parties. This section will examine the two aspects of the realignment of the authority structure, which was conducive to the emergence of model 2 during the period just after the death of Park.

Rise of the Hard-Line Military

Several hours after the assassination, a state of national emergency and martial law were proclaimed by the cabinet at a meeting. As soon as the investigation over Kim's assassination of Park began, the military emerged publicly as the most influential institution. In particular, the intelligence agency, the Military Security Commanding Agency (MSCA), became a powerful organization within the military when the Joint Investigation Headquarters (JIH) for the assassination case was established on 27 October. This was so because the JIH mainly consisted of officers from the MSCA headed by Major General Chun Doo Hwan.

The fact that the MSCA became the core of the JIH had a special meaning not only for a change in configuration of the military in the near future but also for the dynamics of the authoritarian system in the

long run. With the prerogatives of the JIH, the MSCA was able to dominate nationwide networks of intelligence. Owing to the fact that the KCIA director had assassinated the president and that high-ranking officials of the KCIA were under investigation, the KCIA temporarily became almost impotent in performing its function. The major functions of the KCIA, such as nationwide investigation and intelligence activities, were absorbed and performed by the JIH.[3] Even though the KCIA officially remained, it was tightly checked by its competitor, the MSCA.[4] As a result, the MSCA became the center of the information flow.

The December 12th incident was a revolt that was led by the relatively young officer group centered around Chun, the Commander of the MSCA and the JIH, against the leading generals of the existing military around the Martial Law Commander and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Jeong Seung Hwa. The incident began with the forcible escort of General Jeong by the investigation team of the JIH. The official reason for the escort was to investigate Jeong's possible involvement with the assassination of Park. But the escort of Jeong was immediately followed by the occupation of Headquarters of the Army, the Ministry of Defense, and the main executive building by the revolt forces. The two commanders of the Airborne Commanding Headquarters and

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[3]Jo, *[The Military]*, p. 125.

[4]Under the Yushin regime, the KCIA could supervise the MSCA, whereas the vice versa was impossible, from a legal perspective. The KCIA was organized based on the Law on the KCIA, while the MSCA was established simply by a presidential ordinance. Gap Je Jo, "Gukgun Boan Saryeongbu" [The Military Security Commanding Agency], *Weolgan Joseon*, no. 11 (1990), p. 206.

Seoul-Metropolitan Garrison Division were arrested by their subordinates who supported the revolt.[5]

Here we should show, in detail, who were the core members of the group that led the incident and what motivated them to revolt. They had two characteristics as follows. On the one hand, they had some common background. First, some key generals of the group consisted of classmates of the first four-year Military Academy (i.e., 11th class), such as Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo. Second, it was notable that many of the generals and the colonels had served in the MSCA or the PSF, both of whom were highly politicized communities within the military. Third, the key officers of the group were the members of the *Hanahoe*, literally meaning 'one' association, which had been backed by former president Park.[6]

More importantly, they disagreed with those officers of the mainstream of the military around General Jeong, regarding the matter of political transition after Park. General Jeong turned into a 'soft' liner and supported President Choi's original political schedule -- repeal of the Yushin Constitution, enactment of a new constitution, and establishment of a new Republic based on the constitution. General Jeong did so because he gave priority to the unity and prestige of the

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[5]Dae Gon Kim, "12.12 Igeosi Jinsangida" [This is the Truth about the December 12th Incident], *Shindonga*, no. 12 (1987), p. 223.

[6]The association was officially dissolved after the Yun Pil Yong incident, but the close relationship among the members remained virtually intact. See Jong Gak Lee, "Je 5 Gonghwagukeui Puri: Hanahoe" [Root of the Fifth Republic: Hanahoe], *Shindonga*, no. 1 (1988), p. 314.

military.[7] According to him, the privatized military under Park should restore its prestige as a defender of the nation, while keeping itself neutral from politics and supporting the scheduled political transition.[8] In contrast, the officer group which initiated the December 12th incident was disinclined to allow the early repeal of the Yushin Constitution.[9] The members of this group, who had been loyal to the late president Park, maintained a 'hard-line' stance against the public demand for a democratic transition.

The officer group with these characteristics[10] led the revolt through making use of the networks of information, based on the JIH and the MSCA. Accordingly, the December 12th incident was a mutiny led by a hard-line faction, which was centered around Chun, against the commander

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[7]For the military's concern about unity at the moment of critical choice, see Juan J. Linz, "Spain and Portugal: Critical Choices," in David S. Landes, ed., *Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977), pp. 270-1; and Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 147. For its concern about prestige after the period of repression, see Alfred Stepan, *Military in Politics*, p. 260; and *Rethinking Military Politics*, p. 58.

[8]Jo, *[The military]*, pp. 125-9.

[9]*New York Times*, 2 November 1979, reported that in the senior army generals meeting held in secret, they informally decided to repeal the Yushin Constitution; however, some young generals around Chun opposed an early scrapping of the constitution on the ground that this would add insult to injury.

[10]In addition to the characteristics, their concern was about replacement of those politicized officers in the MSCA particularly and about retardation of their promotion because General Jeong's cohort held major commanding posts under the new administration. See Yeong Gi Gweon, "Chun Doo Hwan Gyeongjil Nuga Alyeodna" [Who Informed Chun Doo Hwan of His Replacement?], *Weolgan Joseon*, no. 10 (1989), p. 299; and Jong Yeol Park, "Gukgun Boan Saryeongbu: Chun Doo Hwan Gweonryeokeui Jiju" [The Military Security Commanding Agency: Power Base of Chun Doo Hwan], *Shindonga*, no. 12 (1988), p. 337.

who attempted to restore the military's prestige while conceding its privileges gradually. The rise of the hard-line military was significant in the sense that the relationship between the two subsystems of the ruling block, i.e., the military and the political authorities, became disharmonious, as in model 2.

Estrangement between Political Authorities

The rise of the politically-oriented and hard-line military through an internal conflict was not the only aspect of the realignment of the authority structure. A related question is why the capability of the political authorities further diminished, in contrast to the growing influence of the military. The alienated relationship between the administration under cautious Choi and the ruling camp of the legislature was conducive to the loss of power by the political authorities. The ruling camp, particularly the DRP, made desperate efforts to initiate the political transition, whereas Choi mistrusted its motive.

Let us look at Choi's administration, at first. President Choi began to take a conciliatory stance toward the longtime demand of the opposition forces, after the assassination incident. He proposed that he would revise the constitution and hold a national election within a year or so, since he fully recognized that there was a nationwide demand for the repeal of the Yushin Constitution.[11] However, Choi was not

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[11]This viewpoint was presented not only at the his nationally televised speech on 10 November 1979 but at the presidential inauguration speech on 21 December of the same year. See *Donga Yeongam* 1980, p. 112.

ready to lead an all-out effort for regime change. While defining his administration as an 'administration of crisis management', he repeatedly emphasized that he would lead a 'gradual' transition toward a democratic system. He perceived that the juncture was an emergency situation and stressed that his administration's responsibility to protect the persistence of the political community was greater than that of previous ones.

Accordingly, the measures taken by Choi were conciliatory but very cautious ones. He lifted the PEM 9, one of the most repressive measure under Park (7 December 1979); and he released Kim Dae Jung from house arrest (8 December 1979).[12] Furthermore, he restored the rights of 687 political prisoners, including the two co-chairmen of the NADU, Yun Bo Seon and Kim Dae Jung (29 February 1980).[13] Despite such concessions, Choi did not intend to dismantle the legacy of the Yushin regime at once. He made it explicit that the administration should initiate the constitutional revision, on the ground that the revision of the constitution should not be a product of bargaining between those groups or individuals who were interested in political offices. Thus, Choi formed a research team for the constitutional revision on 21 January 1980 and sent dispatches to Europe to collect data. He also established the Council on Revision of the Constitution (CRC) on 14 March 1980 in order to make a draft. His measures on the revision of the constitution still contained authoritarian traits. Just as former president Park, Choi apparently distrusted the National Assembly and regarded it as an

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[12]*Ibid.*

[13]*Donga Yeongam* 1981, p. 123.

ineffective and partial organization.

Meanwhile, in the new era after Park, the ruling camp of the National Assembly, i.e., the DRP and the *Yujeonghoe*, had lost the object with which they could be affiliated. They had acted as vanguards of the Yushin regime until the death of Park. When the opposition forces formed an alliance and their stance became radicalized in mid-1979 in particular, the DRP and the *Yujeonghoe* competed neck and neck to show their loyalty to the president who used divide-and-rule tactics, as seen in Chapter 4. Their competitive loyalty had contributed to bringing the repressive measures by Park and his close aides. However, as soon as Park was assassinated, they came to seek a way to adapt to the changing environment.

On the one hand, after Park, the *Yujeonghoe* never attempted to defend the Yushin regime, even though it was composed of National Assemblymen who were hand-picked by Park and elected in the NCU. Its members now sought to retire without being humiliated. This attitude of the members was well represented in the statement made by the chairman of the *Yujeonghoe* at their seventh anniversary on 10 March 1980: "What we have to do now is to discover how we can conclude honorably."[14]

On the other hand, the DRP recognized that it was inevitable for the party to repeal the Yushin Constitution and to run for competitive elections in order to gain power under the new constitution which was being studied. The DRP elected Kim Jong Pil, who had been the founder of the party, as the party president and made desperate efforts to take

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[14]Cited in S. U. Lee, [Yujeonghoe and Politics of the Yushin], p. 334.

the initiative in the process of political transition. First, the DRP became competitive but to some extent cooperative with the opposition parties. On 26 November 1979, the DRP, the *Yujeonghoe*, and the opposition parties joined to form the Special Committee for the Revision of the Constitution (SCRC). It was remarkable that the SCRC was composed of an equal number of committee members from the ruling camp and from the opposition camp. Of the 28 members, the DRP and the *Yujeonghoe* contributed seven members each, while the NDP and the DUP contributed thirteen and one respectively.[15] Moreover, along with the NDP, the DRP demanded that the new president Choi release political prisoners and restore their civil rights.[16]

Second, the young assemblymen of the DRP called for a rectification of the party in order to improve its political ability. Park Chan Jong, Oh Yu Bang, and others called for the campaign, aiming at such senior members as former KCIA director Lee Hu Rak, former PSF chief Park Jong Gyu, and former National Assembly Speaker Kim Jin Man. The rectification campaign was conducted under the tacit support of the party head Kim Jong Pil, according to Lee Hu Rak, saying that Kim should be responsible to the turmoil in the party.[17] The result of rectification was the party's decision to expel not only the senior members who became the target of the campaign but also the young members

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[15]Seong Jae Kang, "80 Nyeon Bom Gukhoe Gaeheonteukwieui Jwajeol" [Failure of the Special Committee for the Revision of the Constitution in the National assembly in the spring of 1980], *Shindonga*, no. 7 (1986), p. 264.

[16]*Donga Yeongam* 1981, p. 150.

[17]*Ibid.*, p. 149.

who campaigned. At any rate, rectification was one of the efforts through which the DRP tried to change the party's public image.

In sum, shortly after the death of Park, the authority structure was realigned. First, with the domination of the hard-line in the military, the stances of the military and the political authorities became incompatible with each other. Second, the estrangement between Choi's administration and the ruling camp of the National Assembly further weakened the power of the political authorities. Therefore, the relationship between the subsystems was model 2 in which the military had more weight than the political authorities.

(2) TRANSFORMATION FROM MODEL 2 TO MODEL 1

Partly because of the incompatible relationship between the hard-line military and the cautious but conciliatory political authorities and partly because of the existence of radical opposition forces with a fervent desire for a democratic transition, the authoritarian system in the spring of 1980 was under a 'very high' level of stress. The level of system stress lessened, to some extent, when the military centered around Chun gradually overwhelmed the authority roles of Choi's administration. Not only because the relationship between the ruling camp and Choi's administration became estranged but also because neither of them was able to control the military, the newly emerged hard-line military became a significant factor for choosing the specific path along which the system would travel. According to S. E. Finer's hypothesis on military intervention, one of the two conditions was already met in that the 'disposition' of the military around Chun was

politically motivated. The remaining condition was the 'opportunity' for doing so, which would be given by the effects of domestic circumstances.[18] In this respect, in the spring of 1980, what the military was concerned about was not the matter of whether or not it would intervene but 'when' it would do so. This section will examine how the hard-line military became involved in political affairs and finally overwhelmed the political authorities through taking advantage of the escalating campus disturbances and labor disputes.

Conciliatory Authorities versus Radical Opposition

Owing to the conciliatory measures[19] taken by the political authorities under Choi's administration, the professional politicians faced a new era. The so-called 'age of the three Kims' came about -- one which continued for more than a decade -- as Kim Dae Jung began his political activity thanks to the amnesty of 29 February 1980. The

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[18]S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 2nd edition, p. 74.

[19]In addition to the lifting of the PEM 9 on 7 December 1979, several conciliatory measures were announced in early 1980. The details were as follows. The office of Labor Administration announced that it was considering the gradual restoration of the workers' right for bargaining (8 January). The Ministry of Internal Affairs curtailed the training hours of the Civil Defense Corps and exempted people over 46 years old from training (16 January). The Ministry of Education announced that students of high schools were no longer required to wear uniforms. Universities decided to reinstate the expelled students and professors (22 January). The Ministry of Education changed the policy over the selection of staffs of the Student Defense Corps: from appointment to free election (16 February). More importantly, Choi's administration announced the restoration of civil rights of the 687 political prisoners (29 February). See Jun Kim, "1980 Nyeoneui Jeongse Baljeongwa Daeripgudo" [Situation Change and Contradiction in 1980], in Hae Gu Jeong, at al, *Kwangju Minjung Hangjaeng Yeongu [Studies on the Kwangju Popular Uprising]* (Seoul: Sagyejeol, 1990), p. 129.

ambitious three Kims -- Kim Yeong Sam of the NDP, Kim Jong Pil of the DRP, and Kim Dae Jung of the NADU -- had been convinced that they could compete with one another in the presidential election under a new constitution. Having an optimistic view toward the future, they traveled around the nation and gave speeches to appeal to the public. The result was that the loosely formed alliance between the official and extra-official opposition forces, created by the Y.H. incident, became disengaged.

Furthermore, the conciliatory measures by the political authorities brought about some cleavages within the NADU on the matter of strategy of the opposition movements, even though the alliance between the extra-official opposition forces remained intact. On the one hand, those who emphasized 'gradual struggle' criticized the legacy of the Yushin regime and the corruption of the ruling camp; however, they warned the others not to create an opportunity for the hard-line military to make an excuse to intervene in the political arena. On the other hand, those who focused on 'activism' gave more priority to mass rallies and street demonstrations, by means of which they intended to publicize the plot of the proponents of the Yushin regime and of the politicized hard-line military. Thus, they exemplified the April 19th Student Revolution of 1960 and the Busan-Masan Uprising as the successful opposition movements that had brought about the downfall of dictatorships.

Despite such differences in strategy, these two groups were not incompatible with one another but had common traits. Not only did both groups take a more radical stance than the NDP against the Yushin legacy, but also they agreed that professional politicians should take

office as the condition for the achievement of democracy. Both groups also considered that the middle class in a classical sense -- former political leaders, church leaders, intellectuals, and students -- should be the leading force of the democratic transition.[20]

Thus the NADU became the forerunner of the opposition forces after the death of Park, and it generated a radical demand for a rapid transition of the regime. As the first move, along with the Council of Dismissed Professors and the Council of Democratic Youth, the NADU held a meeting under martial law (24 November 1979). At the meeting entitled the 'National Conference for the Obstruction of Presidential Election by the National Congress for Unification', they denounced the planned indirect presidential election of Choi while following the Yushin Constitution which was scheduled for a revision. Furthermore, they demanded establishment of a democratic cabinet including the extra-official opposition forces and called for dissolution of the *Yujeonghoe*, the DRP, and the NCU.[21] When the meeting was stormed by the martial law troops, some 150 people in the meeting turned into demonstrators exclaiming 'repeal Yushin Constitution' and 'reject the presidential election by the NCU'. Some 140 were interrogated, and many of them were tortured. Fourteen were indicted and sentenced to from two years to ten

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[20]"80 Nyeon 'Seouleui Bom'eui Peongga" [Evaluation of the 'Spring of Seoul' in 1980], in Hyeon Chae Park and Heui Yeon Jo, eds., *Hanguk Sahoe Guseongche Nonjaeng (I) [On the Configuration of Korean Society (I)]* (Seoul: Juksan, 1989), pp. 149-51.

[21]"Tongdaejeojireul Wihan Gukmin Seoneon" [National Announcement for the Obstruction of the NCU], issued by Hahm Seok Heon and others (24 November 1979), mimeograph.

months.[22] The arrest of the leading opposition leaders was a serious blow to the NADU in particular and the extra-official opposition forces in general. However, it stimulated opposition activities by other forces, particularly the students in early 1980.

At the initial stage, i.e., from the beginning of March to mid-April, student activities were limited to campus issues.[23] They demanded the restoration of independent student organizations and the liberalization of campus media and club activities, which had been banned since 1973. Demands on these issues were soon followed by violent demonstrations on campuses. Sometimes they decided to suspend

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[22]NCCK, *[Democratic Movements]*, vol. 4, p. 1770-1.

[23]Similar to the case of the NADU, the two groups coexisted in the student movements. On the one hand, those students who called for 'gradual struggle' focused on solidarity between the students and labor and emphasized campus issues and labor rights. They conceived that time was on their side. Since the economic situation was worse than ever before, they expected that the labor force would explode soon. Therefore, they set the steps according to which they would lead the student movements: first, to achieve democracy within the campus by fighting against corrupt foundations; second, to obtain freedom of the press and labor rights; and finally, to call for the lifting of martial law and for the elimination of the Yushin legacy. On the other hand, those students who called for 'all-out struggle' insisted on street demonstrations to raise political issues mainly. The strategy of this group was in line with that of 'activism' of the NADU. Many students of this group were reinstated students, who had been active in the NADU. Whereas the former group with the 'gradual struggle' strategy predominated in March and early April of 1980, the latter group with the 'all-out struggle' strategy dominated from mid-April to the Kwangju Popular Uprising in May. As we shall discuss later, there were two reasons for the shift. The military presence and its gradual domination over the political authorities became public, on the one hand. Violent strikes by the labor force brought about a new stage of the labor movement, on the other hand. See "80 Nyeondae Haksaeng Undong Mid Gue Nonjaengsa" [The Student Movements and History of the Debates in the 1980s], in Hyeon Chae Park and Heui Yeon Jo, eds., *[Configuration of Korean Society]*, pp. 120-1; and Jun Yeong Shin, "Haksaeng Undongeui Byeonhwawa Baljeon" [Change and Development of the Student movements], in Cheong Seok Kim, at al, *80 Nyeondae Hanguk Sahoe [Society in Korea during the 1980s]* (Seoul: Gongdongche, 1986), pp. 224-5.

class, occupied the offices of the dean and the president, and engaged in night-long sit-in protests, while demanding the expulsion of the unqualified professors who collaborated with the Yushin regime under Park.

To the exploding demands, school authorities and professors in general responded with temperance. Pressed by the mounting demands for a purge of fellow faculty members, the two presidents of the national universities offered to resign. At the best, the professors of a certain university finally made a resolution in which they asserted that "the educational authority of the university and the status of professors should not be encroached upon by any means."[24] But the Ministry of Education and most of the professors simply urged the students to restrain the use of violent means and proposed to resolve the campus issues through dialogue.

The student demonstrations in private universities were worse than those in the national universities. Many of the private schools had fragile foundations, and the founders considered the schools to be their enterprises pursuing profit. They appointed their relatives to the important posts of school administrations and treated professors as their personal employees. Accordingly, the students in these universities not only demanded the expulsion of unqualified professors but also staged hunger-strikes and night-long demonstrations, denouncing the chief director and the board of directors who were involved in nepotism.

In April, the demands of the students extended to a very sensitive

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[24]*Joseon Ilbo*, 29 March 1980.

issue, that is, a military training at the army barracks. Along with the military drill within campus, military training at an army camp during summer or winter vacation became a required course for the university freshmen in 1976 in the name of national security. This issue was not a simple campus issue but a political one as the hard-line military expanded its influence on political affairs. Now students vowed to boycott the off-campus military training. To this student demand, the Minister of Education Kim Ok Gil, who had been a former professor and university president of high moral repute, urged the students to resolve the issue with patience. She vainly tried to persuade the students by saying that the training was not a difficult one in comparison to that of North Korea.[25]

Military's Gradual Intervention

Many observers of South Korea depicted politics of the spring in 1980 as 'foggy' politics. This characterization best illustrates that the political system under such an unstable status as model 2 looses regularity in the process of decision-making. Not only because the information about who influences to what extent is limited but because it is ambiguous what the conversion rule is in producing outputs, the political system is very shaky, on the one hand, and rumor prevails, on the other. However, due to its homeostatic characteristics, the system tends to return to a stable status through a shift in the relationship between the political authorities and the military. In the case of the authoritarian regime in South Korea, the path toward restoration of a

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[25]*Hong Kong AFP*, cited in *FBIS (Asia & Pacific)*, 17 April 1980.

stable status was the growing predominance by the hard-line military over the conciliatory political authorities, i.e., the steady transformation of the relationship between subsystems from model 2 to model 1.

Now let us delve into how the military gradually extended its influence on the political arena. Despite several cautious and conciliatory measures made by the political authorities to liberalize the authoritarian legacy in early 1980, the opposition forces doubted the capacity as well as the intention of the political authorities to guide a regime transition. Their doubt originated with two rumors: one was the formation of a new party around high-ranking bureaucrats centered around Prime Minister Shin Hyeon Hwak, and the other was the administration's plan to adopt the dual executive system in the new constitution. In spite of their repeated denial, both rumors became objects of opposition. Particularly, the latter received many criticisms. The CRC, in fact, studied the three alternatives for the power structure: parliamentary, presidential, and dual executive systems. Moreover, the daily newspapers reported the possibility of adopting the dual executive system.[26] This system could bring about abuse of the emergency measure, not only when the president had a strong political base, but also when the president had a weak political base while being dependent upon the military. What the opposition forces

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[26]*Donga Ilbo*, 10 January. "In the dual executive system, the president may exercise emergency power in the state of emergency, but the prime minister is the head of the administration. However, in the system under study [by the CRC], the president has the authority over the diplomatic and security affairs not only in the state of emergency but in the normal operation of politics."

such as the NADU, the NDP, and the students were concerned over was the latter case: the possibility that the president's emergency power could be influenced by the new party around an authoritarian figure like Shin and by the hard-line military around Chun, the Commander of the MSCA.

The opposition's concern, i.e., the intervention in politics by the hard-line military, became real on 14 April when the Commander of the MSCA, now Lt. General Chun Doo Hwan, was appointed as the acting director of the KCIA.[27] But we should note that the gradual intervention in politics by the military -- more strictly speaking, the gradual overwhelming of the conciliatory political authorities by the hard-line military -- must have become possible either through the meddling or the tacit support of the authoritarian political authorities such as Prime Minister Shin, who had defended the Yushin regime. Shin advocated slow liberalization based on national security and economic development, which had been the very legitimating values of the Yushin regime under Park.

Shin's viewpoint was clearly presented in the foreign mass media, above all. In an interview with the *Sankei Shimbun* on 11 March, Shin stated that: "There cannot be speedy democratization which totally rejects the Yushin system although the incumbent administration intends to promote true liberalization not only in the fields of politics and the economy but also on campus."[28] According to him, there would be no radical democratization to repudiate the Yushin regime completely;

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[27]The reason that he became the 'acting' director was that the KCIA law forbade the KCIA director from holding another post concurrently.

[28]Cited in Su Eon Lee, "1980 Nyeon Seouleui Bom 200 Il" [200 days of the Spring of Seoul in 1980], *Shindonga*, no. 6 (1985), p. 225.

furthermore, the Yushin era was necessary to achieve a defense buildup and economic development.

Such a viewpoint was also expressed in the meetings of the diplomats in America and Asia, opened on 12 March: "The incumbent administration will give the first priority to national security, the second to economy, the third to political development."[29] Also in a message to a meeting of diplomats in the Middle East and Africa, held in Geneva on 3 April, he expressed his security concern with a same tone: "Much attention was being given to political development at home these days, so the national security question seems to have been neglected somewhat. It is something we are worried about."[30] Thus Shin's expressions generated a suspicion about whether or not the new administration under Choi was able to lead a political transition, especially when the rumors spread.[31]

At this juncture, the MSCA chief Chun was appointed to the post of acting director of the KCIA, so that he was able to attend cabinet meetings. Only a few days after the appointment, the media reported his attendance at the meeting which discussed the campus disturbances and the labor disputes.[32] Shortly afterwards, Chun led a shake-up of the KCIA: First, he reshuffled personnel by replacing 33 of 40 senior officials above the section chief level; second, he changed the

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[29]*Donga Ilbo*, 12 March 1980.

[30]*Haptong Press*, cited in *FBIS (Asia & Pacific)*, 3 April 1980.

[31]On the other hand, Shin clearly stood in defense of the military, saying that the military did not influence politics but made efforts for restoring social order only. See *New York Times*, 10 April 1980.

[32]*Joseon Ilbo*, 17 and 24 April.

organization to eliminate the offices of assistant directors; finally, he scaled down the agency in the number of employees.[33]

It was not a surprise that with Chun's appointment, the military publicized its voice. In a press conference on 29 April, Chun made it publicly known that the martial law command would outlaw whoever produced disturbances. This warning was aimed at the three Kims in general and Kim Dae Jung in particular. On the following day, the meeting of martial law commanders decided to take inevitably 'stern measures' on the labor disputes and the three Kims' overheated political forums.[34] The hard-line military led by Chun now made it clear that it would not countenance the radical opposition forces. On the other hand, the political authorities simply exposed their inability to cope with the 'very high' level of system stress caused by the radical opposition forces and by their incompatibility with the hard line military.

The Rise of Model 1

The gradual process of the military's overwhelming of the political authorities, which contributed to the transformation from model 2 to model 1, was completed when 'nationwide' martial law was imposed on 17 May. For a month since Chun's appointment to the KCIA acting director, the student demonstrations focused on such political issues as denunciation of the growing military influence, lifting of martial law, and protection of labor rights, while the labor disputes developed into violent protests.

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[33]*Haptong Press*, cited in *FBIS (Asia & Pacific)*, 30 April 1980.

[34]*Ibid.*

At first, violent protests and wildcat strikes provided the military with opportunities for the complete overwhelming of the political authorities. Garment workers of the Peace Market staged sit-in demonstrations and demanded wage increases because prevailing wages were far below the actual cost of living (8 April). The eight-day dispute was settled through the office of the Labor Administration.[35] But a massive violent protest erupted at the Dongwon Coal Mine of Sabuk Eup, Jeongseon County in Gangwon Province. The protest, called the 'Sabuk Incident', began with a sit-in by a few score miners who demanded a wage increase and opposed the company-patronized union. When their demands were ignored by the company and the union leaders, three thousand miners and their families led a violent protest and clashed with the police. The protesters finally drove the police force from the town and administered its security by themselves (22 April). However, since the protest was an unorganized action, there emerged a split among the protesters regarding how to achieve their demands. As time passed, the fear about an uncertain future prevailed, and finally, the miners negotiated with the company. The result of the three day protest was the death of one policeman and injuries to 70 policemen and miners.[36]

The Sabuk incident originated from the administration's unbalanced energy policy which had favored oil instead of coal, despite the fact that South Korea has never produced a single drop of oil. This energy

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[35]*Korea Times*, 16 April 1980.

[36]Jin Ok Kim, "80 Nyeondae Nodong Undongeui Jeongae" [Development of Labor Movements in the 1980s], in Chae Jeong Lim, at al., *Nodong Hyeonsilgwa Nodong Undong [Labor Situation and Labor Movement]* (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1984), p. 287-8.

policy yielded poor working conditions and low income, based on payment on contract, for the mine workers.[37] At any rate, the impact of the incident was enormous. With the incident, labor disputes spread to 'all sectors of the industry'.[38] At the end of the Yushin regime, major labor disputes had been characterized by the workers' struggle for organizing independent unions in manufacturing industries, as shown in Chapter 3. In contrast, the disputes in 1980 spread to non-manufacturing industries, i.e., to trades within the primary sector such as mining, fishery, and timber and to trades in the tertiary sector like lodging. Along with their explosive characteristics, the spread of labor disputes to all sectors of industry became one of the most significant traits of the labor disputes in the spring of 1980.

The students as well became more radicalized. Students from many universities joined the boycott of military training at army barracks. Furthermore, they made more specific demands regarding the time-table for political transition, while calling for lifting martial law, guarantees of labor rights, and release of arrested fellow students. They also insisted on withdrawal of the Yushin regime's 'remnants', which meant the president, high bureaucrats, and the military. In this context, they denounced the repetitive rhetoric of the authorities by

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[37]*Ibid.*, pp. 281-4.

[38]As a result, the number of labor disputes of 1980 remarkably outnumbered that of previous years, according to the Ministry of Labor.

1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
110	96	102	105	206

Source: CISJD, ed., *[Social Justice Indicators in Korea]*, p. 89.

saying that:

> It is the deceitful logic fabricated by the enemy we confront that social disorder will delay democratic development and national security is the necessary condition for political development. It is old-fashioned propaganda. The democratic movements on campuses and the labor disputes are not chaos but an expression of democracy to scrape out the diseased part of society, that is, the legacies of the Yushin era.[39]

As the students were more concerned about the military's gradual intervention, the demonstrations rapidly spread and intensified in May. The student demonstration on the largest scale was held at the Seoul railway station on 15 May. But on 16 May student representatives from 55 universities and colleges decided to return to the classroom on 17 May on the ground that violent demonstrations would give the hard-line military an opportunity for direct intervention, i.e., a coup. But they could not return to school because of the imposition of 'nationwide' martial law[40] and of Martial Law Decree (MLD) No. 10 on 17 May.

The measures taken according to the MLD No. 10 were as follows. First, all political activities were banned; accordingly, the National Assembly also was dissolved. Second, press, publications, reportage and radio reports were subject to censorship. Third, all the universities and junior colleges were closed. Finally, any form of desertion from one's job, such as sabotage and strike, was banned.[41] With the

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[39]"Hyeon Sigukgwa Minjuhwa Tujaenge Gwanhan Urieui Ipjang" [Our Standpoint on the Current Situation and the Democratic Struggle], issued by the Associated Graduate Students and the Association of Students of Seoul National University (4 May 1980), mimeograph.

[40]The martial law which had been effective until 16 May excluded Jeju Island. But on 17 May the area covered by the martial law expanded to include this island.

[41]*Radio Munhwa*, cited in *FBIS (Asian & Pacific)*, 17 May 1980.

imposition of nationwide martial law and MLD No. 10, the process of the military's overwhelming of the political authorities was virtually completed. In a theoretical sense, the incompatibility between the hard-line military and the conciliatory political authorities diminished through domination of the latter by the former. A new configuration of the relationship between the three subsystems emerged as in model 1.

(3) CONCLUSION

The main focus of this chapter has been as follows: (1) the structural shift of authority relations; and (2) in turn, more importantly, how the newly formed authority structure as in model 2 contributed to the regime's return from model 2 back to model 1, so that no regime change could occur.

At the moment of power vacuum shortly after the assassination, the military became an important factor. In South Korea of 1980, however, there were specific conditions that promoted the military's domination over the political authorities: first, the rise of the politically interested hard-liners in the military, and second, the relatively weakened power of the political authorities that occurred with the estrangement between Choi's administration and the ruling camp of the legislature.

Because of these changes, the interrelationship between the political authorities, the military, and the opposition became highly unstable while generating a very high level of systems stress, as in model 2. Insofar as the political system was to persist, the relationship had to be transformed. In model 2, the role of the

authorities in making decisions is ambiguous while the process of decision-making is uncertain and lacks regularity. The disharmonious relationship between the two components of the ruling bloc, i.e., Choi's administration and Chun's military, changed as the latter gradually overwhelmed the former. The process ended as the political alignment shifted to that of model 1, which still entailed the continued harsh repression of the opposition forces.

The political system under a legitimacy crisis may travel along one of the diverging paths and finally reach one of the two destination models: One is model 5 for no regime change, and the other is model 8 for a regime change. At the crucial juncture, the authoritarian system in South Korea experienced the self-transformation from model 2 to model 1, instead of the shift from model 2 to model 4 that would guarantee a regime transition. Therefore, the remaining process was the shift from model 1 to model 5 through repression of the radical opposition forces by the hard-line military.

In this respect, the dynamics of the authoritarian regime after the death of Park was in striking contrast with that of Spain after Franco. The model 1 of the relationship between the political authorities, the military, and the opposition dominated at the time of the death of Franco and Park. With their death, however, each authoritarian system took a different path. In the process of dealing with legacies of the previous autocratic leader, Spain's Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, with the aid of King Juan Carlos, succeeded in persuading the hard-line military and the radical unionist opposition to refrain from a power grab. By reassuring the military of the limits to political reform,

Suarez guaranteed the prestige of the military, so that he could prevent the latter's attempt to intervene in politics. Suarez also successfully won concessions from the radical opposition by his sincere willingness to engage in dialogue and by his flexibility.[42] Consequently, the moderate Moncloa Pact between the three subsystems was formed. The death of Franco provided the existing regime with an exceptional opportunity for a regime transition. In contrast, after the assassination of Park, President Choi and Prime Minister Shin failed to lead a regime change as shown in the case of Spain.

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[42]Share, "Transition through Transaction," pp. 539-40; Robert Fishman, "The Labor Movement in Spain: From Authoritarianism to Democracy," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 14, no. 3 (April 1982), pp. 281-305; and Edward Malefakis, "Spain and Its Francoist Heritage," in John H. Herz, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 225.

CHAPTER 6. PATH TOWARD ANOTHER AUTHORITARIAN REGIME: FROM MODEL 1 TO MODEL 5

In the previous chapter, we examined the realignment of the authority structure after the death of Park and analyzed how the interaction between the three subsystems became transformed from model 2 to model 1. With the transformation, the level of system stress decreased to some extent, since the hard-line military overwhelmed the more conciliatory political authorities. However, insofar as the opposition continued to be radical, the level of system stress remained 'high', according to the assumption delineated in Chapter 1. The radical extra-official opposition forces were incompatible with the hard-line military, which played a dual role as the political authorities. For this reason, the relationship between the radical opposition and the hard-line military became transformed from model 1 to model 5, one of the two destination models. The task of this chapter is to illustrate the process of model 1's transformation into model 5 and the configuration of the subsystems of model 5.

The Kwangju Popular Uprising in May 1980 represented the explosion of the contradiction that was inherent in model 1. Through the military repression of the uprising, the enthusiasm of the opposition forces in general for a change of regime collapsed, while model 1 changed into model 5. More importantly, the hard-line military around Chun formalized its domination over the political authorities by the establishment of a *de facto* decision-making body, the Special Committee

for National Security Measures (SCNSM), on 31 May. Based on the SCNSM, the hard-line military paved the way toward another authoritarian regime, the Fifth Republic, in which Chun became the president under the banner of the Democratic Justice Party. Meanwhile, the extra-official opposition forces such as labor and the students mostly went underground.

(1) KWANGJU POPULAR UPRISING

With the declaration of nationwide martial law and the imposition of the MLD No. 10 on 17 May, the violent demonstrations were discontinued in Seoul and other major cities. However, the student demonstrations, which denounced the hard-line military and its stern measures, continued in Kwangju even after the imposition of extended martial law. The demonstrations developed into a popular armed struggle when the airborne division brutally repressed students and youths. The result of the uprising was the loss of many lives, particularly those of civilians.[1]

The questions we should address in this section are in what sense the uprising represented a contradiction between the hard-line military and the radical opposition forces, on the one hand, and why the extreme form of this contradiction occurred in the specific region of Kwangju, on the other. The former question concerns something in common with the

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[1]According to the statistics of the Defence Minister, the death toll resulting from the uprising was 191: 164 civilians, 23 soldiers, and 4 police officers. See "Report on the Kwangju Incident to the National Defence Committee of the National Assembly, 7 June 1985," in *Korea Herald*, 9 June 1985. However, the total number of death exceeded 2,000, according to a source from the opposition forces.

past opposition movements in the leading social forces and their demands, whereas the latter draws attention to regional characteristics that sparked the popular uprising.

Commonality with Past Opposition Movements

The students and the activist labor force, which had been the most disadvantaged group under the legitimating values of the Yushin regime, participated in the uprising as the leading forces. In light of the students' longtime role as the spearhead of the extra-official opposition forces and of labor's explosive trait, it was natural for them to become the major participants of the uprising. Table 10 provides us with evidence that the main forces of the uprising were the labor force and the students.

Furthermore, in the context of the political struggle in 1980, the Kwangju Popular Uprising was in line with the previous opposition movements which demanded a change of regime. During the spring of 1980,

Table 10. Deaths in Kwangju Popular Uprising

Social Force	Number of Deaths	Percentage
Total	137	100.0
Workers	73	53.5
Students	40	29.1
Peasants	4	2.9
Small Businessmen	1	0.7
Unemployed	17	12.4
Others	2	1.4

Source: Hong Myeong Kim and Se Gyun Kim, "Kwangju 5 Wol Minjung Hangjaengeui Jeongae Gwajeonggwa Seonggyeok" [The Process and the Characteristics of the Kwangju Popular Uprising in May], in ICKHD, ed., *[Kwangju Popular Uprising in May]*, p. 134.

Note: The data did not include the unidentified deaths.

not only the NADU but also the students called for a repeal of martial law, and guarantees of the rights of the labor force and the farmers, while denouncing the unclear political schedule presented by Choi's so-called 'administration of crisis management'. The demands made by the students in Kwangju on the eve of the uprising were corresponded those demands. For instance, the announcement issued by the student bodies of six campuses, located in Kwangju, presented 15 principles regarding the issues of rights of the farmers and the workers, campus democratization, lifting of martial law, the role of Choi's interim administration, and freedom of the press.[2]

The consistency of these demands at the later phase of the uprising further proved that the uprising was in line with those demands for a regime change in the spring of 1980. Even after a schism[3] in the

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[2]"Je 2 Siguk Seoneonmun" [The Second Announcement on the Current Situation], issued by the student organization of Dongshin Professional School, Mokpo Engineering Professional School, Mokpo College, Seongin Professional School, Chonnam National University, and Choson University (15 May 1980), mimeograph.

[3]Many students and city dwellers armed with rifles, machine guns, and armored vehicles, which were taken from reservists' arsenals and factories of the defense industry, succeeded in repelling the brutal airborne troops from the city of Kwangju on 21 May. However, a schism in the leading group occurred. On the one hand, a majority of the members of the Citizens' Settlement Committee and of the Students' Settlement Committee asserted the need to return their arms and to receive an apology by the martial law command, on the ground that the armed struggle against the regular military forces had limitations. On the other hand, being dissatisfied with this resolution, several youths and students from these committees joined some workers and then composed a separate struggle committee for an all-out battle. This committee reorganized the existing mobile troops, which mainly consisted of workers, and engaged in the final round of bloody battle with the martial law troops on 27 May. See Chang Jin Kim, "Kwangju Minjung Hangjaengeui Baljeon Gujo" [The Development of the Kwangju Popular

leadership in the midst of the uprising regarding the matter of how to settle the armed confrontation with the martial law troops, the major demands by no means changed but remained intact. In the statement issued by the newly formed leadership, the latter called for demands similar to those advanced before: withdrawal of Choi's interim administration, lifting of martial law, release of leading opposition figures, and so on. Exceptionally, it called for the punishment of Chun on the ground that he was the mastermind of the ruthless repression. But the leadership made it explicit that the goal was not compensation but a democratic political system.[4]

In sum, the Kwangju Popular Uprising was the most extreme form of conflict between the hard-line military, which had overwhelmed the roles of political authorities, and the radical opposition centered around the students and labor. It was not different from the previous opposition movements that occurred in other cities on the eve of the imposition of nationwide martial law. The participants did not produce any specific demand related to the regional issue. They called for the end of the repressive regime and finally for a regime transition. In this respect, the Kwangju Uprising was a political struggle that had common grounds, in the leading forces and the demands, with the ongoing opposition

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Uprising], in Hae Gu Jeong, at al, *Kwangju Minjung Hangjaeng Yeongu [Studies on the Kwangju Popular Uprising]* (Seoul: Sagyejeol, 1990), pp. 195-206.

[4]"80 Man Kwangju Minjusimineui Gyeoleui" [The Determination of 800 Thousands Democratic Citizens in Kwangju], cited in Eul Byeong Jang, "Kwangju 5 Wol Minjung Hangjaengeseoeui Mujang Tujaeng" [The Armed Struggle of the Kwangju Popular Uprising in May], in Institute of Contemporary Korean Historical Documents, ed., *Kwangju 5 Wol Minjung Hangjaeng [Kwangju Popular Uprising in May]* (Seoul: Pulbid, 1990), p. 164.

movements in South Korea.

Regional Particularity

The common grounds of the Kwangju Uprising with the previous opposition movements, in the leading forces and their demands, does not explain why the confrontation between the hard-line military and the radical opposition forces developed into an armed uprising in this specific region. Accordingly, we need to look at the regional peculiarity. That is, in addition to the examination of the uprising in the context of the escalation of radical opposition movements during the spring of 1980, we should also examine it in view of the regional underdevelopment of Kwangju.

Of course, the fact that the military excessively repressed the student demonstrations contributed to the development of the armed uprising. After overwhelming of the political authorities by the declaration of nationwide martial law on 17 May, the hard-line military was ready to put down any demonstration in order to establish a firm control over the radical opposition forces. At this juncture, the students in Kwangju continued demonstrations, and the city dwellers joined them, whereas the airborne troops began to beat many participants to death and inflict severe injuries (18 May). Witnessing the brutality of the repression, the participants armed themselves. In this respect, the escalation of the uprising was a spontaneous development without any organized instigation.[5]

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[5]The statement, entitled "Why Did We Have to Arm Ourselves?", which was issued by the 3rd Citizens' Rally for the Protection of Democracy described that: "Why did we have to arm ourselves? The answer is too

Nevertheless, the economic underdevelopment of Kwangju and South Cholla Province was conducive to the explosive popular discontent that developed into an armed confrontation. Because of former president Park's policy of the unbalanced regional development, Kwangju and the surrounding province became the most disadvantaged region. Some indicators provide us with evidence of this regional underdevelopment. First of all, despite the fact that heavy and chemical industries were emphasized during the 1970s, the region did not have any local bourgeoisie who could invite establishment of big enterprises of these industries. Only some minor enterprises which were related to these industries were sustained in the region. Without any linkage to major enterprises, however, they could hardly accumulate capital. The result was that the minor enterprises of the heavy and chemical industries declined in number in this region during the 1970s. For example, in the chemical industry the number dropped by 39.7%: from 184 in 1970 to 111 in 1981. In the machinery industry the number decreased by 29.7%: from 293 to 206 during the same period.[6] On the other hand, the total number of enterprises in the manufacturing industries, in general, of the region dropped by 21.6% during the 1970s: from 2,744 in 1970 to

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obvious. Witnessing the brutality, we took weapons....In the afternoon on 18 May, the Martial Law Command mobilized the airborne troops in a massive scale and made them murder and injure students and youths indiscriminately....Furthermore, it ordered the troops to fire indiscriminately." Cited in E. B. Jang, [The Armed Struggle of the Kwangju Popular Uprising in May], in ICKHD, ed., *[Kwangju Popular Uprising in May]*, p. 166.

[6]Dong Uk Kim, "Hanguk Jabonjueuieui Mosungujowa Hangjaeng Juche" [Contradictions in Korean Capitalism and the Leading Force of the Uprising], in Hae Gu Jeong, at al, *[Studies on the Kwangju Popular Uprising]*, p. 98.

2,152 in 1980. This decrease was notable since the total number at the national level of manufacturing industries increased by 27.8%: from 24,114 to 30,823 during the same period. Accordingly, the province's proportion of all manufacturing industries nationwide declined from 11.4% to 7.0%.[7]

Second, the decline of manufacturing industries in general and the heavy and chemical industries in particular was accompanied by the relative expansion of the tertiary sector and by poor working conditions, compared with the situation in other regions. In 1980 the GRP of the three industrial sectors in Kwangju was divided as follows: 2.4% in the primary sector, 31.3% in the secondary, and 66.2% in the tertiary. The proportion of the tertiary sector in Kwangju was about 20% higher than that of the nationwide average. The small businesses which belonged to the tertiary sector were bars, restaurants, cafes, and motels.[8] Not only was the employment in these businesses insecure, but also the wages of the employees were relatively low.[9]

Finally, the labor force in Kwangju and South Cholla Province had little solidarity with other opposition forces like the church and the students. As an exception, there existed night classes for the workers, which had been led by several progressive youths and students.

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[7]Jin Gyun Kim and Geun Sik Jeong, "Kwangju 5 Wol Minjung Hangjaengeui Sahoe Gyeongjejeok Baegyeong" [The Socio-Economic Background of the Kwangju Popular Uprising in May], in ICKHD, ed., *[Kwangju Popular Uprising in May]*, p. 99.

[8]D. U. Kim, [Contradictions of Korean Capitalism], p. 110.

[9]*Ibid.*, p. 101; and Hong Myeong Kim and Se Gyun Kim, "Kwangju 5 Wol Minjung Hangjaengeui Jeongae Gwajeonggwa Seonggyeok" [The Process and the Characteristics of the Kwangju Popular Uprising in May], in ICKHD, ed., *[Kwangju Popular Uprising in May]*, p. 132.

Consequently, the labor movement was feeble, and the relationship between labor and management in this region remained mostly patriarchal and authoritarian.

In conjunction with the arrest of the presidential hopeful of Kwangju, Kim Dae Jung,[10] and the brutal repression of demonstrations by the airborne troops, the workers and day laborers, as well as the students, were aroused by rumors that incited regionalism, originating from the regional backwardness. The armed struggle, the most extreme form of contradiction between the radical extra-official opposition forces and the hard-line military, occurred in Kwangju, which had been the center of the most underdeveloped region in South Korea. The armed struggle was supported by most segments of the population in Kwangju.

(2) PATH TOWARD MODEL 5

We have noted that the radical extra-official opposition forces were not tolerated by the hard-line military which had overwhelmed the roles of the political authorities. Now it is time to look at the path from model 1 to model 5, the destination model for no regime change. It should be pointed out that in general, the path through which model 1 may travel is determined in the sense that there is no other path but toward model 5, as explained in Chapter 1. The homeostatic character of the political system led model 1, which was still in an unstable status

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[10]He was accused of instigating student demonstrations and rebellion in Kwangju by the military. He had been sentenced to capital punishment by a court-martial on a charge of sedition. At the mercy of Chun, his sentence changed to a life sentence and to twenty years. Finally he was allowed to travel the United States for medical treatment in december 1982.

of a 'high' level of system stress, into model 5. This section will illustrate the process of the shift of the model after the Kwangju Popular Uprising.

The transformation of the model of relationship between the subsystems occurred by the following three means: first, the institutionalization of military domination through the military-dominated committee; second, the functional differentiation between the political authorities and the hard-line military; and finally, the disguising of the radical stance of the opposition forces.

Institutionalization of the Military Domination

On 31 May, four days after the complete repression of the resistance in Kwangju, the SCNSM was formed to institutionalize military domination.[11] Nominally, the SCNSM was an advisory and assistant organization to the president and a coordinating mechanism between the cabinet and the martial law command. However, the SCNSM was a kind of military revolutionary committee controlled by the officer group after a coup. The commander of the MSCA and the acting director of the KCIA, Lt. General Chun, was appointed as the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the SCNSM. Of the twenty-four members of the SCNSM, fourteen were generals on active duty.[12]

The SCNSM displaced the cabinet meeting and virtually became the

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[11]The establishment of the SCNSM had been examined by the MSCA officers since the meeting of commanders of the three military services on 16 May 1980, i.e., one day before the declaration of nationwide martial law. See J. Y. Park, [MSCA: Power Base of Chun Doo Hwan], p. 339.

[12]*Donga Yeongam* 1981, p. 116.

decision-making structure. Given that the legislature was dissolved and that nationwide martial law was imposed, the Standing Committee of the SCNSM supervised, controlled, and adjusted all the affairs of the legislature and the court as well as the administration.

The SCNSM announced four principles: consolidation of national security, overcoming of economic crisis, political development, establishment of national discipline through the purification of social illness (13 June). These principles were presented as new legitimating values of the military rule centered around General Chun. Based on these principles, the SCNSM initiated three measures so as to pave the way toward another authoritarian regime. First, the SCNSM punished the corrupt politicians for abusing their power. It forced nine persons who amassed wealth of 147 million dollars to contribute to the public welfare, and it deprived them of all public posts. The nine included the president of the DRP, Kim Jong Pil, and former KCIA director, Lee Hu Rak.[13] Second, the SCNSM conducted shake-ups of all sectors of society. Not only did it purge more than 300 officials of the KCIA, but also it ousted some 5,480 high ranking civil servants whom it accused of corruption or incompetence. It was remarkable that some of the officials were asked to leave for a simple reason: to give room to a new generation. Moreover, with the suggestion of the SCNSM, the Korean Newspapers Association and the Korean Broadcasters' Association purged over 400 editors and reporters, which comprised about 10% of the

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[13]*Korea Annual* 1981, p. 9.

nation's total.[14] Finally, it initiated the purification of so-called 'social criminals'. The committee mobilized the police and the army to arrest 40,000 persons and then sent them to prison or to the purification program in the military barracks, depending upon the classification of their crime.[15] Remarkably, such a purification campaign was similar to the case of Brazil. Shortly after the coup there in 1964, The High Command of the Revolution proceeded with a clean-up operation in the process of institutionalization of military rule: It purged many civilian bureaucrats and military personnel and tried thousands of people on the charge of crime "against the state, its property, and public or social order."[16]

Functional Differentiation

Few military officers in Asia and Latin America after a coup remained on active duty while controlling the process of decision-making; instead, they differentiated between the roles of the political authorities and those of the military by creating new formal authority structures. The process of functional differentiation of 1980 exactly repeated that on the eve of the Third Republic under Park. After he dominated the Military Revolutionary Committee, Park had made a draft of a new constitution, established a new grass-root party, i.e., the DRP,

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[14]Koon Woo Nam, *South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), p. 234.

[15]*Donga Yeongam* 1981, p. 116.

[16]Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp. 33-4.

and ran an election for the presidency.[17] Likewise, Chun accelerated revision of the constitution; meanwhile, the security agency of the military, which had been the power base of Chun, initiated the formation of an artificial multiparty system by taking advantage of the political ban of leading political figures. And then he ran an indirect election for the presidency.

With the closure of the National Assembly by the imposition of nationwide martial law in May, the revision of the constitution by the SCRC of the legislature automatically stopped. The CRC in the administration under Chun led the revision of the constitution. Of course, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the SCNSM, General Chun, guided the process of revision. On 11 June, he already expressed his view on the main content of the new constitution, in an interview with the president of *Gyeonghyang Sinmun*. The main points which attracted public attention were adoption of the presidential system and indirect election of the president.[18] In retrospect, this interview was simply a confirmation of the ongoing process of revision. The draft which was put to a national referendum on 22 October included the presidential system, indirect election of the president, and a single seven-year term for the presidency.

Meanwhile, the MSCA initiated the formation of the ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party, on a platform of national integrity,

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[17]Se-Jin Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 125-37.

[18]Cited in Su Eon Lee, "Je 5 Gonghwaguk Heonbeobeun Ireoke Mandeureojeodda" [This Is the Way the Constitution of the Fifth Republic Was Made], *Shindonga*, no. 6 (1986), p. 382.

democracy, justice, welfare, and national unification, while it was involved in the creation of other opposition parties.[19] Chun entrusted some colonels in the MSCA with these tasks.[20] But the establishment of the new multiparty system was possible only in accordance with the banning of the most prominent figures from political activity. The law for the political ban, entitled 'Special Law for the Renovation of the Political Climate', was passed by the newly formed temporary legislature, the Legislative Council for National Security (LCNS) (3 November). Some 568 politicians from the DRP, the NDP, and the *Yujeonghoe* became subject to the law.[21] Among them were the three Kims, i.e., Kim Dae Jung, Kim Yeong Sam, and Kim Jong Pil.

Consequently, the completion of the draft of the new constitution and the creation of the multiparty system[22] by legalization of the political ban contributed to the successful accomplishment of the functional differentiation between the military and the political authorities. Chun's close aides who had been active in the SCNSM and MSCA left their military posts and then took offices in the ruling party and the legislature in the new authoritarian regime.

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[19]*Ibid.*, p. 340.

[20] After Chun became the president while handing over the post of the commander of the MSCA to his classmate of the Military Academy, Roh Tae Woo, the colonels retired from active duty and pushed the process of creating the party. Later these colonels took core posts of the ruling party and staff of the president. See J. Y. Park, [MSCA: Power Base of Chun], p. 339.

[21]*Donga Yeongam* 1981, p. 126.

[22]Thanks to the multiparty system, in the national election of 1981 the Democratic Justice Party won only 35% of eligible votes but secured 55% of seats in the National Assembly.

The Disguised Opposition

In illustrating the path toward model 5, the shift in the stance of the extra-official opposition forces also should be noted. On the one hand, owing to the political ban and the formation of the multiparty system, the official opposition force, i.e., the opposition parties, became semiloyal to the newly emerging authoritarian regime. On the other hand, not only the repression of the Kwangju Popular Uprising and the following restrictive measures but also the specific legal mechanisms manacled the extra-official opposition forces such as the students and the labor force.

In order to restrict the activities of the workers, the LCNS passed five basic labor laws: the Labor-Management Council Law, the Labor Standard Law, the Labor Union Law, the Labor Dispute Settlement Law, and the Labor Committee Law (30 December). The labor laws were more restrictive than previous ones in order to exclude again the labor force which had been activated since the end of the 1970s. The laws allowed only company-level unions and prevented collective bargaining. The laws were intended to prevent intervention by third parties, such as the UIMs and the FKTU, while allowing only the administration's intervention.[23] Furthermore, the required number of members for the formation of a new union increased, so that it became more difficult to organize it.

The new labor laws were designed to weaken the role of the union and to dismantle even the previously formed weak linkage among the industrial unions, whereas they aimed at the consolidation of a

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[23]Frederic Deyo, Stephan Haggard, and Hagen Koo, "Labor in the Political Economy of East Asian Industrialization," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 19, no. 2 (April-June 1987), p. 47.

patrimonial labor-management relationship by emphasizing the role of the LMC.[24] The LMC consisted of an equal number of representatives from labor and management. It was supposed to deal with all matters for the peaceful solution of labor disputes with the exception of wages; however, it could not function ideally. On the one hand, management considered workers to be its subordinates and would not treat them as equal partners at the bargaining table. On the other hand, workers were well aware that administrative offices and security agencies would arbitrate on behalf of the interests of management in the case of disagreement on any issue under negotiation. Thus they did not conceive of the LMC as an institution through which they could achieve their aims effectively.[25]

At any rate, the implementation of these restrictive labor laws brought about a decrease in the membership of the unions which had peaked in 1979: from 1.10 million in 1979 to 0.82 million in 1981 and to 0.79 million in 1983.[26] Since the workers could not struggle through legal means, they became dependent upon the small group movements centered around the social meeting and the study group.

All these measures had striking similarities with those measures taken by the military regime in Argentina that emerged in 1976. Instead

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[24]CISJD, ed., *Beopgwa Minjuhwa [Law and Democratization]* (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1986), p. 169.

[25]Michael A. Launius, "The State and Industrial Labor in South Korea," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 16, no. 4 (1984), p. 7.

[26]Jang Jip Choi, *Hanguk Hyeondae Jeongchieui Gujowa Byeonhwa [The Structure of the Contemporary Korean Politics and Its Transformation]* (Seoul: GGachi, 1989), p. 204.

of incorporating the existing channels of the union into the authority structure through the mediation of 'functionaries', the new laws attempted to compartmentalize the union in order to deactivate the workers. For this reason, according to O'Donnell's criteria, the newly established authoritarian regime of 1980 in South Korea lost even the corporatist characteristic which had been common in the authoritarian regimes.[27]

The SCNSM took some measures to curb the opposition movement of the students as well. All student demonstrations were prohibited, and those students who had been previously active were expelled from schools. More importantly, the SCNSM adopted the quota system according to which one third of the incoming freshmen of 1980 would fail to graduate (30 July).[28] This measure was intended to stimulate students to compete for grades and to discourage them from involvement in the opposition movement.

As a reaction to the military repression in Kwangju and those restrictive measures, the students became more committed ideologically, while disguising their radical stance. Disappointed with the American approval of the military repression of the Kwangju Popular Uprising, anti-Americanism emerged among the students.[29] Meanwhile, the students

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[27]Cf. Guillermo A. O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," in James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 75.

[28]*Donga Ilbo*, 30 July 1980.

[29]Such anti-Americanism finally developed to a violence against the property of the United States. Some students set fire to the building of the United States International Communication Agency located in Busan in March 1982. The fact that Ambassador William H. Gleysteen and U.S.-Korea Combined Forces Commander General John Wickham had approved the

held hot debates on the opposition movement by the publication of books about the leading social force, the organization, and the strategy of struggle for a regime change. In other words, the students endeavored to formulate more concrete 'challenging values' in contrast with the legitimating values of the authoritarian regime than their precursors had done.

As a result, there was a remarkable shift in their viewpoint on the leading force of the opposition. The students no longer considered the middle class in a classical sense -- such as church leaders, political figures, and intellectuals -- to be the leading force of the opposition against the authoritarian regime. In the 1970s, the middle class had led the opposition movement and played as a care-provider of labor by representing the interests of the latter. According to the students in the early 1980s, however, the disadvantaged social forces such as the workers should strengthen themselves and serve as a driving force for a regime change.[30] This new perspective derived from a conclusion that an alliance dominated by the middle class could not bring about any significant change in the status of labor. In reality, the NADU, which had been the umbrella organization of the extra-official opposition forces during the period of turmoil in 1979 and 1980, mentioned the

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dispatching of an infantry division to Kwangju later provided evidence that the United States was deeply involved in the illegitimate use of military force. For details, see Samsung Lee, "Kwangju and America in Perspective," *Asian Perspective*, vol. 12, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 1988), pp. 69-122.

[30]Editorial Department of *Yeonse*, "80 Nyeondae Jeonbangi Undonge Daehan Pyeongga" [Evaluation on the Movement in the First Half of the 1980s], in Cheong Seok Kim, at al, *[Society in Korea during the 1980s]*, p. 203.

rights of the labor force and the farmers but virtually excluded them from the role of leading force for a regime transition. A similar case was seen in Brazil. In the process of democratic transition, the workers' specific concerns such as the right to organize and to strike were not achieved, even after their repeated alliances.[31] In accordance with the shift in the viewpoint on the leading force, the organization of the students' opposition movements changed.

However, the students showed diverging views on the strategy as to how the students should act. One group emphasized the students' alliance with labor, whereas the other group stressed the students' forefront struggle by raising political issues. Each group inherited two different traditions of previous student movements, 'gradual struggle' and 'all-out struggle' respectively, even though they agreed with one another on the significant role of the labor force. But it was obvious that student activism was curbed, not only because many students became workers while focusing on a close solidarity with other workers, but also because both groups got further serious blows by the security agencies in the 'Foggy Forest Incident' in December 1980 and the 'Academic Forest Incident' in August 1981.[32]

(3) CONCLUSION

This chapter has illustrated (1) the process by which the radical

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[31]Maria Helena Moreira Alves, "Interclass Alliances in the Opposition to the Military in Brazil: Consequences for the Transition Period," in Susan Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest*, pp. 278-98.

[32]The incidents were named by security agencies. Particularly, the Foggy Forest was named as such because there was no clear leadership of the movement.

extra-official opposition forces confronted the hard-line military which had overwhelmed the roles of the political authorities, and (2) the process of the transformation of the model of relationship between the subsystems. These processes portrayed the path from model 1 to model 5, the path which was the route toward another authoritarian regime.

The popular uprising in Kwangju represented the most extreme form of confrontation inherent in model 1 in the sense that it was an armed political struggle. It attracted our attention in the following two respects. On the one hand, the leading forces and the demands made in the uprising had commonality with those of the previous opposition movements. Among the elements of the opposition shortly before the declaration of nationwide martial law, the students and labor became the main participants while they demanded a democratic regime transition and disengagement of the military from politics. On the other hand, the development of the armed uprising in Kwangju can not only be attributed to the inhumane repression of civilians by the military forces but also to the incitement of regionalism which originated from the underdevelopment of the region. Because of the regional characteristic of the uprising, it did not show any evidence of class conflict. Rather, all the segments of the population were supportive. Nevertheless, the violent uprising provided the hard-line military with an opportunity to legitimate its establishment.

Given that the roles of political authorities were taken over by the hard-military, the latter's remaining concern was the institutionalization of its rule through the SCNSM and of the functional differentiation between the political authorities and the military. In

these processes, Chun made use of the tool of a 'purification' campaign, so as to eradicate political opponents and to legitimate his previous measures. Owing to the political ban of professional opposition figures and to the multiparty system, the official opposition became semiloyal to the newly established regime. On the other hand, with the restrictive control mechanisms, the extra-official opposition forces, such as the students and the labor force, disguised their radical stance temporarily, but they became more committed ideologically.

In this part, we have examined the transformation of model of relationships between the subsystems after Park. Following the generalization developed in Chapter 1, the question -- why the death of a dictatorial leader did not bring about a regime transition that was the fervent desire of the public -- is answered here. The death of the top leader at the time of a legitimacy crisis was a peculiar case; however, the dynamic processes of the authoritarian system after Park followed one of the diverging paths toward the destination model of no change of the regime. As a consequence, his death brought about the replacement of the political authorities only. The essential elements of the Yushin regime were maintained in the Fifth Republic. The structure of authority relations and their legitimating values remained intact.

PART IV

CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER 7. TOWARD A COMPARATIVE MODEL

This research has utilized the hypothetical deductive method, in an attempt to overcome the problems generated by the inductive method in explaining and comparing political realities. A generalization is not a reflection of facts but a logical and parsimonious statement that helps to illustrate empirical realities. However, the inductive method frequently fails to achieve such a generalization by falling into one of the following traps. One is that the inductive method may lead to a taxonomy by which one classifies empirical cases through the citation of appropriate referents. A serious weakness of the taxonomy is its inability to provide the means for explaining causalities and consequences of political phenomena. The other trap is the temptation of huge comparison.[1] This stems from the desire to search for increasingly finer comparisons. Insofar as our goal is to obtain the most economical and parsimonious generalization, the huge comparison obtained through multiplying cases yields only a paradoxical consequence: The larger the number of cases, the lesser the value of the generalization. The origin of the problem is the fallacious idea that a generalization may be achieved by the collection of facts.[2]

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[1]Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), p. 144.

[2]In this respect, Anatol Rapoport has used an analogy to refute such "hyperfactualism", as David Easton calls it. "The really profound understanding of [ocean] waves is quite independent of observing any real waves. For that matter, the most important waves in our lives are not even observable directly." See Rapoport, "Various Meanings of 'Theory'," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 52, no. 4 (December

Based on a critical view of the inductive method, this research has aimed for the development of a generalization concerning the dynamics of the authoritarian political system. This generalization was intended for the purposes of comparison. But it should be noted that comparison is not an simple investigation of similarities and differences. It involves two processes: (1) formulation of generalizations explaining logical relationships between the associated variables, and (2) the application of the generalization to individual cases. The order of these processes is essential for identifying where each case under comparison is located in the complex context of configuration. In this respect, the approach utilized here is different from the comparative method used in historical sociology, where an attempt is made to increase the visibility of particular and varying features of specific social structures through contrasting cases.[3]

The generalization stands on two axioms which are basic to the analysis of the political system: persistence and self-transformation. At first glance these appear to be contradictory, but in reality they are closely linked to one another. Whatever its form, the persistence of a political system depends upon the preservation of the essential variable, the production of binding decisions. When the political system is subject to a low level of stress, the homeostatic characteristic makes its persistence possible through adaptation. This

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1958), p. 988.

[3]Theda Skocpol, "Sociology's Historical Imagination," and "Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology," in Theda Skocpol, ed., *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 1 and pp. 369-70.

adaption for persistence may occur without significant change in the structure of the system. However, when a political system is under a high level of stress, this adaptation may or may not be accompanied by transformation in the form of the political system, i.e., regime change. Transformation of the regime is especially significant since it involves in a change in the mode or context by which members of the system interact. This research focused on this topic in general, and in particular how regimes change from authoritarian to democratic or do not change at all.

This research has postulated that regime change does not occur simply due to the erosion of legitimacy. The erosion of legitimacy, which finally leads to a critical limit, provides the condition for a regime change; however, it does not in itself bring about an automatic change. An intervening mechanism, meaning the relationship between the essential subsystems of the regime, decides the path toward either a democratic transition or no change. For this reason, there are divergent paths through which the authoritarian regime experiencing the legitimacy crisis may travel.

When we use the term legitimacy 'crisis', this does not simply mean a multiplication in the number of events challenging the existing regime, such as demonstrations, sit-ins, and protests. It involves qualitative shifts in the domain or object of opposition. Due to the fact that the legitimacy of the authoritarian system is based on passive support -- which may be derived either from free floating obedience or from the past economic performance of incumbent political authorities -- the legitimacy of the regime tends to be fragile and vulnerable from the

beginning. The fragile legitimacy can then shift to apathy and finally evolve into active opposition. Then the domain of opposition extends from the political authorities and the authority structure to all the elements of the regime, including its legitimating values. Such an extension of the domain of opposition was called the diversification of the object of opposition. Particularly, rejection of the legitimating values, which have been imposed by the incumbent political authorities, is significant for the development of a legitimacy crisis, since their rejection is usually accompanied by the emergence of challenging values.

During the period of the Yushin regime in South Korea, the major shift in the process of diversification of the object of opposition occurred after the national referendum and the declaration of PEM 9 in 1975. These two events of that year represented output failures by the political authorities in responding to the demand for repeal of the Yushin Constitution, the demand which basically meant alteration of the authority structure. With these output failures, there occurred a spill-over effect in the object of opposition. Extra-official opposition forces, in particular, challenged the legitimating values, economic development and national security, while also presenting their own arguments about how the values of their counterpart falsified realities, such as violation of human rights and inhumane treatment of the labor force. The denunciation of the legitimating values was further encouraged by the diplomatic strains with the United States at the end of the Yushin regime. The influence-buying lobby scandal, the issue of withdrawal of the U.S. ground troops, and the human rights issue revealed the vulnerability of national security as a specific

legitimating value.

What should be noted both analytically and empirically is that the legitimacy crisis cannot be reached by a mere manifestation of tension or a dilemma of the ruling coalition between the military based bureaucrats and domestic and foreign capitalists. Such a dilemma or tension has been posited by one group of scholars of the studies on Latin America, e.g., O'Donnell and Evans. Tension might be conducive to disturbance of the economy, but any concrete logical linkage between tension and the legitimacy crisis has not yet been presented. Also from an empirical standpoint, there is little evidence to suggest that the bourgeoisie or the middle class played a major role in the development of the crisis, both in Latin America and South Korea.[4]

Thus, when we employ the concept of crisis, along with the diversification of the object of opposition, we should also account for the politicization and activation of the labor force. In an authoritarian political system, the exclusion of labor is crucial in the process of the legitimation of the regime, since the labor force is one of the most essential segments of the society for the achievement of the legitimating value, economic development. For this reason, however, its activation through forming an alliance with other social forces brings the most fatal threat to the legitimacy of the regime.

In South Korea's authoritarian regime, the labor force became activated through solidarity and alliance with other extra-official opposition forces, particularly the church. This solidarity and

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[4]Cf. Jose Casanova, "Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain's Transition to Democracy," Social Research, vol. 50, no. 4 (Winter 1983), pp. 941-2.

alliance were needed by the labor force because of the exclusionary corporatist policy of the political authorities. The latter controlled labor by legal mechanisms which were intended to encapsulate the unions into their authority structure through functionaries at various levels of their hierarchy. Without solidarity and alliance, labor could not become activated, since it was segmented and divided along the lines of education and gender. The syndrome of a legitimacy crisis appeared when an alliance arose between opposition forces as a whole -- the previously existing alliances centered around the NADU, the solidarity between the church and labor, and the NDP. Finally, the crisis brought about the death of Park and the collapse of the authority structure centered around him in October of 1979.

Now let us look at the model of relationships during the legitimacy crisis. The stance of the opposition is already decided according to the means of expression the allied opposition forces take. In contrast, the stances of the political authorities and of the military, both of which form a ruling block, will be dependent upon how they conceive the given situation. In turn, their conception of the situation originates from the authority relations between them: how the roles are differentiated between the two subsystems and how each of them influences one another. Unfortunately, we cannot generalize the relations, since each authoritarian regime follows its own unique road.

If one of the two subsystems within the ruling block predominates over the other, the stances taken by each of them are compatible with one another. If not then a schism may arise between them. Some scholars of Latin American authoritarian regimes have focused on this

schism, calling it 'decomposition of the governing block' or 'internal disunity of the state apparatus'. They have postulated that in the case of popular protest, the military's desertion of the ruling block is the critical determinant of a successful regime change.[5] This postulate might be borne in mind with respect to the specific interrelationship between the subsystems, which is same as that of model 3 in this research: the non-conciliatory political authorities, the soft-line military, and the radical opposition. Here the stance of the military is soft because it is concerned about unity and prestige and thus can yield some prerogatives while also responding to the demands of the opposition.

However, their postulate has a flaw. It may lead to an over-generalization, namely that the schism in the case of popular protest is the determinant for a regime change. As opposed to this generalization, we should note that the causality of a regime change (or no change) is not single but several because the interaction between subsystems is relational. A schism between the political authorities and the military may also appear when the hard-line military becomes estranged from the conciliatory political authorities, as in model 2. This is exemplified by South Korea shortly after the death of Park.

Attempting to avoid such over-generalization, this research has sought to specify generalizations about the model of relationships and

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[5]For instance, Susan Eckstein has said that: "Although prolonged protest movements may in themselves undermine state legitimacy, successful extra-legal seizures of power are generally contingent on internal disunity within the state apparatus. Military desertion has been critical to revolutionary victories." See, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America," in Susan Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest*, pp. 47-8.

of the divergent paths which an authoritarian regime under a legitimacy crisis may follow. Through the generalizations we have understood that model 8 will lead to a regime change and that model 5 will not. For this reason, O'Donnell and Schmitter may be correct to note that the moderate pact between the three subsystems, as in model 8, will be 'desirable' for a stable regime transition.[6] But our goal has been something more than merely to ascertain what model is desirable in a normative sense. The generalization here is comprehensive enough to show by what mechanism a legitimacy crisis 'can' or 'cannot' bring about a regime change.

This research leaves some agendas for further studies. First, the weight (or power) of subsystems, particularly that of ruling block subsystems like the military and the political authorities, has to be integrated into the generalization. Since the weight will decide which specific path to take out of two possibilities at the moment of schism between the two subsystems, the weight is a determining factor for the course of the dynamics. Second, the future of model 5 has to be elaborated. Considering that even model 5 may not remain constant in the long run, it contains some possible means for the alteration of the characteristics of the authoritarian regime. These means may be an electoral realignment or change in the party system which is initiated by the political authorities.

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[6]Guillermo A. O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 39.

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